

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

Nihil Obstat.

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CENS. THEOL.

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THE
"SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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MARIÆ IMMACULATÆ

SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

ENCYCLICAL LETTER
OF
OUR HOLY FATHER
BY DIVINE PROVIDENCE
POPE LEO XIII.
ON
THE RESTORATION OF CHRISTIAN
PHILOSOPHY,
ACCORDING TO THE MIND OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE ANGELIC DOCTOR

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*To His Venerable Brethren, all the Patriarchs, Primates,
Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World, in
favour and communion with the Apostolic See,*

POPE LEO XIII.

VENERABLE BRETHREN,

Health and Apostolic Benediction.

The Only-begotten Son of the Eternal Father appeared on earth to bring salvation and the light of the wisdom of God to the human race. As He was ascending to Heaven He bestowed on the world a blessing, truly great and wondrous, when, commanding His Apostles to 'go and teach all nations,'* He left a Church, founded by Himself, as the universal and supreme mistress of all people. Man, whom the truth had set free, was to be kept safe by the truth. Indeed, the fruits of heavenly doctrine, by which salvation was gained for man, could not have endured for long unless Christ our Lord had set up a perpetual teaching authority (*magisterium*) for the instruction of souls in the faith. This Church, then, not only built on the promises of its Divine Author, but following in His love, has kept His commands. She has always looked to one end, and desired it with great desire ; that is, to teach the true religion and wage ceaseless war with error. For this there have been the watchful labours of Bishops, each in his own place ; and for this Councils have made laws and decrees. More than all, for this there has been the daily anxiety of the Roman Pontiffs. They are the successors of Blessed Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, in his Primacy, and therefore it is their right and

* Matt. xxviii. 19.

their duty to teach the brethren, and confirm them in the faith.

Now, the Apostle warns us that the faithful of Christ are often deceived in mind 'by philosophy and vain deceit,'* and that thus the sincerity of faith is corrupted in men. For this reason the Supreme Pastors of the Church have always held that it is part of their office to advance, with all their power, knowledge truly so called ; but at the same time to watch with the greatest care that all human learning shall be imparted according to the rule of the Catholic faith. Especially is this true of 'philosophy,' on which the right treatment of other sciences depends in great measure. We Ourselves spoke to you shortly of this, among other things, Venerable Brothers, when first We addressed you all by an Encyclical Letter. Now, by the importance of this matter, and by the state of the times, We are forced again to write to you, that you may so organize the course of philosophical studies as to insure their perfect correspondence with the gift of Faith, and also their agreement with the dignity of human knowledge.

If anyone look carefully at the bitterness of our times, and if, further, he consider earnestly the cause of those things that are done in public and in private, he will discover with certainty the fruitful root of the evils which are now overwhelming us, and of the evils which we greatly fear. The cause he will find to consist in this—evil teaching about things, human and divine, has come forth from the schools of philosophers ; it has crept into all the orders of the State ; and it has been received with the common applause of very many. Now, it has been implanted in man by Nature to follow reason as the guide of his actions, and therefore, if the understanding go wrong in anything, the will easily follows. Hence it comes about that wicked opinions in the understanding, flow into human actions and make them bad. On the other hand, if the mind of man be healthy, and strongly grounded in solid and true principles, it will assuredly be the source of great blessings,

* Col. ii. 8.

both as regards the good of individuals and as regards the common weal.

We do not, indeed, attribute to human philosophy such force and authority as to judge it sufficient for the utter shutting out and uprooting of all errors. When the Christian religion was first established by the wondrous light of Faith shed abroad, 'not in the persuasive words of human wisdom,* but in showing of the Spirit and power,' the whole world was restored to its primeval dignity. So also now, chiefly from the almighty power and help of God, we may hope that the darkness of error will be taken away from the minds of men, and that they will repent. But we must not despise or undervalue those natural helps which are given to man by the kindness and wisdom of God, Who strongly and sweetly orders all things; and it stands to reason that a right use of philosophy is the greatest of these helps. For God did not give the light of reason in vain to the soul of man, nor does the superadded light of Faith quench, or even lessen, the strength of the understanding. Its effect is far from this. It perfects the understanding, gives it new strength, and makes it fit for greater works. The very nature of the providence of God Himself, therefore, makes it needful for us to seek a safeguard in human knowledge when we strive to bring back the people to Faith and salvation. The records of antiquity bear witness that this method, both probable and wise, was used habitually by the most illustrious Fathers of the Church. They, in truth, were wont to give to reason offices neither few nor small; and these the great Augustine has summed up very shortly: 'Attributing to this science . . . that by which the life-giving Faith . . . is begotten, nourished, guarded, and strengthened.'

In the first place, then, if philosophy be rightly and wisely used, it is able in a certain measure to pave and to guard the road to the true Faith; and is able, also, to prepare the minds of its followers in a fitting way for the receiving of revelation. Hence it has not untruly been called by the

* 1 Cor. ii. 4.

ancients 'an education leading to the Christian Faith,' 'a prelude and help of Christianity,' 'a schoolmaster for the Gospel.'

In truth, the loving-kindness of God, with regard to the things concerning Himself, has not only made known by the light of Faith many truths beyond the reach of the human understanding, but has also revealed some which are not altogether beyond the power of reason to find out. Such truths, when the authority of God is thus added, become known to all both at once and without any mixture of error. This being so, certain truths, either divinely revealed to us for our belief, or bound up closely with the doctrine of the Faith, were known to wise men among the Gentiles, who were guided only by the light of natural reason. By fitting arguments they vindicated and demonstrated these truths. St. Paul says : 'The invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made ; His eternal power also and divinity.' Again : 'The Gentiles, who have not the law,' nevertheless 'show the work of the law written in their hearts.'

It is opportune, therefore, in a high degree to use, for the good and the advantage of revealed truth, these other truths that were known even to wise heathens ; for thus human wisdom, and the very testimony of the adversaries, give their witness to the Catholic Faith. Further, it is plain that this way of treating the question is not a thing newly devised, but an ancient way very much used by the holy Fathers of the Church. Moreover, these venerable witnesses and guardians of holy traditions see a kind of form of this, and almost a type of it, in one action of the Hebrews ; who, as they were going out of Egypt, were commanded to take with them vessels of silver and of gold, with precious garments of the Egyptians. This was done that, by a use suddenly changed, the riches which had ministered to superstition and to rites of ignominy might be dedicated to the service of the true God. Gregory of Neocæsaræa praises Origen for this very reason, that, skilfully gathering together

much of the teaching of the Gentiles for the defence of Christian wisdom, and for the destruction of superstition, he used these things as weapons taken from the enemy, and with wondrous power hurled them back. Both Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa approve and praise this manner of teaching in Basil the Great. So also Jerome greatly commends the same thing in Quadratus, a disciple of the Apostles ; in Aristides, in Justin, in Irenæus, and in very many others. Augustine also says : ‘ Do we not see how Cyprian, that doctor of great sweetness and that martyr of great blessedness, was laden with gold and silver and raiment when he went forth from Egypt ? Was it not so with Lactantius, with Victorinus, Optatus, and Hilary ? Not to speak of the living, was it not so with countless Greeks ? ’ If, then, natural reason produced so rich a crop of learning as this before it was fertilized by the power and working of Christ, much more abundant will be its harvests now, when the grace of the Saviour renews and increases the inborn powers of the mind of man. Is there, indeed, anyone who does not see that a plain and easy road is opened to the Faith by philosophy such as this ?

The usefulness, however, which springs from such a way of studying philosophy is not confined within these limits ; for in truth severe reproof is given, in the words of the wisdom of God, to the foolishness of those men who, ‘ by these good things that are seen, could not understand Him that is ; neither, by attending to the works, have acknowledged (Him) who was the workman.’

In the first place, then, this great and glorious fruit is gathered from human reason—namely, that it demonstrates the existence of God : ‘ By the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby.’

In the next place, reason shows that God, in a way belonging only to Himself, excels by the sum of all perfections—that is, by an infinite wisdom, from which nothing can be hidden ; and also by a supreme justice which no

affection of evil can touch. Hence reason proves that God is not only true, but the very Truth itself, which cannot deceive or be deceived. Further, it is a clear consequence from this that the human reason obtains for the word of God full belief and authority.

In like manner reason declares that the evangelical doctrine has shone as the light from its very beginning, by signs and miracles which are infallible proofs of infallible truth; and that therefore they who receive the Faith by the Gospel do not act rashly, as if they had 'followed cunningly devised fables,' but, by an obedience that is altogether reasonable, submit their understanding and their judgment to the authority of God.

Further, not less than these things in value is it that reason clearly shows us the truth about the Church instituted by Christ. That Church, as the Vatican Synod decreed—'because of the wonderful way in which it spreads; because of its great holiness and inexhaustible fruitfulness in all places; because of its Catholic unity and invincible stability—is in itself a great and perpetual motive of credibility, and an unanswerable argument for its own Divine legation.'

The foundations, then, having been laid in the most solid way, there is needed, further, a use of philosophy, both perpetual and manifold, in order that Sacred Theology may assume and put on the nature, habit, and character of true science. For in this noblest kind of learning it is above everything necessary that the parts of heavenly doctrine, being many and different, should be gathered together, as it were, into one body. Thus they are united by a union of harmony among themselves, all the parts being fittingly arranged, and derived from their own proper principles. Lastly, all of these parts, and each of them, must be strengthened by unanswerable arguments suited to each case.

Nor must we pass by in silence, or reckon of little account, that fuller knowledge of our belief, and, as far as may be, that clearer understanding of the mysteries of the faith

which Augustine and other Fathers praised, and laboured to attain, and which the Vatican Synod itself decreed to be very fruitful. Such knowledge and understanding are certainly acquired more fully and more easily by those who, to integrity of life and study of the faith, join a mind that has been disciplined by philosophical culture. Specially is this so since the same Vatican Synod teaches that we ought to seek for understanding of holy dogmas of that kind 'both from the analogy of the things which naturally are known, and also from the way in which the mysteries themselves are related to one another, and also to the last end of man.'

Lastly, it pertains to philosophical discipline to guard with religious care all truths that come to us by Divine tradition, and to resist those who dare to attack them. Now, as regards this point, the praise of philosophy is great, in that it is reckoned a bulwark of the faith, and as a strong defence of religion. 'The doctrine of our Saviour,' as Clement of Alexandria bears witness, 'is indeed perfect in itself, and has need of nothing, forasmuch as it is the power and the wisdom of God. But Greek philosophy, though it does not by its approach make the truth more powerful, has yet been called a fit hedge and ditch for the vineyard, because it weakens the arguments of sophists against the truth, and wards off the crafty tricks of those by whom the truth is attacked.'

In fact, as the enemies of the Catholic name borrow their warlike preparations from philosophic method, when they begin their attacks on religion, so the defenders of the science of God borrow many weapons from the stores of philosophy, by which to defend the dogmas of revelation. Again, we must count it no small victory for the Christian Faith, that human reason powerfully and promptly wards off those very weapons of the enemy which have been got together by the skill of the same human reason for purposes of harm. St. Jerome, writing to Magnus, shows how the Apostle of the Gentiles himself adopted this kind of argument. 'Paul, the leader of the Christian army and the unanswered speaker,

pleading a cause for Christ, turns skilfully even a chance inscription into an argument for the faith. From the true David he had learnt indeed how to pluck the weapon from the hands of his enemies, and how to cut off the head of Goliath in his greatest pride with his own sword.'

Nay, more ; the Church herself not only advises Christian teachers, but commands them to draw this safeguard from philosophy. For the fifth Lateran Council decreed that 'every assertion contrary to a truth of enlightened faith is altogether false, because the truth cannot possibly contradict the truth': and then it commands doctors of philosophy to apply themselves studiously to the refutation of fallacious arguments ; for St. Augustine says : 'If any reason be given against the authority of the Holy Scriptures, then, however subtle it may be, it deceives by its likeness to the truth ; for true it cannot possibly be.'

But if philosophy has to be found equal to the work of bringing forth such precious fruits as We have mentioned, it must, above everything, take care never to wander from the path trodden by the venerable antiquity of the Fathers, and approved in the Vatican Synod by the solemn suffrage of authority. It is plainly seen that we must accept many truths in the supernatural order which far surpass the power of any intellect. The human reason, therefore, conscious of its own weakness, must not dare to handle things greater than itself ; nor to deny these truths. Again, it must not measure them by its own strength, or interpret them at its own will. Rather let it receive them in the fulness and humility of Faith ; reckoning this its greatest honour, that by the goodness of God it is allowed as a handmaid and servant to be busied about heavenly doctrines, and in a certain measure to reach them.

In those heads of doctrine, however, which the human understanding naturally can take in, it is clearly just that philosophy should use its own method, its own principles, and its own arguments : yet not so as to seem to draw itself away with audacity from the authority of God. So, also, when it is plain that things known to us by revelation are

most certainly true, and that the arguments brought against the Faith are not in accord with right reason, the Catholic philosopher should bear in mind that he will violate the rights both of Faith and reason, if he embrace any conclusion which he understands to be contrary to revealed doctrine.

We know indeed that there are to be found men who, exalting too highly the powers of human nature, contend that the understanding of man falls from its native dignity when it becomes subject to Divine authority, and that being thus bound, as it were, in a yoke of slavery, it is greatly retarded and hindered from reaching the heights of truth and excellence. Such teaching as that is full of error and falsehood. The end of it is that men, in the height of folly and sinful thanklessness, reject all higher truths. They deliberately cast away the Divine blessings of faith, from which the streams of all good flow, even to civil society. Now, the mind of man is shut up and held in certain bounds, and narrow enough those boundaries are. The consequence is that it falls into many mistakes and is ignorant of many things. On the other hand, the Christian Faith, resting as it does on the authority of God, is the certain teacher of truth. He who follows this guidance is neither entangled in the nets of error nor tossed about on the waves of doubt. Hence the best philosophers are they who join philosophical study with the obedience of the Christian Faith. Then the brightness of Christian truths falls on the mind, and by that brightness the understanding itself is helped. This takes nothing from the dignity of the reason ; nay, rather, it adds to the reason a great deal of grandeur and subtlety and strength.

Worthily and most fruitfully do we use the keenness of the understanding when we set ourselves to refute opinions against the Faith, and to prove those things which agree with it. For in disproving errors we ascertain their causes, and then show the falsity of the arguments by which they are bolstered up ; while in proving truths we use the force of the reasons by which they are demonstrated with certainty, and by which all prudent men are persuaded. If,

then, anyone deny that the riches of the mind are increased and its powers extended by studies and arguments such as these, he must of necessity contend absurdly that the discrimination of truth and falsehood does not in any way help towards intellectual advancement. Rightly, therefore, does the Vatican Synod mention in the following words the great benefits which are received by Faith from reason : ' Faith frees the reason from error, and guards it, and instructs it with a manifold knowledge.' If, then, man were wise, he would not blame Faith as being hostile to reason and natural truths. Rather he would give hearty thanks to God and rejoice greatly that, among so many causes of ignorance and in the midst of such floods of error, the most holy Faith shines brightly on him ; for, like a friendly star, that Faith points out to him the harbour of truth, so that he can have no fear of going out of his course.

If, then, Venerable Brothers, you look back at the history of philosophy, you will see that all the words which We have spoken are approved by the facts. Certainly, among the ancient philosophers, living without the Faith, they who were reckoned the wisest erred most harmfully in many things. Though they taught the truth about some things, yet you know how often they taught that which was false and absurd. You know how many uncertain things and doubtful things they handed down about the true nature of the Godhead, the first beginning of creation, the government of the world, God's knowledge of the future, the cause and principle of evil, the last end of man, everlasting beatitude, virtues and vices, as also about other subjects, of which a true and certain knowledge is above everything necessary for man.

On the other hand, the first Fathers and Doctors of the Church understood clearly from the counsel of the will of God that the restorer of human knowledge is Christ, who is the ' power of God and the wisdom of God,' and ' in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.' They undertook to examine thoroughly the books

of these wise men of old, and to compare their opinions with the teaching of Revelation. With prudent choice they accepted all the true words and wise thoughts with which they met ; but the rest they either set right or cast utterly away. As God, in His careful foresight for the defence of His Church against the rage of tyrants, raised up the martyrs, very strong and lavish of their mighty souls ; so against philosophers, falsely so called, and against heretics, He raised up men great in wisdom to defend even by the help of human reason the treasure of revealed truth. From the very beginning of the Church, indeed, Catholic doctrine has found enemies most hostile to it, who have derided the dogmas and teachings of Christians. They have laid down such doctrines as these : That there are many gods ; that the matter of which the world is made has neither beginning nor cause ; that the course of events is governed by a certain blind force and inevitable necessity ; and that it is not ruled by the counsel of the providence of God. Wise men, whom we call Apologists, have in due course attacked these teachers of insane doctrine, and, with Faith for their guide, have drawn arguments from human wisdom itself. They have in this way proved that one God, highest in every kind of perfection, is to be worshipped ; that all things have been made out of nothing by His almighty power ; that they are all sustained by His wisdom ; and that each one is directed and moved towards its own end.

Among these, St. Justin Martyr claims for himself the first place. Having frequented the most celebrated schools of learning among the Greeks that he might try what they were, he learned, as he himself acknowledges, that he could drink in the truth with full mouth only from revealed doctrines. These he embraced with all the eagerness of his soul ; stripped off the calumnies that hung round them ; defended them vigorously and fully before the Roman Emperors ; and reconciled with them many sayings of the Greek philosophers. In that time the same work was also done exceedingly well by Quadratus, Aristides, Hermias, and Athenagoras. In the same cause glory not less than

theirs was gained by the Bishop of Lyons, Irenæus, the invincible martyr. He refuted with power the wicked teaching of the Easterns, scattered as it was by the help of the Gnostics throughout the bounds of the Roman Empire. St. Jerome says of him: 'He explained . . . the beginnings of heresies one by one, and pointed out from what fountains of the philosophers they flowed.'

Again, there is no one who does not know the disputations of Clement of Alexandria, which the same St. Jerome thus mentions with honour: 'Is there anything that is not learned in them? Is there anything not drawn from the depth of philosophy?' He himself also wrote books of an incredible variety, which are of the greatest use in building up a history of philosophy, in rightly exercising the art of dialectics, and in establishing the harmony that exists between reason and faith. Origen followed him, renowned among the teachers of the Alexandrine school, and deeply learned in the doctrine of the Greeks and the Easterns. He wrote a very great number of books, and spent much labour upon them. Wondrously, just at the right time, they explained the Holy Scriptures, and threw light on our sacred dogmas. It is true that these books, at least in their present state, are not altogether free from errors; yet they embrace great force of teaching, by which natural truths are increased in number and in strength. Tertullian, too, fights against the heretics by the authority of Scripture. Then changing his weapons, he fights against the philosophers with arguments of philosophy. With so much acuteness and learning does he refute them, that he answers them openly and confidently: 'Neither about science nor about learning are we, as you think, on an equal footing.' Arnobius also in his books against the Gentiles, and Lactantius in his Institutions especially, strive earnestly with like eloquence and strength to persuade men to accept the dogmas and commands of Catholic wisdom. They do not overthrow philosophy, according to the way of the Academy; but partly by their own weapons, and partly by weapons taken from the agreement of philosophers

among themselves, they convince them. The great Athanasius and Chrysostom, first of preachers, have left writings about the soul of man, about the Attributes of God, and other questions of the greatest moment. These in the judgment of all are so excellent that it seems as if scarcely anything could be added to their subtlety and exhaustiveness. Not to be too prolix in mentioning them one by one, we add to the number of these most illustrious men of whom we have spoken the great Basil and the two Gregories. From Athens, then the home of the highest culture, they went forth equipped with the panoply of philosophy. Having acquired all their riches of learning by most ardent study, they used them to refute the heretic, and to build up the faithful.

But it is Augustine who seems to have borne away the palm from all. With a towering intellect, and a mind full to overflowing of sacred and profane learning, he fought resolutely against all the errors of his age, with the greatest faith and equal knowledge. What teaching of philosophy did he pass over? Nay, what was there into which he did not search thoroughly? Did he not do this when he was explaining to believers the deepest mysteries of the Faith, and defending them against the furious attacks of the adversaries? or when, after destroying the fictions of Academics and Manichæans, he made safe the foundations of human knowledge and their certainty, searching out also to the furthest point the reason and origin and causes of those evils by which man is oppressed? With what copiousness and with what subtlety did he write about the angels, and the soul, and the human mind; about the will and free-will; about religion and the blessed life; about time and eternity; about the nature of all changeable bodies! Afterwards, among the Easterns, John of Damascus followed in the footsteps of Basil and Gregory Nazianzen; while in the West, Boethius and Anselm, setting forth the doctrines of Augustine, greatly enriched the domain of philosophy.

Then the Doctors of the Middle Ages, whom we call Scholastics, set themselves to do a work of very great

magnitude. There are rich and fruitful crops of doctrine scattered everywhere in the mighty volumes of the Holy Fathers. The aim of the Scholastics was to gather these together diligently, and to store them up, as it were, in one place, for the use and convenience of those that come after.

What the origin of the Scholastic discipline was, what were also its characteristics and its value, it will be well, Venerable Brothers, to set forth more fully here in the words of a man of the greatest wisdom—our predecessor Sixtus V.: 'By the Divine gift of Him, Who alone gives the spirit of knowledge and wisdom and understanding, and Who, through the ages, according to her needs, enriches His Church with new gifts, and surrounds her with new safeguards, our ancestors, being men exceedingly wise, developed the study of Scholastic Theology. There were especially two glorious Doctors, teachers of this famous science—that is, the angelic St. Thomas, and the seraphic St. Bonaventure. With surpassing abilities, with ceaseless study, with laborious toil and long watchings, they worked it out and adorned it. They arranged it in the very best way, unfolded it brilliantly in many methods, and then handed it on to their successors.'

The knowledge and the exercise of this science of salvation have certainly always brought the very greatest help to the Church; whether it be for the right understanding and interpretation of Scripture, or for reading and expounding the Fathers with greater safety and profit, or for laying bare and answering different errors and heresies. This doctrine flows from the brimming fountain of the Sacred Scriptures, of the Supreme Pontiffs, and of Holy Fathers and Councils. Now, indeed, in these last days, it is in the highest degree necessary to refute heresies and confirm the dogmas of the Catholic faith. For now have come those dangerous times of which the Apostle speaks. Now men, blasphemous, proud, deceivers, go from bad to worse, wandering from the truth themselves and leading others into error. These words might seem to embrace only the

Scholastic Theology ; but it is plain that they are also to be taken in reference to philosophy and its praise.

Scholastic Theology has splendid gifts, which make it very formidable to enemies of the truth ; as the same Pontiff tells us. ‘ It has,’ he says, ‘ an apt coherence of facts and causes, connected with one another ; an order and arrangement, like soldiers drawn up in battle array ; definitions and distinctions very lucid ; unanswerableness of argument and acute disputations. By these the light is divided from the darkness, and truth from falsehood. The lies of heretics, wrapped up in many wiles and fallacies, being stripped of their coverings, are bared and laid open.’ But these great and wondrous gifts can only be found in a right use of that philosophy which the masters of Scholasticism, of set purpose and with wise counsel, were everywhere accustomed to use even in their theological disputations.’

Moreover, it is the proper and singular gift of Scholastic theologians to bind together human knowledge and Divine knowledge in the very closest bonds. For this reason, truly the theology in which they excelled could never have gained so much honour and praise from the judgment of men as it did, if they had used a system of philosophy which was maimed, or imperfect, or shallow.

Now far above all other Scholastic Doctors towers Thomas Aquinas, their master and prince. Cajetan says truly of him : ‘ So great was his veneration for the ancient and sacred Doctors that he may be said to have gained a perfect understanding of them all.’ Thomas gathered together their doctrines like the scattered limbs of a body, and moulded them into a whole. He arranged them in so wonderful an order, and increased them with such great additions, that rightly and deservedly he is reckoned a singular safeguard and glory of the Catholic Church. His intellect was docile and subtle ; his memory was ready and tenacious ; his life was most holy ; and he loved the truth alone. Greatly enriched as he was with the science of God and the science of man, he is likened to the sun ; for he warmed the whole earth with the fire of his holiness, and

filled the whole earth with the splendour of his teaching. There is no part of philosophy which he did not handle with acuteness and solidity. He wrote about the laws of reasoning ; about God and incorporeal substances ; about man and other things of sense ; and about human acts and their principles. What is more, he wrote on these subjects in such a way that in him not one of the following perfections is wanting : a full selection of subjects ; a beautiful arrangement of their divisions ; the best method of treating them ; certainty of principles ; strength of argument ; perspicuity and propriety in language ; and the power of explaining deep mysteries.

Beside these questions and the like, the Angelic Doctor, in his speculations, drew certain philosophical conclusions as to the reasons and principles of created things. These conclusions have the very widest reach, and contain, as it were, in their bosom the seeds of truths wellnigh infinite in number. These have to be unfolded with most abundant fruits in their own time by the teachers who come after him. As he used his method of philosophizing, not only in teaching the truth, but also in refuting error, he has gained this prerogative for himself. With his own hand he vanquished all errors of ancient times ; and still he supplies an armoury of weapons which brings us certain victory in the conflict with falsehoods ever springing up in the course of years.

Moreover, carefully distinguishing reason from Faith, as is right, and yet joining them together in a harmony of friendship, he so guarded the rights of each, and so watched over the dignity of each, that, as far as man is concerned, reason can now hardly rise higher than she rose, borne up in the flight of Thomas ; and Faith can hardly gain more helps and greater helps from reason than those which Thomas gave her.

For these causes, especially in former days, men of the greatest learning and worthy of the highest praise both in theology and philosophy, having sought out with incredible diligence the immortal writings of Thomas, surrendered

themselves to his angelic wisdom, not so much to be taught by his words, as to be altogether nourished by them. It is plain also that nearly all founders and lawgivers of religious Orders have bidden their children study the doctrines of Thomas, and very religiously adhere to them, giving a caution that it will be allowed to none to deviate ever so little from the footsteps of so great a man. To pass by the Dominican family which, as it were, by a right of its own, glories in this greatest of teachers, the statutes of each Order testify that Benedictines, Carmelites, Augustinians, the Society of Jesus, and many other holy Orders, are bound by this law.

Now our mind flies with great delight to those very celebrated universities and schools which formerly flourished in Europe: such as Paris, Salamanca, Alcala, Douai, Toulouse, Louvain, Padua, Bologna, Naples, Coimbra, and very many others. No one is ignorant that the reputation of these universities grew by age; that their opinions were asked when weighty issues were at stake; and that those opinions had great influence everywhere. But it is also well known that, in those illustrious abodes of human learning, Thomas reigned as a ruler in his own kingdom. The minds of all, both teachers and hearers, with wondrous consent found rest in the guidance and authority of one Angelic Doctor.

But further—and this is of greater importance—the Roman Pontiffs, our predecessors, bore witness to the wisdom of Thomas Aquinas with praises singularly strong, and with most abundant testimonies. Clement VI., Nicholas V., Benedict XIII., and others, testify that the whole Church was enlightened by his admirable teaching. Pius V. acknowledges that heresies are confounded and exposed and scattered by his doctrine, and that by it the whole world is daily freed from pestilent errors. Others, with Clement XII., say that most fruitful blessings have flowed from his writings on the whole Church. They affirm also that the same honour has to be given to him as to the greatest Doctors of the Church, such as Gregory and Am-

brose, and Augustine and Jerome. Others did not hesitate to set forth St. Thomas as a standard and teacher to universities and great schools of learning, saying that they might safely follow him. On this point the words of Blessed Urban V. to the University of Toulouse seem to be most worthy of mention: 'It is our will, and by the authority of these letters we enjoin on you, that you follow the doctrine of Blessed Thomas as true and Catholic, and strive to unfold it with your whole strength.' This example of Urban was followed by Innocent XII. in the University of Louvain, and by Benedict XIV. in the Dionysian College of Granada. To these judgments of the Pontiffs about Thomas there is added, as a crown, the testimony of Innocent VI.: 'His doctrine above all other doctrine, with the one exception of the Holy Scriptures, has such a propriety of words, such a method of explanation, such a truth of opinions, that no one who holds it will ever be found to have strayed from the path of truth; whereas anyone who has attacked it has always been suspected as to the truth.'

Moreover, Œcumenical Councils, made glorious by the flower of wisdom gathered from the whole world, always strove with great care to give singular honour to Thomas Aquinas. In the Councils of Lyons, of Vienne, of Florence, of the Vatican, you may say that Thomas was present at the deliberations and decrees of the Fathers, and almost that he presided at them, contending against the errors of Greeks and heretics and rationalists, with a power from which there was no escape, and with a most auspicious result.

But we now come to the greatest glory of Thomas—a glory which is altogether his own, and shared with no other Catholic Doctor. In the midst of the Council of Trent, the assembled Fathers so willing it, the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas lay open on the altar, with the Holy Scriptures and the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, that from it might be sought counsel and reasons and answers.

Lastly, another crown seems to have been kept for this peerless man—that is, the way in which he extorts homage,

praise, and admiration even from the enemies of the Catholic name. It is well known that there have not been wanting heresiarchs who openly said that, if the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas could only be got rid of, they could 'easily give battle to other Catholic Doctors, and overcome them, and so scatter the Church.' A vain hope indeed, but no vain testimony!

For these reasons, Venerable Brothers, so often as We look at the goodness, the force, and the exceedingly great usefulness of that philosophical doctrine in which our fathers took such delight, We judge that it has been rashly done when this doctrine has not always, and everywhere, been held in its own rightful honour. Especially do We judge this to be the case, since it is plain that long use and the judgment of the greatest men, and, what is more than all, the consent of the Church, have favoured the Scholastic method. Here and there a certain new kind of philosophy has taken the place of the old doctrine; and because of this, men have not gathered those desirable and wholesome fruits which the Church and civil society itself could have wished. The aggressive innovators of the sixteenth century have not hesitated to philosophize without any regard whatever to the Faith, asking, and conceding in return, the right to invent anything that they can think of, and anything that they please. From this it quickly followed, of course, that systems of philosophy were multiplied beyond all reason, and that there sprang up conflicting opinions and diverse opinions even about some of the chief things which are within human knowledge. From a multitude of opinions men very often pass to uncertainty and doubt; while there is no one who does not see how easily their minds glide from doubt into error.

But, since man is drawn by imitation, we have seen these novelties lay hold of the minds of some Catholic philosophers, who, undervaluing the inheritance of ancient wisdom, have chosen rather to invent new things than to extend and perfect the old by new truths, and that certainly with unwise counsel, and not without loss to science; for such a manifold

kind of doctrine has only a shifting foundation, resting as it does on the authority and will of individual teachers. For this reason it does not make philosophy firm and strong and solid, like the old philosophy, but, on the contrary, makes it weak and shallow.

When We say this, however, We do not condemn those learned and able men who bring their industry and their knowledge, and the riches of new discoveries, to the aid of philosophy ; for We clearly see that such a course tends to the increase of learning. But with great care we must guard against spending the whole of our attention, or even the chief part of it, on such studies as these, and on such instruction.

Let the same judgment be formed about Sacred Theology. This may well be aided and illustrated by many helps of erudition ; but it is altogether necessary that it should be treated in the weighty manner of the Scholastics, in order that it may continue to be the ' unassailable bulwark of the faith,' by the forces of reason and revelation thus united in it.

Students of philosophy, therefore, not a few, giving their minds lately to the task of setting philosophy on a surer footing, have done their utmost, and are doing their utmost, to restore to its place the glorious teaching of Thomas Aquinas, and to win for it again its former renown.

That many of your order, Venerable Brothers, are with like will following promptly and cheerfully in the same path, We know to the great gladness of Our heart. While We praise these much, We exhort them to go on in the way that they have begun. To the rest of you, one by one, We give this word of counsel : there is nothing which We have longer wished for and desired than that you should give largely and abundantly to youths engaged in study the pure streams of wisdom which flow from the Angelic Doctor as from a perennial and copious spring.

Our reasons for wishing this so earnestly as We do are many.

First, in our times, the Christian Faith is commonly

opposed by the wiles and craft of a certain deceitful kind of wisdom. All young men, therefore, and especially those who are growing up as the hope of the Church, ought to be fed with healthful and strong food of doctrine. Thus, being mighty in strength, and possessing an armoury in which all needful weapons may be found, they will learn by experience to treat the cause of religion with power and wisdom, according to the admonition of the Apostle, 'being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you': and being 'able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.'

Next, there are many who, with minds alienated from the Faith, hate all Catholic teaching, and say that reason alone is their teacher and guide. To heal these men of their unbelief, and to bring them to grace and the Catholic Faith, We think that nothing, after the supernatural help of God, can be more useful in these days than the solid doctrine of the Fathers and the Scholastics. They teach firm foundations of Faith, its Divine origin, its certain truth, the arguments by which it is commended to men, the benefits that it has conferred on the human race, and its perfect harmony with reason. They teach all such truths with a weight of evidence and a force that may well persuade even minds unwilling and hostile in the highest degree.

Again, we all see the great dangers which threaten family life, and even civil society itself, because of the pestilence of perverse opinions. Truly all civil society would be much more tranquil and much safer if healthier teaching were given in universities and schools; a doctrine more in unison with the perpetual teaching office (*magisterium*) of the Church, such as is contained in the volumes of Thomas Aquinas. He disputes about the true nature of liberty, which, in these days, is passing into lawlessness; about the Divine origin of all authority; about laws and their binding force; about the paternal and just government of sovereign princes, with our obedience to higher powers, and the common love that should be among all. The words of Thomas about these things, and others of a like nature, have

the greatest strength, indeed a resistless strength, to overthrow the principles of this new jurisprudence, which is manifestly dangerous to the peaceful order of society and to public safety.

Lastly, from the restoration of philosophical teaching as it has been set forth by Us, all human sciences ought to gather hope of improvement, and the promise of a very great safeguard. For from philosophy, as from a guiding wisdom, the beneficent arts have hitherto derived a healthy method and a right measure. They have, moreover, drunk a vital spirit from it as from a common fountain of life. It is proved by fact and constant experience that the liberal arts have been most flourishing when the honour of philosophy has stood inviolate, and when its judgment has been held for wisdom : but that they have lain neglected and almost obliterated when declining philosophy has been enveloped in errors and absurdities.

Hence, also, the physical sciences, which now are held in so much repute, and everywhere draw to themselves a singular admiration, because of the many wonderful discoveries made in them, would not only take no harm from a restoration of the philosophy of the ancients, but would derive great protection from it. For the fruitful exercise and increase of these sciences it is not enough that we consider facts and contemplate Nature. When the facts are well known we must rise higher, and give our thoughts with great care to understanding the nature of corporeal things, as well as to the investigation of the laws which they obey, and of the principles from which spring their order, their unity in variety, and their common likeness in diversity. It is marvellous what power and light and help are given to these investigations by Scholastic philosophy, if it be wisely used.

On this point it is well to call one thing to your minds. It is only by the highest injustice that any jealousy of the progress and increase of natural sciences is laid, as a fault, at the door of that philosophy. When the Scholastics, following the teaching of the Holy Fathers, everywhere taught through-

out their anthropology that the human understanding can only rise to the knowledge of immaterial things by things of sense, nothing could be more useful for the philosopher than to investigate carefully the secrets of Nature, and to be conversant, long and laboriously, with the study of physical science. Indeed, they themselves prove this by their works. Thomas, and Blessed Albert the Great, and other princes of the Scholastics, did not so give themselves up to the study of philosophy, as to have little care for the knowledge of natural things. Nay, on this matter there are not a few of their words and discoveries which modern teachers approve and acknowledge to be in harmony with truth. Besides, in this very age, many distinguished teachers of physical sciences openly bear witness that there is no contradiction, truly so called, between the certain and proved conclusions of recent physics, and the philosophical principles of the Schools.

We, therefore, while We declare that everything wisely said should be received with willing and glad mind, as well as everything profitably discovered or thought out, exhort all of you, Venerable Brothers, with the greatest earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it as far as you can, for the safety and glory of the Catholic Faith, for the good of society, and for the increase of all the sciences. We say the wisdom of St. Thomas ; for it is not by any means in our mind to set before this age, as a standard, those things which may have been inquired into by Scholastic Doctors with too great subtlety ; or anything taught by them with too little consideration, not agreeing with the investigations of a later age ; or, lastly, anything that is not probable.

Let, then, teachers carefully chosen by you do their best to instil the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas into the minds of their hearers ; and let them clearly point out its solidity and excellence above all other teaching. Let this doctrine be the light of all places of learning which you may have already opened, or may hereafter open. Let it be used for the refutation of errors that are gaining ground.

But lest the false should be drunk instead of the true ; or lest that which is unwholesome should be drunk instead of that which is pure ; take care that the wisdom of Thomas be drawn from his own fountain, or at any rate from those streams which, in the certain and unanimous opinion of learned men, yet flow whole and untainted, inasmuch as they are led from the fountain itself. Take care, moreover, that the minds of the young be kept from streams which are said to have flowed from thence, but in reality have been fed by unhealthy waters from other springs.

Well do we know that all our work will be vain, unless, Venerable Brothers, He bless our common efforts, Who in the Divine Scriptures is called the ' God of all knowledge.' By those same Scriptures we are warned, that ' every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.' Again, ' If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men abundantly and upbraideth not ; and it shall be given him.'

In this matter, then, let us follow the example of the Angelic Doctor, who never began to read or to write without seeking for God's help by prayer ; and who in simplicity acknowledged that all his learning had come to him, not so much from his own study and toil, as immediately from God. With humble and united prayer, therefore, let us all together beseech God fervently to pour out the spirit of knowledge and understanding on the sons of the Church, and to open their minds to the understanding of wisdom.

Also, that we may receive more abundant fruits of the goodness of God, use that patronage which is most powerful with Him ; that is, the patronage of the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is called the Seat of Wisdom. Secure also, as intercessors, Blessed Joseph, the pure Spouse of the Virgin ; and Peter and Paul, the chiefs of the Apostles, who renewed the whole world with truth, when it was corrupted by the uncleanness and the contagion of errors, and who filled it with the light of the wisdom which is from Heaven.

Lastly, in hope, trusting to the help of God and relying on your pastoral zeal, to all of you, Venerable Brothers, to

all the clergy, and all the people committed to the care of each, we give, with great love in the Lord, our Apostolical blessing, the earnest of heavenly gifts, and the witness of our special goodwill.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, this 4th day of August, 1879, in the second year of our Pontificate.

LEO, PP. XIII.

THE LEONINE EDITION.

IN the year 1879 Pope Leo XIII. addressed a letter, dated October 15, to Cardinal de Luca, Prefect of the Congregation of Studies, to found the Academy of St. Thomas. In this letter the Pope mentions his intention of bringing out a new edition of all the Saint's works. He speaks of it as an edition, 'quæ cuncta omnino Sancti Doctoris scripta complectatur optimis quoad fieri potest formis litterarum expressa accurataque emendata; iis etiam adhibitis codicum manuscriptorum subsidiis, quæ ætate hac nostra in lucem et usum prolata sunt. Conjunctim vero edendas curabimus clarissimorum ejus interpretum, ut Thomæ de Vio Cardinali Cajetani et Ferrariensis, lucubrationes per quas, tanquam per uberes riviculos, tanti viri doctrina decurrit.'

The *Motu Proprio* for the new edition appeared January 18, 1880. In this it was ordered that the new edition should be reserved to the Propaganda Press. The edition was confided to Cardinal de Luca, Cardinal Simeoni, and Cardinal Zigliara. With the works of St. Thomas they were directed to edit Cajetan on the 'Summa Theologica,' and Ferrariensis on the 'Contra Gentiles.'

Cardinal Zigliara, in the Preface to the first Volume, says that, in obedience to the command of His Holiness, 'Magister Generalis Ordinis Prædicatorum cui demandata est a Leone XIII., cura hujus editionis operum Sti. Thomæ, quosdam religiosos in scientiis simul et arte paleographica

eruditos designavit, qui bibliothecas perlustrant, codices optimæ notæ inquirunt, scripta S. Thomæ inedita diligenter investigant, atque omnia scripta notata aliis religiosis Romæ degentibus et novam hanc editionem curantibus transmittant.'

The groundwork of the new edition is that of St. Pius V. (1570). Little is known of the history of this edition. Several learned Dominicans were employed in it, and among them Remigius Nanni, Cardinal Justiniani, and Thomas Marriques, S.P.A. Magister. It is the best of all the editions of the 'Opera Omnia' published up to the time of Leo XIII. As the Pope says in his letter to Cardinal de Luca: 'Cœtera enim, cum veteres tum recentiores, partim quod non omnia S. Thomæ scripta exhibent, partim quod optimorum, ejus interpretum atque explanatorum careant commentariis, partim quod minus diligenter adornatæ sint, non omnia tulisse punctum videntur.'

This Piana, or Roman, Edition, however, seems to have been made with the help of earlier editions rather than of the manuscripts.

The first Volume of the Leonine Edition comprises the 'Dissertation of De Rubeis on the Life and Writings of St. Thomas,' also the 'Commentaries of the Saint on Aristotle's Works,' 'Peri Hermenias,' and 'Posteriora Analytica.' As St. Thomas's Commentaries on the former terminate at the end of the Second Book, Cajetan's Commentary on the remainder has been given.

The Greek text of Aristotle (Didot's edition) has been inserted in place of the second Latin version given by the Piana, synopses of each lesson and copious notes being added.

The second Volume gives the Commentaries on the eight books of Aristotle's 'Physics,' and the third Volume contains those on the treatises, 'De Cœlo et Mundo,' 'De Generatione et Corruptione,' and the 'Meteorologia.'

It is worthy of note that up to the time when the new edition was undertaken, the Commentary on both of the books, 'De Generatione et Corruptione,' was looked upon as genuine work of St. Thomas; but by means of the manu-

scripts, as well as from internal evidence and discovery of their origin and source, it has been proved in the Preface to the third Volume, that only the first seventeen lessons of the Commentary on the First Book are by St. Thomas, the remainder on the First Book, and all on the Second, being drawn from Albertus Magnus.

Discoveries were also made concerning the Commentary on the books of the 'Meteorologia,' as may be seen in the Preface. That on the Third and Fourth were known to be spurious. That on the Third Book is taken from Peter of Alvernia; that in the Leonine Edition, the Commentary on the last lesson of the Second Book, is also shown to be taken from Albertus Magnus.

On the publication of the third Volume, the Pope addressed a Letter to Cardinals Simeoni and Zigliara (Cardinal de Luca had died), dated October 11, 1886, expressing his wish that the 'Summa Theologica' and 'Summa Contra Gentes' should be the next edited and published.

Of the former, up to this time (1906) nine volumes have been published, containing almost all that St. Thomas wrote before his death. With these appears the Commentary of Cajetan. The text of St. Thomas has been compared with manuscripts and early editions; quotations have been verified. Each manuscript used in the edition has been read through, and when it differs from the Piana, a note is made of the variant. In composing the second Volume no less than 20,000 variants were marked.

The printing of the work was done at the Propaganda Press. The work was confided wholly to the Dominican Order by Pope Leo XIII. before his death.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.

St. Thomas was born at Rocca Secca, in Italy, in the year 1226. He belonged to the noble family of the Counts of Aquinum, in the kingdom of Sicily. He had two brothers

and four sisters. When five years old he was sent to the famous Abbey of Monte Cassino, in accordance with the custom of noble families at that time, his kinsfolk cherishing the design of his becoming a Benedictine monk, and being raised in due time to the dignity of Abbot of that great monastery. Thomas remained several years at Monte Cassino. At the age of sixteen, repudiating the offers of his influential friends, he joined the newly-founded Order of Friar Preachers, or Dominicans. Forthwith he began that career of study and learning which illuminated the whole Western Church. Refusing the dignities of Archbishop of Naples and of Cardinal, he died in his religious state in the year 1274, aged forty-eight.

St. Thomas studied at Cologne under Albertus Magnus, a member of the same Order, eventually Bishop of Ratisbon. In the year 1260 he returned to Italy, and taught in Rome. In 1265 the 'Summa Theologica' was first published in the Pontificate of Clement IV. In 1267 Thomas attended the General Chapter of his Order in Paris, and was made Regent of Studies for the second time. He returned to Naples in 1272. In 1274 Pope Gregory X. summoned him to the General Council of Lyons, but on his way thither he was taken ill, and died at the Cistercian Abbey of Fossa Nova, after a month's illness, to the grief of all Christendom. The University of Paris sent a letter of condolence to the General Chapter of the Dominican Order at Lyons on the loss to the Order and to the Church.

St. Thomas was buried at Toulouse, in the church of his Order. He was canonized by Pope John XXII., and Pope St. Pius V. declared him a Doctor of the Church, an honour not given for many centuries, so that he was called the Fifth Doctor of the Church, associated with St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, St. Gregory, and St. Jerome in the Latin Church.

The 'Summa Theologica' of St. Thomas was published in the years 1265-1269, as regards Parts I. and I.-II. When Regent of Studies in Paris, Parts II. and III. were published by St. Thomas.

Part III. was written partly in Rome, and partly at Naples, up to Question XC., *De Partibus Pœnitentiæ*. The remainder, after the Saint's death, was written probably by Henry of Gorcum.

From the Feast of St. Nicholas (December 6) in 1273 to his death St. Thomas could not be induced to write anything more.

The 'Summa Theologica' has been published with his other works, and also many times separately. The chief edition till our time was published by Pope St. Pius V. in 1570, and was called the Piana Edition.

THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

§ I. INTELLECTUAL.

Quicumque autem intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectæ, ex ejus notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat, et dicitur verbum cordis significatum verbo vocis (Summa Th., I., Q. XXVII., A. 1).

Verbum Mentis.

The Scholastic Philosophy is in all essential particulars a continuation of the primitive Christian system of thought. It is sometimes described as a contrast to the preceding speculation; as 'Aristotle baptized'; as if the Scholastics accepted what the early Church rejected; as if their system were an innovation on the ideas of the Fathers and Doctors of the first centuries. It is almost implied that an accidental union existed in principle, with antagonism in method; as if St. Thomas did what St. Augustine would never have done, unless constrained by a kind of necessity. Such a view leaves entirely out of sight the true and intrinsic bond of union between the Christian Philosophy of all ages. To say that Aristotle was rejected and abhorred by the Christians of one age, and accepted and honoured by the Christians

of another age, implies a very partial and inadequate view of a great subject.

Without entering at present into a comparison of the Scholastic with the old Greek Philosophy, it is enough to remark upon the special character of the Scholastic system in the sense that it is propounded by the Church as the handmaid to Revelation; for in that light alone is it to be called the Christian Philosophy. In that sense alone has it the right to the pre-eminent position accorded to it by the Saints and Doctors of the Church; this is the key to its inner signification; it is this which fills out all its relations, and makes its sphere complete.

The Scholastic Philosophy propounds the mental words, the *verbum mentis*, which makes a formal union of Reason and Revelation. Such is its meaning, its message, its mission.

In the new Dispensation, the moralist and the jurist found himself in presence of the new Fact, the Life and Claims of Christ; the politician was confronted with the rights of the new Kingdom of Christ; the Philosopher was in presence of a new Mind, of a new Teacher, Christ. The ages have not yet succeeded in exhausting the lessons of this Mind, of this Teacher, applied in their living force to every generation of man. The Mind of Christ is the source of the Christian Philosophy. Principles of general application flow from it to every age. Particular principles in the way of methods are adapted to the needs of every age. In the times called Scholastic, the need was for the Mind of Christ in its unchanging principles to be applied to contemporary needs by way of evidence and argument summed up in that method of Formal Reasoning which is embodied in the Syllogism.

Without entering at present into the objective truth of the Scholastic Philosophy, it will not be difficult to see that the 'differentia' which gives to it its position as a species of the great *genus* of Christian Philosophy resides in its subjective character; and that its character in that respect is to be found in the mental word to the elaboration of which all its force is directed.

This, again, was not absolutely its own invention. St. John refers to the inner philosophical gift when he writes to the Christians : ' You have received the Unction of the Holy One, and know all things ' (1 John ii. 20). This inner illumination was so prominent in the Early Church that it was the first gift usurped by the heretics called Gnostics. This was the first object of that unlawful ambition which in all ages feeds upon what is not its own in the Church. But this was not a transitory gift. As the endurance of the martyrs appeared to be even newer in the eyes of the world than the cause for which they died, so did this *charisma* shine out as a new constellation in the intellectual firmament beyond all others.

The adherence to the word of Christ was made perfect by the interior word, the *verbum mentis*, which made the adherence and assent of the disciple to be truly intelligent.

That the mind assents to Faith with a true intellectual conviction was a truth which the Scholastics were not content merely to repeat. They took it as a fact, and made it the basis of their apostolate. Their ardent students were apostles, with an aim, a mission, a message of supreme urgency, consisting in the dissemination of the word of Truth by means of the *verbum mentis*, through the instrumentality of the word of the mind.

The times called for such a mission. The age was teeming with perversions and rebellions against the rationality of the word which found expression in the voice. The particular outrage which roused the Scholastics to vindicate the word was that fundamental violation of reason perpetrated by the Waldenses and Albigenses in emptying the word of intelligible meaning, in separating the word and the voice from each other.

How useless and dangerous were words apart from thoughts, and thoughts divorced from words, was plainly shown to the age by the doings of the Waldenses and Albigenses. The former made the word ' poverty ' a meaningless formula, the latter flung about words like fiery arrows to kindle conflagrations even in the sanctuary. Empty sounds ; screams

of rage and violence, were the weapons of error in those days. St. Thomas arose when the storm was greatly spent. His work was to root up what remained, and to plant anew the tradition of the union of thought and word, which was to be the special success and glory of his Philosophy thenceforth. The importance of such a work in his eyes may be seen from his two *Opuscula* on 'The Difference of the Divine and Human Word,' and on 'The Nature of the Word of the Intellect,' besides what occurs on the same subject in his 'Summa Theologica' and elsewhere.

St. Thomas achieved his purpose through a threefold struggle: against the Waldenses and Albigenses, as above described; against the depraving of Aristotle on the part of the Arabian philosophers; and against Aristotle himself. The last was by far the subtlest, most difficult, and also the most perfect triumph of this threefold struggle. The contest with the first two kinds of adversaries required little more than strength of mind and clearness of purpose; it was akin to the work of the clashing of the Crusaders' swords, and the rescue of the shrine of truth from the infidel; the last named was the deft plucking out from a friend's eye of the twist which threatened to make his help abortive.

The prejudice of the early Church against Aristotle is so well known that it is seldom really attempted to be explained how and why the Scholastics began and carried on what is often assumed to be a simple innovation on their part. If we show that it was no innovation at all, except the innovation of circumstances, we shall be able to dissipate the idea that they acted in a manner foreign to the spirit of St. Augustine and other Fathers of the earlier times. There was, indeed, a subtle sympathy and a corresponding unity between them and the first ages of Christianity, too often and too wholly ignored.

Between the Christian ages there exists a profound connection on this point. The Scholastics were able to receive Aristotle because the opportunity had arrived which gave them the power of neutralizing or of subduing the chief point

of hostility between him and the Christian system. This point lay in his *finality*. His Rationality was perfect ; but where could Faith come in when every idea seemed symmetrically to arise only from the abstraction of the universal from the senses ? Faith might come in as an hypothesis or as an assumption ; but could it be in any way the fruit of reason ? Aristotle to the early Fathers was the denier of Faith as a Rationality. The time came when the Scholastics could make Faith fit into the classic system of the Origin of Ideas. This was a great triumph ; and it made Aristotle so that he was never again used against Faith considered as a rational act.

The Scholastics, no less than the early Fathers, quarrelled with Aristotle's *finality*. The difference lay in the fact that whereas this finality was presented to the early Fathers as *character*, to the Scholastics it was presented as *mind*. As character it could not be overcome, and was not overcome ; as mind it could be overcome, and was overcome when the time for its conquest arrived. The time at length came. What was that time ? It was when the formality of Christian Argument appeared in the Christian Syllogism.

St. Thomas teaches that in the mind there are three distinct things which remain within it—the *intellectual power*, the *idea* (*species rei intellectæ*), and the *act of intelligence* (*intelligere*). None of these is the *word*, because none of them can be signified by the voice (Opusc., xiii.). An accurate distinction is required to separate the two last from the word, which by its very nature tends to issue forth into the voice : *Verbum autem interius conceptum per modum egredientis se habet, quod testatur verbum exterius vocale quod est ejus signum . . . illud enim egreditur a dicente vocaliter ad extra. Illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius quod intelligens intelligendo format.*

The formation of the *verbum mentis* is the first care of the Scholastics, proceeding thence to the *verbum vocis* as its end, test, and sign.

In this respect we may say that the *verbum mentis* is the point of contrast to modern philosophy so far as it differs

from Scholasticism. Modern Philosophy undertakes to find its excellence in the *intelligence*—the act of understanding in the mind.

This is not the place to draw out the consequences of these two principles respectively.

Modern Philosophy places the end of Philosophy in *reflection*. St. Thomas allows that reflection is near to the word ; yet declares that they are distinct and separate. He says : 'Generatio verbi videtur propinquissima cognitioni reflexæ, unde multi putaverunt eam esse reflexam . . . sed sciendum est . . . gignitio verbi non est reflexa' (Opusc. xiv., *de natura verbi Intellectus*). Again : 'Non enim generatur verbum ipsum per actum intellectus.' Further, he says : 'Intelligere in radice prius est verbo, et verbum est terminus actionis intellectus.'

This indeed is no new view as regards modern systems of Philosophy. Reid noticed the fact as regards 'the new systems' ('The Human Mind,' chap. vii., conclusion).

It is evident that two philosophical systems, beginning to differ in so subtle a principle, will only by degrees branch out openly into contradictory results. Yet few will refuse to acknowledge that some such root difference must exist, when the plain resulting contrast can be accounted for by such a principle. It will also be acknowledged that if such principles be really the source of the contrast, then St. Thomas's principle is probably the right one, and Philosophy should be founded on the *verbum mentis*.

Philosophy is meant to be *useful*. Its utility is founded on the *verbum mentis*, as was inherited from the classic exponents of Rationality in all ages, and from Aristotle in particular.

That such a *verbum* was St. Thomas's aim is evident from the general character of the 'Summa.' This great work embodies the contrast to modern thought above named. It may be called a psychological work ; standing out in that sense as a contrast to the ontological character of modern ideas. The system of St. Thomas evidently rests on the correspondence between mind and object. The

controversies of Realists and Nominalists bring this out very clearly. St. Thomas wishes above all to show how Revelation is received *by the mind*.

It is customary to speak as if Faith in its philosophical aspect rested only on the credibility of the witnesses. Yet that is not enough to show that Faith is in itself a mental act of the strictly intellectual order. A truth or fact received on testimony may be received so far as not to be denied. But Faith requires much more than this. It is received as an intellectual act.

The Scholastic Philosophy, therefore, is founded on what we may call *the enucleation of the word*. This great principle brings out the full relation of the will to the intellect, a principle not equally recognized or treated of in any other Philosophy. It goes out also into every cognate subject, such as Theology, Asceticism, Mysticism, and every branch of Psychology, in such a way as to exalt the actuality of the mind as the test of a sound and living theory.

The *verbum mentis* is also the sign of Progress. The Scholastic Philosophy, by virtue of its characteristic principle, is the Philosophy of Progress.

Here we may pause to consider and rebut the opinion of an eminent writer, who, although perhaps not himself a philosopher, yet accurately registers the phase of thought to which he adverts in several well-known passages. In his 'Essay on Bacon,' Macaulay declares that Natural Theology is not a progressive science. He says that a Blackfoot Indian has all the proofs of the life of man after death that a philosopher can possess. The surprising thing about such a statement is that it has never been challenged. It may be challenged on two grounds ; because it shows a confusion between the objective evidence and the subjective mind ; and on the ground that evidence is not identical with fact. The mind comes in to receive and adjust the evidence. A man may have facts before him ; it does not follow that he can use them as evidence.

To say that Natural Theology or Philosophy is not a progressive science means that it is not a science at all.

Every science is progressive. To say that a savage knows all there is to be known about the soul is equal to saying, at least, that he knows all that can be known about the body; and that medicine is not a progressive science. A cannibal savage may know the body as well as any surgeon or physician; yet his knowledge of its anatomy does not make him a Harvey or a Fergusson.

A civilized Philosopher knows far more than a savage as regards the objects of Philosophy. He possesses a verification far above the savage. He has a knowledge of the relations brought to him from all ages. He knows the value of his own ideas. He can compare his thoughts with those of the sages everywhere.

All theologians agree that a denial of God on the lips of an educated and civilized man entails a greater responsibility than on the lips of a savage. How could this be if they were on equal terms as regards these problems? The civilized man knows more. So, in reference to the far-off days of Job, mankind generally has advanced in the consideration of these truths. The assured tone of Job's 'friends' would not be so much appreciated in these days.

Macaulay goes on to say that neither is Revelation a progressive science. The Schoolmen would join issue with him on this point. It is their glory to have made Revelation a progressive science.

As regards Progress in Natural Theology, the Scholastics advanced it a considerable step when they established the Existence of God as an inferential truth.

Likewise as regards Revelation, they most acutely analyzed the principle of Testimony.

Moreover, they drew out the relations of the Mind and Life of Christ both to Natural Theology and to Revelation, as the fount of certainty in both.

To talk about 'unassisted reason' is like talking about unassisted digestion. Such a thing never existed in this world without mental or bodily starvation. The mind has its appetite, which feeds on garbage rather than not feed at all. The 'appetite of reason,' as St. Thomas says,

is the will. 'Unassisted reason' does not exist. Even the savage is ever thinking, and feeding his reason.

Progress is the badge of Scholasticism. It resides in the word ; and is unfolded by the action of the word.

Among the signs of the Progress effected by the word may be mentioned the Scholastic vindication of Faith as an intellectual act and its reconciliation with the Aristotelean origin of ideas. Other points might be named in direct contact with Revelation ; which are not here mentioned, because they are parts of Theology.

Science begins with certain facts. In this point Scholasticism is a true science. As anatomy proceeds in its scientific conclusions from the certain facts of the human body, which are ever the same, and as medicine likewise rests on facts that do not change, the same is to be said of mathematics and of all the mental sciences till we come to the highest of all.

How far Progress has faded from Philosophy can be seen when a great and popular writer is accepted laying down the principles above noted.

To say that Divine Science is not progressive because its principles are as known and as fixed as they were in the days of Job, is just as well as to say that medicine is not a progressive science because the human body is the same as it was in the days of Moses. Further, this is to ignore all the shades and distinctions of truth comprised in the human *verbum*, and makes truth a refraction, not a reflection, of thought.

Objective truth is one thing ; its appreciation in the subject is another. Truth is in the mind, says St. Thomas. Two worlds exist, fitted for each other ; and the more and more correct adjustment of the subjective word to its primal source of illumination includes all that progress in knowledge which increases by sure steps the dignity of man. The Blackfoot Indian does not know as much as a Philosopher, and he knows much less than a Christian. The facts of the world may be before him ; but he does not appreciate these facts aright. To insinuate that a savage can judge of

these facts even as a Socrates or Plato is an outrage on the human mind. It ignores all the relations which depend on mental cultivation.

If we wish to see how Progress advances in Philosophy, we need only compare the Scholastic word with the Patristic, and the Patristic with the Apostolic, to see how truth never rises above its source, but nevertheless irrigates an immenser region, and is more adapted to every mental phase that adorns the human family.

The act of understanding, the *intelligere*, seems to be the badge of Modern Philosophy. It is not a necessary element of progress; and so far on that basis, Macaulay gives a correct diagnosis of philosophical advance. Surely, however, the mind is meant to progress. It has its step, and can march; like its companion the body.

The contrast between the *verbum* and the *intelligere*, inaugurated when Scholasticism was abjured, soon became a conflict, and developed into civil war, when the systems fought amongst themselves on their own congenital soil.

But why should there have been a conflict at all? If the new system departed from the old, why should it not depart in peace, with a token of gratitude towards its origin? Scholasticism had at least vindicated the law that *thought was worth thinking*. If thought wished to migrate, we might suppose it would migrate at least with a sense of obligation towards the soil of its infancy and the sky whereunder it had passed its youth.

The *intelligere* of Modern Philosophy is summed up in Reflection, which is not by itself a principle of Progress. It may be a *terminus a quo*; but of itself it does not involve any definite *terminus ad quem*. It necessarily remains in itself, and sums up the past; finding its end in keeping what it has gained.

We hear much of reconciliation, which is not possible between opposites. One or other of the two systems must surrender its characteristic principle.

In these circumstances it remains for us to assert that the

Philosophy which rests on the *verbum* has alone the promise of Progress.

St. Thomas knew nothing of reconciliation except in the sense of subduing the mind to Christ. The idea of compromise of vital principles is no reconciliation ; it is only stagnation.

Scholasticism is Metaphysics. Modern science is anything else : Mechanics, Chemistry, Biology, everything that ends in sense. Metaphysics will return to popular favour when Scholasticism with its characteristic *word* returns to power.

§ 2. ETHICAL.

Verbum Cordis.

The idea of Philosophical Progress, as above described, brings us to the ethical contest which underlies the enunciation of the word in all ages. Man was endowed with the gift of expressing his thought by the enucleation of the word. But he early lost the freshness and force of the enunciation ; till the final calamity of Babel divided the human thought into the many tribes of tongues and dialects which have been the principle of perennial discord. The fault of our first parents is early seen in its consequences as regards the enunciation of the word required from them. They lost the word of innocence, and their stammering tongues could only make clear their refusal to pronounce the full word of repentance required by their new situation.

From this point of view we may divide the ages of thought in speech into *the enunciation and the enervation of the word*. This contrast also became a contest and a conflict which in all ages has left its deep marks on the whole history of mankind. Man has by his present nature an inherent hesitation and repugnance to confront himself with the pronouncement of his own thought in the *verbum*. Into the source of that hesitation we need not now inquire further ; the fact itself is patent, and the consequence is equally plain and patent that this strange infirmity has had such an

effect upon intellectual progress that it occupies a distinct sphere in the realm of Philosophy. Not to recognize this fact is to ignore a very manifest and potent influence that lies at the root of a vast field of aimless speculation.

The first formal and historical recognition of this philosophical characteristic is to be found in the unique mission of Socrates, who went forth with the one purpose of confronting man, not only with his own ignorance, but with his own idea, hitherto disguised by sophistry, or ignored, a stunted growth, withering away and blighted. How difficult his mission was, how hateful he became by the mere fact of making man a questioner unto himself in the sincerity of the word, is plainly shown by the historical sequence of his life and death.

St. Thomas and the Scholastics carried out the tradition of Socrates into the twin word of Reason and Revelation. In this word the mind attained to its full stature of enunciation. St. Thomas rescued the word from Waldensian and Albigenian license; he rescued it when he plucked Aristotle from the grasp of those who were in the act of burying him beneath pyramids of Oriental jugglery, of words divorced from sense. The Arabian Philosophers at that time suffered from what we may call *Megalomania*. They used words too big for the sense they tried to squeeze into them; till the *verbum* between them all was in danger of being for ever stifled in the caverns of Unmeaningness.

St. Thomas was the true knight-errant of the *verbum*. He began with taking up the key of thought, introducing himself into the recesses where the fair and luminous idea was bound and captive; scattering the bats and owls of dim and unworthy speculation, delivering the *verbum* into its true sphere of enunciation free and undefiled. Such a work was a mission, resting on ethical quite as much as on intellectual qualities. The Scholastics were the greatest verbal apostles ever seen in the world. Their aim in that character was the *verbum cordis*.

From the time of Babel thought and word had never been happily married. Their discord had filled the world

with clamour ; till the fatal remedy *divorce* was pronounced to be the cure, and was put forward as the condition of peace. We have the consequence before us in two worlds at variance—thought on one side, word on the other—pursuing paths leading directly to confusion ; till man almost seems to possess *de jure* no voice but an irrational sound ; and his dignity seems only fully vindicated by silence alone, like ‘ the voiceless daughters of the violet sea,’ in the words of the Greek poet. Not for nothing, indeed, was man compared to a fish in the Gospel ; for he had lost his voice.

Meanwhile, however, the true tradition of the word was not lost. It went on because truth went on ; because Redemption was preparing by long ages of silence, by the order of Divine Providence, in time and season, in number, weight, and measure. The redemption of the human word was accomplished and made perfect by the coming of the Divine and Eternal Word in Person. The word of man was redeemed by the Word of God.

The first formally organized attempt against the human word was the Arian uprising to deprive the Substantial Word of His Personal Divinity and Supremacy. The echo of that great struggle has been heard in our age on the part of those who accuse the word’s defenders and vindicators of ‘ empty janglings,’ of the trifling about mere sounds. Surely these charges should be laid against Arius, not against Athanasius. It was the former who did these things ; he was the innovator on the peace of the earth. The enunciation of the word happily prevailed. The Scholastics won the same victory on different grounds in their day, as above described.

With the decline of Scholasticism, the enervation of the word entered upon a new phase of conflict with the *verbum mentis* accoutred as the *verbum cordis* ; till now, at length, the boastful panoply of *Agnosticism* stands before us as the intellectual Goliath of our age—the refusal to pronounce the word, arrayed in strength, based on the assumption of the higher intellectual dignity.

St. Thomas saw not this idol of mental sloth and verbal apathy ; but it might seem as if he foresaw its sway, so keen

and proper is the instrument he bequeathed for its overthrow. The three principles of the *verbum mentis*, the *verbum cordis*, and the *verbum vocis* are summed up and put as it were into a sling to be hurled with astonishing force against the pretence of rational men not to speak, and not to adequately think; of knowledge based on formal Ignorance. The sling is the Eucleation of the Word.

How many rights and privileges of the human mind are outraged by the term *Agnosticism* it is needless now to inquire. Its *culmen* of pretence is reached in the words of its protagonist as follows: 'By continually seeking to know, and being thrown back with a deepened conviction of the impossibility of knowing, we may keep alive the consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist—the Unknowable' (Herbert Spencer, 'First Principles').

Take away from this passage all the positive words of knowledge which Agnosticism expressly disclaims; and little remains. If we cannot know, we cannot have a 'conviction' or 'keep alike the consciousness of knowing,' or possess 'the highest wisdom'—still less can we have a 'highest duty,' or a duty at all. All this indeed is but a refutation of the last word and sum of all—'the Unknowable.' If all these kinds of knowledge exist, then the 'Unknowable' has no real meaning even in the mouths of its advocates. But there is something more important to be said.

The insidious character of Agnosticism does not lie only in the profession of Ignorance as regards truths we can know and may know. It lies deeper, in the perversion of that knowledge of our own Ignorance which is the peculiar characteristic of the human mind.

In the vast recesses of human cognoscibility there lies a pearl of great price, a kind of talisman which unlocks all mental secrets, and forms the *signaculum* of human intellectual greatness. This is *the knowledge of our own Ignorance*—a light shining darkly, which belongs to man alone of all terrestrial creatures. In this, by this, man is placed apart,

separate and supreme on earth. It is impossible to mark out the boundaries of this light. One thing we know of it, which is that it is a knowledge, in all its parts, to its uttermost boundaries, in all its degrees and spheres.

Agnosticism is not Ignorance, or a healthy and natural darkness. It is the refusal to know. It is really the pride of man raising himself up as the fount of knowledge.

It is but too evident that the tradition of the enervation of the word, the paralysis of thought, is carried on in our age, and has been raised up to a system. What its ravages are is but too plain. Its votaries are weary of it, as man must necessarily be in due time of whatever is a drain upon his nature. The intellectual nature of man has its rights, its duties, and its aspirations. Agnosticism is the denial of our natural desire and instinct to know, and must be regarded as a disease fastening itself upon the Rationality of man.

The remedy for it is to be found in the return to the great Scholastic tradition of the enucleation of the word. The *verbum cordis* represents the struggle which has gone on for so many ages between the plain dictate of the *verbum mentis*, and the downward tendency of the human word as above described, resulting in the conflict between the *enunciation* and the *enervation* of the word. From this point of view the *verbum cordis* may be called the Problem, as the *verbum mentis* is the Progress, of the word. Mankind in all ages oscillates between these two tendencies, the one for which man was created going forward to the full bloom of rational Certainty, the other to which he is exposed from the habit of that strange intellectual inertia leading him to disguise his own thoughts, and to hide his own intellectual dictates in the cloud of uncertainty. The tendency of this age is to raise this tendency into a system, to glorify it, and to invest it with a dignity utterly at variance with its dangerous character and real nature.

The Scholastics are the only Philosophers who have taken this strange tendency into full account, and provided a place for it in their system. They know what it means,

and hence their eager insistence upon the full pronouncement of the *verbum mentis*, by aid of vigorous adhesion to the duty and end of rational Certainty.

§ 3. HISTORICAL.

Verbum Vocis.

It may be said that words are the history of Philosophy. It is by words that we can trace the onward march of those great dominant thoughts which make up the Scholastic system, which as we have seen, have been the special objects of elucidation and enunciation, of enucleation and vindication. The Scholastic words have scored a deep mark on the face of the world, and whatever may be said to the disparagement of the Schoolmen, at least it will be allowed that they have raised up a dominion of words in every sense unrivalled.

It is not here necessary, after what has been said, to vindicate the use of words. Without words society could not exist; kingdoms and empires and civilizations would fall unless supported by these unseen, wingless messengers of thought given by men to each other as the tie which binds up and holds up whatever is important in human society. Without words, the world would become a desert, and man a beast.

These remarks are sufficient to introduce the fact that the Scholastic word has had a history. It has gone forth to the ends of the earth.

Words are the end of philosophy. When wise words are uttered, philosophy has done its work. Action belongs to conscience, to religion. No man rules his life by intellect alone, and philosophy, the spokesman of intellect, has no such office of direct rule in the realm of action.

If, indeed, any exception to this rule could be found, we might almost assert that Scholasticism is an example of it. So great was its dominion, so vast was the territory over which it reigned, that for once words seem to tower over life and to become a dominion that ruled in every department of human existence. Yet, when we examine

the case more closely, we can see that the Scholastic Philosophy did not exceed its proper limits. Its rule only shows what words can do when duly employed for their full and legitimate mission ; when trusted.

A further reproach against Scholasticism and its parent stem in Greek thought is expressed as follows by Macaulay, in the eloquent essay above cited : ' If the tree which Socrates planted and Plato watered be judged by its flowers and leaves, it is the noblest of trees. But if we take the homely test of Bacon, if we judge of the tree by its fruits, our opinion of it may perhaps be less favourable.' This ' homely test,' however, is not Bacon's. It is in the Gospel ; it belongs to reason itself. All ages, all men, judge of a tree by its fruit ; but its fruits mean its produce. Its flowers have a value even if we cannot eat them. If all trees but fruit-trees were rooted up, the world would be shorn of much that is useful for the very reason that it is ornamental. We judge of a rose-tree by its roses ; of an apple-tree by its apples. Words are useful by a supreme utility ; and they have the merit also of being ornamental. Plato has the renown of having invented the art of conversation. Who will deny the supreme utility of such a gift to the world ? If we have passed beyond the region of monosyllables, it is chiefly owing to those lofty Greeks who are here accused of planting and watering as in the idle luxury of a vacant summer's day. All Philosophy, indeed, on such a basis, might almost be called a ' Mid-summer Night's Dream.'

Perhaps, after all, we must allow that words are more useful than the steam engine. Words are the machinery of thought ; without them thought would be imprisoned in perpetual uselessness.

If we can imagine the world deprived of all flowers, and of all leaves, we can perhaps form some adequate idea of a mental world without Socrates and Plato. To charge it against a flower that it is not a fruit, to accuse a leaf of not being a potato, surely implies a very false standard of both ornament and utility.

The Greek Philosophy added dignity to life. It made thought regal. Mankind ever needs those who can think and speak wisely, while words remain the indispensable coin of all mental currency. The Greeks made words more intimate to human life than the steam engine and the telegraph; and indeed we may ask, without words what becomes of the steam engine and the telegraph?

Jowett says: 'Great philosophies tend to pass away in words' (*Pref..trans.* Plato). Philosophy passes into words as into its proper end; but the end remains if the words are true.

Socrates proved that the world was unpeopled with the ideal man in multitude; and that systems of philosophy could not count upon wisdom in the mass. The only Greek systems that seemed to influence life were the Cynic and the Stoic; the two that perished because they knew not their own limits. Yet they really perverted religion and corrupted life. The wise words of Socrates and Plato did not die. If Plato shone like a cold sun upon the Greek world, still he was a sun, and not a meteor; and in due time warmth was added to him.

Motion and action are the two contrasted modes of the useless and the useful. Action is motion with the principle of fecundity. The Scholastics invented the action of words; they made words live, and they derived this from the word world of Christ.

It is impossible not to see that the life of Christ, as it altered action necessarily also altered thought. Action preceded thought in the Christian world, as it does in the natural world; and time came when the thought of Christ was drawn out in an exquisitely fine gold thread of argument for the purposes of Christian Evidence.

The new Philosophy of the Scholastics began by the same fiery impulse that led to the Crusades, issuing forth from innumerable cells of apostolic energy. The time had arrived for Christian Evidence to be clothed in argument. 'St. Benedict,' says Cardinal Newman, 'is the historical emblem of the retreat of Christian civilization from the world; and St. Dominic of its return.'

The new word of the new era was *Cur*—‘Why?’—a word hitherto repudiated as the first note of rebellion. Yet here it was formulated as the basis of the new philosophy. The recluse who had looked upon *Cur*—‘Why?’—as the challenge uttered by the arch-rebel, the old serpent, had serious misgivings at first about a word so wholly unsanctified; while it required the ‘*Respondeo dicendum quod*’ of St. Thomas to remove all hesitation in the use of a term which God had made for the useful end of man’s rationality.

Any great historical Fact may be regarded from the standpoint of either place or space—as a thing present or as a thing absent. Its position in place is the first consideration leading us to appreciate what is meant by its absence—by its space.

Scholasticism occupies a great place in history. Of its greatness and grandeur there can be no question. The ages when it reigned have not left behind them a barren expanse of waste; on the contrary, in the plainest marks which arrest the eye, in the arts, are still cherished monuments which all regard as models of beauty and proportion; institutions which will reign as founded in the nature of man. Among these may be mentioned Gothic architecture, with all its subsidiary arts, issuing forth in those vast erections which still are acknowledged to fill up the most elevated artistic views. Beginning in time with Scholasticism, their rise and perfection are so evidently connected with the philosophical methods that prevailed while this architecture flourished, that comparisons have frequently been drawn between what was built and what was said in these ages as twin argumentative forces in support of truth.

Can we find a more appropriate figure in stone of the ‘*Summa*’ of St. Thomas, than the orderly greatness, vastness, and proportions of a great Gothic Cathedral? Again, another evident fruit of the Scholastic Philosophy can be seen in the University system, which arose and flourished in the same ages. To sum up the Scholastic system in its

career of power, we may look at the Council of Trent, wherein its method and principles are so plainly inscribed in the Decrees and Canons; above all in the Canons on Justification which are the admiration of all acquainted with the most opposite ideas (*e.g.*, Cardinal Newman and Dean Stanley).

And what is the space correlative to its absence during these latter ages? Not that it has been, or is, entirely absent. But it has been absent in the sense of having had prominent and successful rivals. Of the merits of those rivals this is not the place to speak; nor do their merits or demerits in any way alter the *fact* that the Scholastic Philosophy looms out as large by its space as by its place. Its absence is as conspicuous as its presence.

When Pope Leo XIII. issued his immortal Encyclical of August 4, 1879 (*supra*), a great noise was made among the dry bones, as men thought.

We are beginning the new Scholastic era. It has been called, perhaps unadvisedly, the neo-Scholastic era, as if it were to derive its character from evolution. Evolution and revolution are first cousins, as we frequently see. This need not be. Let us take Leo XIII. as he is; and he is St. Thomas; for as plainly as words can tell, he urged the study of St. Thomas's text, comprising the Angelic Doctor's principles and method; as did also Pope Pius IX.

St. Thomas comes back to our age. He necessarily comes to our thoughts. Steeped as we are in ideas of Evolution, Biology, Sociology, St. Thomas intrudes himself among it all; not as if he spoke our words, but knowing his right as a human thinker to utter with us the primary mental words which are the interpretations for all ages.

One claim he has to speak; and that is in the name of unity and order. Our thoughts, our words want unity and order. If he could speak audibly, what should we hear? He would say: 'I have one gift which you have not, a perennial gift, needed by every age, as man's thought is of every age; unity and order, the key of interpretation. My ages of rule were ages of unity and order; wherein the

key of interpretation was applied to every secret, and thought penetrated to the extreme human *scibile*. You have, perhaps, a richer variety, a greater wealth of figures, an abundance of theories. But do they influence the people? No, for you have not the gift of rule—unity and order. Many thoughts come before you and are spoken, but you have not ‘the interpretation of the vision.’

Let us apply this to a dominant idea—the Evolution of Species. St. Thomas is ready to deal with this theory, to which his principle of the *verbum* is plainly applicable. Coming to deal with it, he would be surprised to find that there is no accepted definition of *species*. Without such a definition he could not proceed further. The consequence of such a vacant space in the very heart of the problem affects its direct consequences. If *species* is not definite, man is not defined; he may be an embryo, on the way to become an angel, for what man has been is then no rule as to what he is in the sense of limiting what he will be. There is no finality, if there are no definitions in Science. The same luxuriant vegetation of theories unrestrained can be seen on all sides. ‘Reconciliation’ in the sense of compromise is not possible. There must be supremacy in the ascendancy of some principle of interpretation; or else we may have only political truth in the sense of expediency, but not philosophy.

Were St. Thomas living now, he would look with his piercing gaze upon contemporary thought, and compel it to do what contemporary thought is so reluctant to do—to pronounce the *verbum*, to enucleate the word—its own, proper lawful interpretation. He would note all the leading systems which have weight, and in a sense comprise the rest. These would be facts to him. He would treat them as he treated Aristotle; and again, as he treated Averroes, Avicenna, and Avicebron. He would force each of the systems to give up all the truth within them; nor would any protest prevent him from seizing them at their core, or prevent them from yielding up to him their full value. He would extract the truth; and by means of the

truth refute the error, and thus incorporate the truth into his own synthesis. This he would do as regards Evolution, Biology, and Socialism. Moreover, he would do all this in the interests of Revelation ; for in no other relation would he regard them. How much the age would shrink from such contact is evident. But the Master would do it. They would all be absorbed into his reason, and transformed in the alembic of his mind till they came out all in one precious orb of the one *verbum*. This is the Scholastic method, the method of mental rule—of intellectual supremacy. Has it yet been done ? Is it being done ? No ; at present it is all Evolution, or anti-Evolution ; Socialism, or anti-Socialism, etc.—each theory standing out ranged against its opposite. I do not say that such results are the effects of a bad system ; but that it is not Scholasticism ; it is not St. Thomas ; it is not rule. We want not only theories and problems ; but we want solutions. We want in philosophy what is plentifully applied in mathematics, and in all the other sciences which to-day are called rational. We want, for instance, to know how much truth there is in Evolution ; which at present is not known ; and so of other theories.

As a matter of historical fact, the Scholastic system is the only Philosophy which has made a stable and consistent union of minds as regards the thought which is not of obligation, and which is peculiarly exposed above all others to the dangers of division, strife, and inutility. The Greek Philosophy comes next to it in that respect, but at how great a distance history plainly tells. The Scholastic is the Social Philosophy, entering into human life as a friend joining and connecting at all points of union, sitting at the fireside, brightening because truly rationalizing life in all its phases. Everywhere it has a word to say ; to every man it can speak wisdom. It is not the philosophy of the classes only ; it lives and speaks and teaches among the masses. It is the only Philosophy which in this respect is truly social and in the best sense of the word is democratic. Yet it does not flatter ; it speaks the truth. While address-

ing the rationality of all men, it does not ignore the claims of the cultivated intellectuality of the few ; nor does it level the wisdom of the wise to the sphere of the folly of the uninstructed. It is fearless and impartial. For these reasons it is loved and trusted. Pope Leo XIII. in his great Encyclical refers to that wisdom our fathers so much loved, and turns with a yearning glance to the age when in the words of an old Father, ' All Christians were philosophers, and all philosophers were Christians,' words that comprised the sub-apostolic ages, but can be applied to every age when Christ is recognized as the Prince of Philosophers. In our ages philosophy and philosophers have shown and proved their dividing force ; in the Scholastic ages the opposite was the case, when mind was truly free, and error was fairly rejected. No yoke of falsehood then lay like an incubus on the human mind. Every man enjoyed his primeval birthright in a free intellect, akin to all the free cities that flourished in those days, and to the free institutions unrivalled in our later times. Philosophies are much in vogue now as cliques ; whereas the Scholastic, by its very name, is social, gregarious, and unitive. Its maxims are topics of discussion in the market-place ; its aphorisms flourished on the housetops. It speaks its problems in cities, and gathers round it everywhere crowds of eager lovers of wisdom.

The sign and proof of this happy social success are to be seen in the monumental success of the Scholastic words. No other system has had in its train such an immense concourse of words. All these words have a definite meaning ; they carry in themselves a thought, and they each have a place occupied by no other. Thus word carries thought to the furthestmost point of intellectuality ; while thought reacts on and reinvigorates word.

One quality stands out as the historical climax of the Scholastic in contrast to Modern Philosophy ; and that is *Certainty*. In those old former days, men were certain of what they knew. In these days they are hardly certain that they even know. Which of these two is the more

direct tribute to the intellectuality of man? Which of the two more clearly serves the purpose of human life?

The Scholastic system bristles with Certainty, is full of Conclusions. In our day Conclusions are suspected; they are not popular; and Uncertainty is taken to be an indispensable mark of a sound Philosophy. It is needless here to consider and examine what hidden ore of truth may be concealed and disguised under forms that ignore the prime qualities of man's intellectuality. Suffice it to say that if we look to results and regard success, that system which most advances Certainty and exalts Conclusion is surely the one that is worthiest of man. The Scholastic is the only Philosophy that imputes Certainty to man as a *Duty* of his nature as a man.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DIVINE WORD AND THE HUMAN WORD.

(St. Thomas Aquinas, *Opusc.*, xiii.)

(*Translated.*)

In order to understand what is meant by *word*, it must be observed that, according to the Philosopher, the things in the voice are signs of what is in the passions of the soul. It is usual in Scripture for the things signified to be called signs, and *vice versa*; according to the text, *And the rock was Christ* (1 Cor. x. 4). Therefore it necessarily follows that the intrinsic thing in our soul, signified through the external voice by our word, should be called *word*. But whether the name *word* agrees first with the external thing spoken by the voice, or with the conception of the mind, need not concern us at present. Still it is evident that what is signified inwardly existing in the soul comes before the word itself pronounced, as its cause. But if we wish to know what is the interior word in our soul, let us see what the word externally pronounced by the voice signifies.

In our intellect three things exist, viz.: *the power of the intellect*; *the idea (species) of the thing understood*, which is its form, related to the intellect itself as the colour is to the eye; and *the act of understanding*, which is the operation of the intellect. None of these is signified by the exterior word pronounced by the voice; for this name *stone* does not signify the substance of the intellect, because he who names it does not mean that; nor does it signify the idea whereby the intellect understands; for neither is this what the speaker means; nor does it signify the act of understanding, since to understand is not an action which proceeds out of the one who understands; but it remains within him. The word inwardly conceived proceeds outwardly, as is proved by the exterior word which is its sign, proceeding vocally from the one who utters it inwardly. That, therefore, is properly called the interior word which the intelligent agent forms by the understanding. And the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations; for by its operation which is called the intelligence of invisible things, it forms definition; and by the operation whereby it composes and divides, it forms enunciation or something similar; and therefore what is so formed and expressed by the operation of the intellect, either defining or enunciating, signifies something by the exterior word. Hence the Philosopher says, 'The idea (*ratio*) expressed by the name is definition.' What therefore is so formed and expressed in the soul is called the interior word; and is therefore related to the intellect, not as that *by which* it understands, but as that *in which* it understands; because in what is thus expressed it sees the nature of what it understands. From these premisses, therefore, we can see these two things concerning the word, viz., that the word always proceeds from the intellect and exists in the intellect; and that the word is the idea (*ratio*) and likeness of what is understood. And if the same thing is the intelligent subject and also the thing understood, then also the word is the idea and the likeness of the intellect whence it proceeds; but if the intellect and the

thing understood are not the same, then the word is not the idea (*ratio*) of the intelligent subject, but of the thing understood ; as the conception which anyone may have of a stone is the likeness of the stone only ; but when the intellect understands itself, then such a word in it is the idea and likeness of the intellect ; and so Augustine places the likeness of the Trinity in the soul according as the mind understands itself, but not according as it understands other things. It is evident, therefore, that in every intellectual being, which has the power to understand, the word must exist ; for it belongs to the nature of understanding that the intellect in the act of understanding forms something ; and the thing formed is called the word. Intellectual nature comprises human nature, angelic nature, and the Divine Nature. Therefore, the human word exists ; and hence we read, *The fool said in his heart, there is no God* (Ps. xiii. 1.) There exists also the angelic word ; *the Angel said*, etc. (Zach. i. 9). And there is the Divine Word ; *God said*, etc. (Gen. i. 3), of which John speaks, *In the beginning was the Word* (John i. 1).

It is clear that he did not say this of the human word, nor of the angelic word ; because both of these are made ; since the word does not precede the one who utters it ; but this Word of whom John speaks is not made, but all things are made by Him. This must be understood therefore of the Divine Word. It must be understood that the Word of God of whom John speaks has three differences as regards our human word.

The first difference, according to Augustine, is that our word is first *formable*, before it is *formed* ; for when I wish to conceive the idea of a stone, it is necessary that I should attain to the word itself by reasoning ; and the same thing applies to all other things understood by us ; except perhaps as regards first principles, which since they are naturally known, are at once understood, or known without discursive reasoning. Therefore as long as the intellect discourses by reason, it is cast about here and there ; nor is the foundation perfect until it has perfectly conceived the idea of the

thing, and then it first has that idea of the word ; and hence it is that in our soul there exists also the thought whereby is signified the discursive inquiry itself, and the word then formed by perfect contemplation of the truth ; therefore perfect contemplation of the truth is called *the word*. Thus therefore our word is first in potentiality before it is actual (*in actu*). But the Divine Word is always actual ; and therefore the name of *thought* does not properly belong to the Word of God. For Augustine says : ‘ That Word of God is so called which cannot be described as thought, lest anything as it were voluble should be believed about God ’ (‘ De Trin.’ iii.) ; and what Anselm says that ‘ to speak means to the Supreme Father only to see in thought ’ is improperly said.

The second difference between our word and the Divine Word consists in the fact that ours is imperfect ; whereas the Word of God is most perfect ; for we are not able to express all that is in our soul in one word ; and therefore there must be many imperfect words for us to express all we know. It is not so, however, in God ; for since He understands both Himself and all things by His Essence, and by one act, one only Divine Word expresses all that there is in God, not only of the Father ; but also of creatures ; otherwise it would be imperfect. Hence Augustine says : ‘ If there were anything less in the word than in the knowledge of the speaker, the word would be imperfect.’ But the Divine Word is evidently most perfect. Therefore it is but one ; hence, ‘ God speaks once ’ (Job xxxiii. 14).

The third difference is that our word is not of the same nature with ourselves ; but the Divine Word is of the same nature with God, and subsists in the Divine Nature. For the intellectual idea formed by our intellect about anything is in the intelligible soul only ; and the act of understanding of the soul is not identical with the natural being of the soul, because the soul is not its own operation ; and therefore the word formed by our intellect does not belong to the essence of the soul ; but is an accident to it. But in God

the act of understanding and His Being are one and the same ; and therefore the Word formed by the Divine Intellect is not an accident, but belongs to His Nature ; and hence it must be subsisting, because whatever is in the nature of God is God. Hence the Damascene said : ' The Subsisting Word of God is an Existence and Being in the hypostasis ; but other words (*i.e.*, ours) are forms of the soul.'

Hence, from these principles we must hold that, properly speaking, the Word in the Divine Nature is always to be considered personally, since it imports nothing else but an expression of an intelligent Being. It is likewise evident that the Divine Word is the likeness of Him from Whom It proceeds, and that It is coeternal with Him from Whom It proceeds, since it was never first formable before it was formed, but was always actual (*in actu*), and that It is equal to the Father, since It is perfect and expressive of the whole being of the Father ; and It is coessential and consubstantial with the Father, since it is subsisting in His Nature. It is also clear that in every nature, whatever proceeds and has the likeness and the nature of him from whom it proceeds, is called son ; and this is so in the Word Who in God is called Son ; and that His production is called Generation.

THE METHOD OF ST. THOMAS.

Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis.—ST. THOMAS.

In considering the method pursued by St. Thomas in the ' Summa,' it is necessary first to note what he lays down in his *Opusculum* on ' The Difference between the Divine Word and the human word.'

In this we see that what are absolute perfections in God are relative imperfections in man, and *vice versa*. The ' differences ' in man as regards the Divine Word make up the qualities and character of the human word. Upon these qualities of the human word the method of St. Thomas is founded.

That method, it will be seen, is essentially precise, didactic, logical. Not only does the great Teacher follow out this line of logical argument, but he draws his disciple along the same path, to the same method of disputation, argument, and of logical conclusion.

In this respect the 'Summa Theologica' stands out among all the works of the great Doctor. None of his other writings so excel in logical form, in division, subdivision, and argument. As this was his last and greatest work, it is clear that such a method had the full sanction of his experience, and comprised the ripest effect of his scholastic wisdom, as the way recommended to him for the purpose mentioned by him in the Prologue, 'ad eruditionem incipientium.'

It is true that students approaching the 'Summa' for the first time may feel puzzled by the method thus displayed. Every subject is introduced by the word 'Utrum' (Whether); and clothed in the garb of apparent doubt. This preliminary term is equal to, *Is it so? Is it true? Why?* Nothing is excepted; neither the primary dictates of Reason, nor the primary dogmas of Revelation. Everything comes in as a question, to become a verification before it is accepted as a Truth. All propositions are summoned to the same bar, to plead their rationality before the human mind and its assessors. Truly the words quoted at the beginning seem to be carried to their extreme limit, and even to excess:—'Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis.'

The modern student may wonder as he sees what looks like the Cartesian Doubt emerging from the depths of the thirteenth century, shaped by the master theologian of the Church; and published as the sound method of discipleship.

The human mind is a discursive mind. If in place of *Doubt* we use the term *Difficulty*, we shall have made a step in advance towards realizing that the Method of St. Thomas is the consequence of the congenital environment surrounding the human mind in the very conditions of its present existence. Hence it is that the Scholastics say with St. Thomas, *omnis nostra cognitio a sensu initium habet* ('Summa Th., I., Q. I., A. 9); and again, *in cognitione*

humana fundamentum et origo est sensus (Opusc. xxi., *de princ. Ind.*).

This is not the place for a full treatment of the Origin of Ideas, according to the Scholastic theory. It is sufficient to say that the principles of discussion and argument come down to us from the classic tradition of all ages, and were formulated into shape first of all by the immortal question of Socrates. The question of St. Thomas is not the Doubt of Descartes, but may be called the Socratic doubt, justified by the process of sound reasoning.

Such is the method of discipleship for the end St. Thomas had in view, which was the enucleation of the word, as above described, and also in his words, 'Apud nos, doctores quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum' (P. I., Q. CVI., A. 1).

This great work contains the 'Summa' of the teacher, and the 'multiplex distinctio' adapted to the capacity and need of the disciple. It is a teaching work, the greatest of its kind ever put forth by mortal man. In the logical arena master and disciple meet in that conflict and correspondence of mind with mind, and word with word, the result of which is the special fruit of the Scholastic system. Many a battle royal has been fought over the 'Summa' in the schools; as the flashing eye and kindling word expressed the interest amounting to enthusiasm to find the fitting thought and the right word for the supremacy of truth. The principle and end of such a method are founded on the perfect trust of St. Thomas in the human mind, according to his own words; 'Intellectus circa proprium objectum semper verus est; unde ex seipso nunquam decipitur; sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo hujusmodi' (P. I., Q. XCIV., A. 4).

While all the writings of St. Thomas are pervaded with what may be called a strong syllogistic strain, the 'Summa Theologica' towers above them all by the precision of its parts no less than by the vastness and grandeur of its design. Not a comma has escaped the chiselling of the master; every detail is in place; yet so exquisite is the art

that the result strikes the mind with a sense of lightness only to be produced by a perfect proportion.

The Rationality of the human mind thus drawn out implies the presence of that inner sense of Difficulty which is essentially a part of Reason. It is our mental nature fully displayed. A child learns by asking questions ; to ' children of a larger growth ' in the school of experience, one problem after another is solved in the same way, with an added sense of responsibility in the answer. The method of logical form has its roots in the inmost recesses of the mind, where every man sits in the discernment of judgment on his own thoughts, subjecting each one to the ' discussio ' which is so natural as to be inseparable from every phase of sound mentality. Man carries on with himself a perpetual debate. Reason brings its ' corpus cogitabile ' to Intelligence for discernment ; Intelligence frames its verification in the forms of Reason. This we call Difficulty in the sense of inquiry. St. Thomas makes it a debate. The Scholastics contained the first great debating society ; and the ' Summa ' is its model.

The human mind is the only intellect which sees difficulty. In this lies the peculiar perplexity and complexity of man ; also his peculiar prerogative ; so that the human mind is the only one which reaches truth through and by means of difficulties ; whose sun shines through clouds ; and whose clouds subserve the purpose of its sun. Man walks among the shadows ; but the shadows are Signs. His knowledge is more akin to the irradiations upon him of the stars, in the expanse of the vast cloak of night, than to the noonday illumination of the unclouded sun.

Difficulty of discussion and inquiry have no real connection with doubt.

If man reasons at all, he must ask, Why ? It was the mission of Socrates to spur men on to ask, Why ? It was the mission of the Scholastics to carry on the *why* to a successful issue. The lawful *why* is the voice of the natural man rebutting the plea of the artificial man in favour of that intellectual inertia called in our day Agnosticism.

Investigation is so natural a process that every man can test its propriety by an appeal to the inner working of his own mind. Reason as a discursive faculty, involving argument, presupposes inquiry, which is rooted in the nature of cause and effect. The mind's right is to see effects everywhere. The resolution of difficulty means the tracing of effect to cause.

All possible difference, then, exists between Socrates and Descartes in their respective *Utrum*, as teachers of Certainty and Uncertainty. St. Thomas carried on the Socratic demand upon the human mind to realize its estate of pupillage in the school of aboriginal verification.

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle together, however, do not suffice to present us with the full method of St. Thomas. St. Thomas had a secret of his own, expressed to posterity in a word of his own. The external logical form which he inherited and the interior ratiocinative process he imported into the weight of evidence for truth were made complete by his own sonorous *Respondeo dicendum quod*, which marks the great contrast with the past, the great departure for the future. That decisive sense of Certainty and Certitude to which the ancient Greeks had not aspired, was made by St. Thomas the prelude, the preamble, the necessary first steps, almost the commonplace of the system, which he founded on antiquity, yet made so new. The old philosophy had become corroded by doubt to the verge of disintegration.

The world has calumniated St. Thomas as if he spent his time in asking 'Why?'; whereas he said 'Because' as often as he said 'Why?' and indeed he never said the first without the second. He raised no question without answering it. His whole mental force was directed, not to the Question; but to the Answer. The 'Because' is the luminous word which shines upon his breast; for this he is called the sun of doctrine, and praised as the channel of almost miraculous illumination to the Church.

'Beyond all doubt,' says Cardinal Manning, 'the Scholastic Philosophy is the most solid and subtle system ever yet elaborated by the human mind by its own unaided

force.' This is the triumph of St. Thomas's 'Respondeo dicendum.' The Scholastic system may be called the Philosophy of 'Because.' The Certainty of 'Because' made the golden age of Scholasticism.

The method of St. Thomas in the 'Summa' may be described as the Ratiocination of the human word in contrast to the perfection of the Divine Word; and, on the other hand, as a contrast also to the Rationalism of the human word itself, in excess wandering off beyond its own laws. The human mind was not made for Doubt; it was made for Certainty.

To realize the full meaning of St. Thomas's 'Because,' we must realize that he did not invent it. He no more invented it than he invented Reason. 'Because,' like 'Why,' was spoken in all ages; and is connatural to man in all ages.

It is significant that the new era of Scholasticism was initiated by the 'Cur' of St. Anselm. This necessarily involved a new 'Because.' Both were enriched and extended by Peter Lombard. With the work of these two eminent men, one a Saint and Doctor of the Church, the first step of the Scholastic Rationality had advanced so far as to remove objections against Faith urged by reason. The Faith was rational because the objections were irrational; this was the high-water mark of the first period; the work of Anselm and Peter; and a great work it was, a mighty stride forward.

Then arose another and a greater period, wherein, by the 'Summa Theologiæ' of Albertus Magnus, and in the 'Summa Theologica' of St. Thomas, the promise of the first period was brilliantly accomplished. Not only did the Scholastic Doctors supply Faith with correct premisses. They made Faith itself a premiss, extracting from it by a most subtle and victorious process the gold of rational Certitude and Certainty contained within it. Thus did the 'Because' of St. Thomas and his school arise in its gigantic stature. Thus were the great words verified, 'Ratio in homine habet locum dominantis.'

It must not be supposed that the 'Because' of St.

Thomas was only an advance on Anselm and Peter. In that respect its 'difference' is less than when it is compared to the ancient sages, and still less even when compared with modern systems. The method of St. Thomas's 'Because' was so closely akin to what immediately preceded that it absorbed all previous Scholastic lore without an effort; indeed in that respect it was a legitimate consequence of what had been established in the schools. As regards the Grecian philosophy, however, it was an innovation; to much of modern thought it remains what it ever was, a contrast.

If we wish to see this clearly at a glance, we may ask the question, How does the Scholastic differ from Modern Philosophy?

We have considered this point as a Principle; it remains to treat of it as a Method.

The Method of St. Thomas was pre-eminently artistic. This has become a commonplace remark as regards the 'Summa';—as Cardinal Newman, when an Anglican, remarked also as regards the 'Catena Aurea,' in his Preface to the English Oxford translation.

If we wish to know the principles of his artistic method, we can find it in the two great treatises which expound it to the full, the Question XIII. of the 'Summa' *De nominibus Dei*; and the Treatise on Analogy written by Cardinal Cajetan. So far from the imagination being excluded, it was formally installed as the method leading us to speak adequately of God Himself; so far from its being stunted, it was raised to heights unknown to Greece; ignored in more modern times.

In what manner the ancients were deficient in this point is shown by the words of St. Thomas:—'Antiqui autem, ignorantes vim intelligendi, et non distinguentes inter sensum et intellectum, nihil esse existimaverunt in mundo nisi quod sensu et imaginatione apprehendi potest. Et quia sub imaginatione non cadit nisi corpus, existimaverunt quod nullum ens esset nisi corpus' ('Summa Th.,' I., Q. L., 1). This is a description of the plainly univocal principle, upon

which rested the old Mythology, which, with all its brilliant imagery, contained nothing beyond what existed in the average experience of the average man.

St. Thomas fully adhered to the method of univocation in its own sphere ; and its sphere included all that the senses perceived. It is superfluous to explain what the senses are in the Scholastic system as the origin of knowledge. The application, or adaptation, of this principle to suprasensual truth is thus premised :—‘ Similitudo autem intellectus nostri non sufficienter probat aliquid de Deo, propter hoc quod intellectus non univoce invenitur in Deo et in nobis ’ (I., Q. XXXII., A. 1, ad 2). We know God from and by creatures ; ‘ Deum nominare non possumus nisi ex creaturis ’ (Q. XIII., A. 5). Again : ‘ Intellectus noster, qui ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem manuducitur, oportet quod Deum considerat secundum modum quem ex creaturis assumit ’ (Q. XXXIX., A. 8). It is clear, then, that we know God by inference from sense. The final principle of this exquisite artistic method is expressed in the great words :—‘ Magis enim manifestatur nobis de ipso [Deo] quid non est, quam quid est ’ (I., Q. I., A. 9, ad 3).

It is to be observed, therefore, that the Analogy of St. Thomas and the Scholastics means Proportion, as Cajetan clearly teaches, the importance of which Analogy he thus describes : ‘ Sine illa non possit metaphysicam quispiam discere, et multi in aliis scientiis ex ejus ignorantia errores procedunt. Quod si ullo unquam tempore accidit, hac ætate id evenire clara luce videmus.’ He had previously remarked that he was induced to treat of the subject by its very obscurity, and ‘ by the lamentable want of profound literature in our age ’ (*Invitatus et ab ipsius rei obscuritate, et a nostri ævi flebili profundarum literarum penuria*).

What St. Thomas’s greatest commentator thought of Analogy is thus evident. That he equally well saw before him the age of its decline is also evident. Modern philosophers seem to be agreed that a new method was dawning at that time. Thus Reid, whose system has been valued as in some sense a new departure, says : ‘ If

one attentively examines the system of the ancient philosophers, either concerning the material world or concerning the mind, he will find them to be built solely upon the foundation of Analogy.* From other passages it appears that Reid considers Analogy only by way of comparison. The idea of Analogy by way of proportion is not adequately realized by him, and the same may be asserted of Butler, Berkeley, and others who have in various ways used and propounded Analogy.

The Analogy of Proportion is founded on the well-known Scholastic axiom, 'Quod recipitur, per modum recipientis recipitur.' It depends on the subjective law of the mind, and rests on the same law as Perspective; expressed in the words quoted from Aristotle, 'Natura autem rei quæ intelligitur est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum modum essendi extra animam secundum quem intelligitur' (I., Q. LXXVI., A. 2, ad 4).

Univocation without proportion applied to these truths results in Equivocation. St. Thomas uses this term in a sense that denotes a lawful use of intellectual power.

The simplest form of univocation is expressed in the words of Wordsworth concerning Peter Bell:

' A primrose by a river's brim
A yellow primrose was to him,
And it was nothing more.'

Why, we may ask, should it be anything more? Because it has relations. A child may not grasp these relations; but to a man the analogy of relation is an imperative need and duty of mind. When we see the Scholastic Philosophy banished from modern life under the plea of Analogy, we begin to suspect the existence of a somewhat abnormal Equivocation in the prevalent counter-theories. St. Thomas admits a proper and reasonable Equivocation (Q. XIII., A. 5); but Equivocation to the verge of irony is found often enough to make us see the reign of a principle that aids neither univocation nor analogy.

We have dwelt upon the principle of the *verbum*. We

* 'An Inquiry into the Human Mind,' chap. vii.

are now treating of its method. Considering it now as we are in the latter aspect, it is St. Thomas's view of truth in the mind ; in connection with which the following passage from the 'Summa' is fittingly here quoted :—'Veritas proprie est in solo intellectu ; res autem dicuntur veræ a veritate quæ est in aliquo intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa intellectum. Cujus quidem veritas in hoc consistit quod habeat conformitatem ad res intellectas' (I., Q. XVI., A. 8). In this passage is briefly summed up the true, sound, and safe relativity of truth. A longer description would take us into the whole Scholastic theory of ideas.

Thus the plenitude of St. Thomas's *Because* comes out in its full splendour. His 'Because' is the true illumination, harmonizing the limited nature of the human mind with the objective truth.

The Method of St. Thomas is bounded by these words 'Utrum' and 'Respondeo dicendum.' These differ from and altogether excel the Doubt and the *ergo* of Descartes, with an amplitude of their own, as comprising the fullest measure of rational inquiry and rational solution. In a true sense they are his own ; for it is impossible to find any topic of Certitude and Certainty that has not a place in them.

THE 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA.'

This famous work was the last and greatest written by St. Thomas Aquinas.

It is divided into Three Parts. The Second Part is subdivided into two, called the *Prima Secundæ* and the *Secunda Secundæ*.

The whole 'Summa' is arranged on a uniform plan. Every subject is introduced as a question, and divided into articles. The number of questions in the whole 'Summa' is 612—of articles, 3,120. Each article has also a uniform disposition of parts. The topic is introduced as an inquiry for discussion, under the term *Utrum*, whether—*e.g.*,

Utrum Deus sit? The objections against the proposed conclusion are then stated. These are generally three or four in number; but sometimes extend to seven or more. The conclusion adopted is then introduced by the words, *Respondeo dicendum*. At the end of the thesis thus expounded the objections are answered, under the forms, *Ad primum, ad secundum, etc.*

The 'Summa' is cast in a severely logical and scientific form. It is like the orderly march of a great army; the array of deductions following in serried ranks one after the other in ceaseless tread over the vanquished 'objections,' and attaining to a triumphant victory. Every thesis is made into a battle of words, ending in a syllogistic conclusion which allows of no truce or escape, every detail in its place contributing to the eventuality of the final result. There is no passion; no haste; all goes forward in serenest order to the end. The entire 'Summa' may be compared to a miniature campaign, wherein the battalions of error are all the more completely overthrown, because they are permitted to advance in all their undisguised strength to the attack. If we multiply the objections by the articles, we shall arrive at the conclusion that St. Thomas advances over ten thousand objections against the Christian Religion; and he answers them all. Has any other Philosopher ever equalled such a feat? These objections are all carefully chosen and formulated in the best order for their real strength to be felt—objections that in those days were living, though to us in many ways dead and buried, owing to the victorious refutations of the 'Summa.' Every one of these objections receives a full, accurate, and often most profound answer that in itself makes a thesis of great proportions.

It may be thought that the comparison drawn from the idea of a battle is out of place as regards the work of a great student. But it suits the time, the place, and the age of the 'Summa,' and the spirit of the Crusades, which breathed their high and lofty genius into its pages. St. Thomas was an apostle; the word to him was the instrument of a

conquest over mind. If St. Thomas was a great thinker, he was also a great writer; he wrote to win souls, as a Friar Preacher. It may be granted, however, that such a comparison comprises only one side of the facts that governed the situation. St. Thomas, indeed, represents the peaceful side of the advance of the Christian hosts. He was not in the vanguard where swords clanked and helmets gleamed; he was the rearguard of the great crusading army.

A very interesting history of the 'Summa' might be written from the objections. Indeed, the objections are the key to its history. How far the 'Summa' can be called obsolete may be seen from the objections. This history is seen not only in the objections singly, but in their connection by the word 'Præterea,' translated *Further*, which joins them together in form, and makes them a chain of ascending degree, exquisitely disposed and proportioned to the final conclusion. The monotony of this form is really the strength of the objections as one combined and serried attack on the main position.

The objections explain why St. Thomas wrote; why in many cases he selected the titles of the articles. They have a further interest and importance in showing, besides the grasp of that mighty mind, the extraordinary diligence and drudgery of that apostolic and saintly life, the absolute self-denial involved in such a work, betokening the self-sacrifice of a Saint. The objections contain much trivial matter; sophistries, fallacies, carpings, and criticisms of every description. In reading them, however, do we not hear the sophists, the critics themselves? Do we not recognize beneath it all the cry of souls? And on the other hand, do we not see the large heart and mind of an apostolic Saint, willing to hear all if he can only save some? Perhaps no part of the 'Summa' speaks for the drudgery, the vast labour involved in all its pages, so well as do the objections.

As to the 'Article' itself, beginning in every case with 'Respondeo dicendum,' it is reported that a Pope exclaimed: 'Quot articuli tot miracula!' Each of these

articles, long or short, contains the thought of years, matured and elaborated by the great mind, scientific in its every fibre, compressed into a most brilliant and lucid summary. To describe them would be to write a commentary upon them.

What the influence of the 'Summa' has been, and is, may perhaps be best seen from the commentaries. Its illuminating power is proved by the long ages of deep and accurate thought it has called forth from acute minds. What St. Thomas has done may be seen from what he has made other men do. Following in the track of the great luminary is a crowd of stars, forming together a path of light that may be compared to the 'milky way' in the heavens. Each of these stars has a light of its own, a merit of its own, and a place of its own, in the vast firmament of Thomistic lore. These commentators are no less remarkable for their humility than the great Master himself. Content to abide each one in his own place, aspiring only to add to the illumination of Truth, not for the shining forth of self, all the Commentators have a share in the sanctity and moral greatness of St. Thomas, no less than in his mental influence.

The Scholastics have been charged with subtlety. Of course they are subtle; but not in their main thesis too subtle. The subject-matter requires subtlety; the same is the case with mathematics and the other pure sciences. If a book treats of law, its contents will probably be 'dry'; in that respect its dryness is its merit. The Scholastics soared into regions where thought seems almost to be disembodied; no wonder that the average mind of an age which believes not in metaphysics should pant after them bewildered. As an example of unfair prejudice it has been said as a sneer that St. Thomas disputes 'how many angels can stand on the point of a needle.' It is curious that when he touches on the question, he decides almost in the precisely opposite sense that each Angel, if it occupies place, must have its own place; so that one place is filled by one angel (I., Q. LII. A., 3).

Enough has been put forward above to explain the position of the Scholastics, and to show that their *verbum* was essentially based on the twin illumination of Reason and Revelation. Any other assumed basis of judgment will, of course, inevitably lead to their being undervalued and depreciated. St. Thomas and his School were animated by the apostolic desire and duty of repelling and refuting the objections of their age.

The following Translation has been revised and corrected according to the Leonine edition of Pope Leo XIII. The chief previous edition was the edition of St. Pius V., in 1570. Into this was incorporated all that was excellent in former times.

The chief editions since 1570 were those of John Nocaldi (Paris, 1663), Reginald Lucarini (Rome, 1666, and Padua, 1698); another edition, 1712; Bettinelli (Venice, 1745), with the Notes of F. Bernard de Rubeis in 1755. The Leonine is now the standard edition.

The Translation rendered in the following pages consists of the 'Prima Pars' of the 'Summa Theologica,' comprising 119 Questions and 584 Articles. It contains the treatises 'De Deo Uno, and Trino,' 'De Angelis,' 'De Homine,' 'De modo et ordine intelligendi,' etc. These may be regarded as the foundation of all that follows in the 'Summa.'

The First Number contains QQ. I. to XXVI.; the Second Number, QQ. XXVII. to LXXIV.; the Third Number, QQ. LXXV. to CXIX.

Among the other versions of the 'Summa,' the poetic rendering entitled 'Hymnus Angelicus,' by Father Francis Penoa, O.P. (1651), is worthy of special mention.

TRANSLATION OF THE 'SUMMA.'

The Translation here presented to the public is based on the principle of being a *literal* and *clear* rendering of the Text. Three courses were open to those who undertook

the labour of this work—a paraphrase, an annotated edition, and a literal translation. A decision in favour of a literal translation was eventually adopted. There is room for such an English Text, in this day of Texts. It is useful in many ways ; indeed, it may be called a necessity.

The idea of an English Text of this kind excluded any large system of notes. Indeed, to such a work annotations in proportionate length would so greatly extend its size that the question of expense was bound to arise. Moreover, the Translators felt that any considerable course of Notes would be in a great degree an obstacle to their design. No doubt an English reader following the Text as thus presented may often be inclined to pause and ask the meaning of this or that phrase, or the drift of this or that argument. Any work of the past would suggest such difficulties. This applies especially to the 'Summa Theologica,' which is so singularly fruitful in ideas, and is such a stimulus to thought. Against such a demand, however, may be brought the plain fact that St. Thomas's Articles do not require Notes in the sense of danger-signals or warnings, such as may be necessary in the case of some works of brilliant but uncertain reputation, expressed in an obscure style. Nothing of the difficulty of ambiguous phrase belongs to St. Thomas. He is probably the clearest author who ever lived.

The Latin of St. Thomas is not difficult. Still less is it obsolete ; not a term he uses but is in full vigour at the present day. The Notes then required would be called for by the System he advocates, and the theories he puts forward. Such Notes have the nature of a continuous Commentary, which for obvious reasons is not possible. Nor do the Translators consider it desirable. The Text of the 'Summa' has a difficulty of its own ; but it is a reasonable difficulty. It is good for the student to think out such a difficulty for himself. Again, the Text may be obscure, but with a reasonable obscurity, fitted to the subject-matter, suited to the dignity of the Author—nay, even a tribute to the dignity of the reader. Our readers are addressed by

St. Thomas as thinkers ; he believes in their intelligence ; he trusts in their minds. Notes of too copious a kind lower the author, the reader, and the Text ; they subserve only the useless purpose of making everything too easy, taking away the high stimulus of curiosity and research which add to reading the high and intellectual pleasure of study. These words of explanation will, we hope, make the Text of St. Thomas in English a high, and profitable, and acceptable undertaking.

No one feels more keenly than the Translators the difficulty of rendering the Text of St. Thomas into English. Apart from the abstruse and difficult points raised, independently of the vast abysses of truth opened to the eye, more mysterious often in what is suggested than what is expressed, it is impossible in a translation to do justice to the conciseness and elegance of the style, or to express adequately the clearness of the thought, the lightning-like rapidity of the glance, or to bring out the grasp of the subtlest points, so apparent in the original work itself, all uniting in a charm that can be felt. What comes out above all is the tone and authority of a great Teacher, of the one who worthily fills the first place in the ranks of mastership and discipleship.

In spite, however, of the inherent difficulties of the task, and of the feeling engendered by it that a translation can never be the Angel of the Schools himself, nevertheless those who have done this work have experienced it throughout as a labour of love, and as a pleasure that carries with it its own reward. To translate the 'Summa' is to know St. Thomas as he can hardly be otherwise known ; and to know him is to understand something of the spell he cast over Europe for so many long years, as the one great architectonic and periodic mind, sheltering and fostering and forming all that was intellectually best in Europe. To know St. Thomas is to love him ; and to love him is to value aright the work done to make him known to others. The Translators have the further and crowning pleasure of the assurance that their work is in accordance with the wishes and expressed desires of the Holy See.

Our aim in this Translation is to induce readers to become students of St. Thomas. The reasonable difficulties of the Text will serve as a stimulus for such a purpose.

No one can study the 'Summa' without feeling raised up to the true region of Rational Religion. This is indeed the region which to-day seems to be unoccupied to such a degree that we may almost call it vacant and waste ground, whereon grow only the weeds of Rationalism with all the other products of unrestrained private judgment. Of all products of the human spirit, Religion alone is unguarded, exposed to the sport of the winds and the storms. A treatment is advanced which would not hold good in any other department of life; methods are pursued which in commerce would lead to bankruptcy, in police to anarchy, in politics to revolution. How far these principles, or principles which are no principles, have made incursions into the civil departments of life need not be dwelt upon at present; it is enough to say that their evil effects are visible enough to cause reasonable alarm. The plain Fact is acknowledged that Religion in general and as a fact greatly stands out from the Rationality of life. As a consequence, it is consigned to the sphere of sentiment, and treated only as an emotion.

The Scholastic Philosophy has for its glory, to make Rationality in Religion; and this it does by drawing from Faith the intellectuality enshrined within it. What this includes of benefit to the present age hardly needs description.

In one department of Science, however, it cannot be denied that St. Thomas is 'behind the age'; as regards his astronomical ideas, when he speaks for the old order of theory before the times of Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton. On this head it is in some quarters insinuated, if not openly averred, that the Scholastics were responsible for such theories; whereas the fact is, of course, that they simply took up and passed on what had come down to them from Hipparchus and Ptolemy. As to St. Thomas himself, his remarks display no more interest or information on the subject than might be uttered by any 'educated gentleman'

of his time who was able to observe for himself in the spirit of an amateur ; and to record his own occasional impressions. He had made no special study of natural science ; this is quite evident. It is not deemed necessary to revive these old theories by the addition of Notes to the passages where they occur, as they do not affect the argument, and are mostly appended as illustrations.

St. Thomas is not anxious to display any severely critical discernment in the quotation of authorities. Some doubtful or spurious authorities, and others of a minor rank, are placed by him on the same level apparently as Aristotle and SS. Augustine, Ambrose, and Gregory. The False Decretals of course, he accepts. It is enough to point out that these quotations never affect the argument. He uses them for the sake of the answers. It is interesting to note the respect the author pays to the least of such authorities, and the ingenuity exercised in reconciling their words with dogma ; but as a whole they are quoted as illustrations only, and sometimes seem to serve the purpose merely of pegs upon which to hang an objection for the sake of the more important reply.

There is one sub-section, as it may be called, of this department which requires a few slightly more extended remarks.

It will be observed, throughout this part of the 'Summa,' that St. Thomas frequently refers to the ruling of the 'heavenly bodies' in human affairs ; and in such a way as apparently to give countenance to pronounced views of astrology. Much of this may be referred to the old astronomy above mentioned ; still there remains a *residuum*, which may seem at first sight difficult to reconcile with the true and admitted and permitted boundaries as regards this interesting subject.

It may be pointed out, as the standpoint of all these opinions, that St. Thomas looked upon the universe as a vast harmony and concord of parts forming one united whole, wherein every single portion occupied its own allotted place. The idea of 'separate parts' did not appeal to him

so much as the subordination of the parts to the whole, and the working out of every detail in connection with the perfect organism. Any other idea of the universe was alien to his mind. In accordance with this principle, the 'corpora cœlestia' held their proper place, operating as forces in concurrence with all the other natural agents to the perfect carrying out of the purpose and end uniting them all together. So far he might almost be imagined as joining hands with Newton.

Thus the 'Astrology' held by St. Thomas meant that the stars exercised their own influence on climate, and on all the corporeal elements of human life, in agreement with other laws, and in subordination to all superior laws; above all in absolute subjection to the supreme and absolute Will of God. This is clearly expressed by his words: *Motus cœli est in universo corporalium naturarum sicut motus cordis in animali quo conservatur vita* (I., Q. XVIII., A. I. ad 1).

It may seem strange to us, in this connection, that the lawful and once current ideas of the Astrology recorded in the Bible and mentioned in the 'Summa' should have come down to us only as an echo of the unlawful astrology which, it cannot be denied, keeps pace with our civilization. Without entering at present into the causes of the eclipse of what was once a noble science, it is enough to say that no sign of it can be justly traced to the secret and illicit and absurd practices carried on by fortune-tellers, star-gazers, and crystal-gazers who reap as profitable an income in the present day, as they have ever done in all ages, from the credulity of mankind.

We may ask, why have we lost the clue to the lawful use of dreams? Why is astrology so dangerous a pursuit that the Church feels compelled to discountenance it even as a use, and not only as an abuse? The answer cannot be provided here, except to say that the breaking up of the grand unity of the world taught by the Scholastics began when the Reformation gave entrance to that notion of universal antagonism which has multiplied sects and divisions even at the fireside. Authority and Liberty; Religion and

Science, Industry and Profit, Poverty and Wealth, what are all these in our days but antagonisms? representing so many warfares; the idea of their essential unities and subserviencies being wellnigh lost. When St. Thomas returns with the luminous idea of the one *Cosmos*, then will practical unity again flourish.

(The idea of harmony thus emphasized has found a beautiful expression and practical treatment as regards human society in a book too much forgotten, Digby's 'Comptium,' a work of which English Catholics should be proud.)

Perhaps this is the only subject in the 'Summa' which demands explanation in the sense that it might be misunderstood.

As regards Catholics in general, for whom this Translation is principally intended, it may be truly said that the greater portion of the 'Summa' is so plainly intelligible that they will only find confirmation of all they have learned from their cradles. These will be instructed, enlightened, delighted, with the luminous teaching of the great Master; they will not be puzzled or drawn into any maze of speculation at variance with the simplest words of their Catechism. Since the age of St. Thomas a new duty has been by some introduced into the Gospel—the duty of learning to read; for private judgment on the Bible means this, which even to the perplexed heathen has been proposed as the basis of salvation. This duty St. Thomas certainly never acknowledged. Nevertheless, the custom and law of reading have become so well advanced and rooted that the Church recognizes in all countries her duty of acting upon it as a fact. With this fact in view, we now address ourselves to the large class that learn from books. To these we say, Here is one of the greatest books in the world—a book which has formed Universities, nourished doctors, presided at Councils. It is still a book, and wherever its words penetrate the incommunicable spell of genius and sanctity radiates from the page which in its present printed form the Author himself never saw.

We feel sure they will be glad to read this Text, which has worked as powerful a revolution in the world as any accomplished by the violent methods which are chiefly chronicled for their noise and devastation. The 'Summa' is necessarily a problem, attractive to all who can appreciate the two conditions of all real and fruitful problems, certainty and fixity of Principle with elasticity of means to elucidate it as a Conclusion. To these we offer the 'Summa' as a compliment to their education and intelligence, as a Text unadorned and unencumbered except with the introduction of a necessary comment to announce who is entering into their lives, and for what purpose he seeks to form the pronouncement of their mental word on the highest of all subjects.

The prejudice which may obstruct the free greeting we bespeak for the 'Summa' is really slight compared with the deep cleft between the thought of the author and the current Idea of the age that metaphysics enclose a vast unreal domain aptly to be called a desert. St. Thomas took metaphysical truth to be a reality. Nowadays to many, Metaphysics are the standing unreality. Hamilton, Mill, and Ward lamented the loss to the English people brought about by this irrational prejudice. Yet metaphysical truth is plainly acted upon day by day. It is used, yet not recognized; employed, but not avowed. Such a loss, then, is not merely an absence; it is one of those inconsistencies and contradictions which make this our age richer than any other in confusions confounded in ceaseless cycles of warfare against the primary dictates of Reason. The only idea of Metaphysics we can generally find is the relation of the univocal to matter. We may hope that the 'Summa' will help to restore some sense of the value of this most real of all sciences.

Apart from all here advanced as a means to obviate or penetrate into the unnatural obscurity founded in prejudice, it remains to be said that there exists such a thing as legitimate obscurity. A great text of an eminent teacher has the right to be obscure. The subject-matter is sometimes

extremely exalted ; difficulty adheres to it, as clouds hang about the summit of a mountain. Too much intelligibility means lowness ; too much clearness means shallowness. 'Still waters run deep.' The great pools of Thought contain the eternal problems of Truth absolute.

But, it may be objected, is not faith simple, is not Religion for all ; both the ignorant and the wise ? What has profundity to do with salvation ? To this question, if it deserves the name as objected against the 'Summa Theologica,' it is enough to reply that St. Thomas teaches Theology, and that the science of Theology bears the same kind of relation to supernatural life and to grace that the sciences of Astronomy and Physiology and Law bear to human life in the natural order. Theology, as the science of experts and the learned, is no more necessary to salvation and grace than Astronomy and Biology are to human civilization—no more ; and yet also no less ; for as an age which worships Evolution will be ready to aver, human civilization is at least accidentally bound up with correct science, and is liable to suffer from the diffusion of unripe and incorrect ideas on subjects which perhaps have no essential bearing on the intrinsic merits of any individual man.

Theology is a science which pours the light of principles on conduct and belief ; making conduct more consistent, less exposed to panic, fanaticism, and superstition ; making belief more intelligent ; making the same also more intelligible to outsiders, objectors, and worshippers of intellectual excellence.

The Translators feel, as regards the 'Summa,' that there is such a thing as normal intelligibility ; there is also an abnormal intelligibility of the vulgar sort, which corrodes the mind, and deprives intellectuality of its native vigour. They have aimed at the first. They have made St. Thomas intelligible by a sound translation ; they have not aimed at the second ; they wish the Text to speak for itself and persuade itself into the mind of *the thinker*. They do not wish to 'cram' the 'Summa' into anyone ; what they rely upon is intelligent appreciation and sincere study of a Text which

has moved the world, and which stands among the rare immortal things produced by the human intellect.

The objections which in various degrees, and tones, underlie the preceding remarks, coalesce into this one question. Is it worth while, can it be a success, to translate St. Thomas into English? Thinking that it is worth while, that it can and will be a success, the Editor and Translators transmit their labours to the approval which the future alone can provide.

W. L.

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PROLOGUE

BECAUSE the master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle : *As unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat*—1 Cor. iii. 1, 2), we purpose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this Science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments ; partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book might require, or the occasion of the argument offer ; partly, too, because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers.

Endeavouring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

FIRST PART.

QUESTION I.

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE.

(In Ten Articles.)

To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavour to investigate the nature and extent of this Sacred Doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry :—

(1) Whether it is necessary? (2) Whether it is a Science? (3) Whether it is one or many? (4) Whether it is speculative or practical? (5) How it is compared with other sciences? (6) Whether it is the same as Wisdom? (7) Whether God is its subject-matter? (8) Whether it is a matter of argument? (9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes? (10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this Doctrine may be expounded in different senses?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER, BESIDES PHILOSOPHY, ANY FURTHER DOCTRINE IS REQUIRED?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. Man should not seek to know what is above reason : *Seek not the things that are too high for thee* (Eccclus. iii. 22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science.

Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.

Obj. 2. Further, knowledge can only be concerned with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true ; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science—even God Himself ; so that there is a part of philosophy called Theology, or the Divine Science, as Aristotle has proved. Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.

On the contrary, It is said, *All Scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice* (2 Tim. iii. 16). Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science there should be other knowledge—*i.e.*, inspired of God.

I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is ordained to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason ;—*The eye hath not seen, besides Thee, O God, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee* (Isa. lxiv. 4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by Divine Revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a Divine Revelation ; because the Truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this Truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught Divine Truths by Divine Revelation. It was therefore necessary that, besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learnt through Revelation.

Reply Obj. 1. Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, *For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of man* (Ecclus. iii. 25). And in this the Sacred Science consists.

Reply Obj. 2. Sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. The astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion—that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (*i.e.*, abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learnt from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in Sacred Doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A SCIENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Sacred Doctrine is not Science. For every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But Sacred Doctrine proceeds from articles of Faith which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all. *For all men have not faith* (2 Thess. iii. 2). Therefore Sacred Doctrine is not a science.

Obj. 2. Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this Sacred Science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Therefore Sacred Doctrine is not a science.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected, and strengthened.* But this can be said of no science except Sacred Doctrine. Therefore Sacred Doctrine is a science.

I answer that, Sacred Doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the light of the natural intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that Sacred Doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician; so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.

Reply Obj. 1. The principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of Sacred Doctrine.

Reply Obj. 2. Individual facts are treated of in Sacred Doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally: but they are rather introduced both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences), and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the Divine Revelation, on which this sacred Scripture or Doctrine is based, has come down to us.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS ONE SCIENCE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Sacred Doctrine is not one science; for according to the Philosopher, *that science is one which treats only of one class of subjects.* But the Creator and the creature, both of whom are treated of in Sacred Doctrine, cannot be grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore Sacred Doctrine is not one science.

Obj. 2. Further, in Sacred Doctrine we treat of angels, created bodies, and human morality. But these belong

to separate philosophical sciences. Therefore Sacred Doctrine cannot be one science.

On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science : *Wisdom gave him the science of holy things* (Wisd. x. 10).

I answer that, Sacred Doctrine is one. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not, indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man, ass, stone, agree in the one precise formality of being coloured ; and colour is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science ; and therefore is included under Sacred Doctrine as under one science.

Reply Obj. 1. Sacred Doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally and independently, but of God primarily ; and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not impaired.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well ; because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the *sensus communis* is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or audible. Hence the *sensus communis*, although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in Revelation. So that in this way Sacred Doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the Divine Science, which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A PRACTICAL SCIENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Sacred Doctrine is a practical science ; for a practical science is that which ends in action (according to the Philosopher). But Sacred Doctrine is ordained to action. *Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only* (Jas. i 22). Therefore Sacred Doctrine is a practical science.

Obj. 2. Further, Sacred Doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law. But Law implies a moral science, which is a practical science. Therefore Sacred Doctrine is a practical science.

On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with human operations ; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But Sacred Doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a practical science ; but it is rather speculative.

I answer that, Sacred Doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences, because it considers in each, the same formal aspect (ratio), namely so far as they can be known through Divine Revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless Sacred Doctrine includes both ; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is rather speculative than practical, because it is more concerned with Divine Things than with human acts ; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God, in which consists eternal bliss. *This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.*

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS NOBLER THAN OTHER SCIENCES ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Sacred Doctrine is not nobler than other sciences ; for the nobility of a science depends

on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than Sacred Doctrine; for its principles—namely, articles of faith—can be doubted. Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler.

Obj. 2. Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher; as music depends upon arithmetic. But Sacred Doctrine does in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to Magnus, that *the ancient doctors so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their scriptural learning.* Therefore Sacred Doctrine is inferior to other sciences.

On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one: *Wisdom sent her handmaidens to call them to her citadel* (Prov. ix. 3).

I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. One speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of the Divine Knowledge, which cannot be misled; in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter, because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to the further purpose. Political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army is ordained to the good of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are ordained. Hence it is

clear that from every standpoint it is nobler than other sciences.

Reply Obj. 1. It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our intelligence, which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun. Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things.

Reply Obj. 2. This science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as if it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it does not accept its principles from other sciences; but immediately from God, by Revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens; just as the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason, (from which proceed the other sciences), to that which is above reason, such as is taught in this science.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS DOCTRINE IS THE SAME AS WISDOM?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that this Doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles from without is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed. But this Doctrine derives its principles from without. Therefore this science is not wisdom.

Obj. 2. Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the

principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.

Obj. 3. Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa. xi. 2). Therefore this Doctrine is not the same as wisdom.

On the contrary, It is said, *This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations* (Deut. iv. 6).

I answer that, This Doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not merely in any one kind, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who perfectly considers the highest principle in that order: as in the order of building he who plans the form of the house is called wise and the architect, in opposition to the inferior labourers who trim the wood and make ready the stones: *As a wise architect I have laid the foundation* (1 Cor. iii. 10). Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he orders his acts for a fitting purpose: *Wisdom is prudence to a man* (Prov. x. 23). Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, who is God, is most of all called wise. Hence Wisdom is said to be the knowledge of Divine things, as Augustine says. But Sacred Doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause—not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him—*That which is known of God is manifest in them* (Rom. i. 19)—but also so far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence Sacred Doctrine is especially called wisdom.

Reply Obj. 1. Sacred Doctrine does not derive its principles from any human knowledge, but from the Divine Knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

Reply Obj. 2. The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural

reason through some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through Revelation, and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science, must be condemned as false: *Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God* (2 Cor. x. 4, 5).

Reply Obj. 3. Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue rightly judges in what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the habit of the virtue. The first manner of judging Divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: *The spiritual man judgeth all things* (1 Cor. ii. 15) And Dionysius says: *Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of Divine things.* The second manner of judging belongs to this Doctrine, which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by Revelation.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS SCIENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not the subject of this science. For in every science the nature of its subject is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the Essence of God, for Damascene says: *It is impossible to define the Essence of God.* Therefore God is not the subject of this science.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be comprehended under the subject of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach conclusions not only

concerning God, but concerning many other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the subject of this science.

On the contrary, The subject of the science is that of which it principally treats. But in this science the treatment is mainly about God ; for it is called Theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is the subject of this science.

I answer that, God is the subject of this science. The relation between a science and its subject is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. That is properly taken to be the object of a faculty under the formality of which all things are referred to that habit or faculty, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight as being coloured. Hence coloured things are the proper objects of sight. But in Sacred Science all things are treated of under the formality of God ; either because they are God Himself ; or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the subject of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of Faith, for Faith is about God. The subject of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the formality under which it is treated, have asserted the subject of this science to be something other than God—that is, either things and symbols, or the works of salvation, or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.

Reply Obj. 1. Although we cannot know in what consists the Essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God ; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever other conclusions are reached in

this sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or accidental qualities, but as in some way related to Him.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED SCIENCE IS A MATTER OF ARGUMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems this science is not a matter of argument. For Ambrose says : *Put arguments aside where faith is sought.* But in this science faith is especially sought : *But these things are written that you may believe* (John xx. 31). Therefore Sacred Doctrine is not a matter of argument.

Obj. 2. Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory, *faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience.* Therefore Sacred Doctrine is not a matter of argument.

On the contrary, The Scripture says that a Bishop should *embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers* (Titus i. 9).

I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences : so this Doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of Faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else ; as the Apostle from the Resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (I Cor. xv.). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those that deny them, but leave this to a higher science ; whereas the highest of them can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make

some concessions of metaphysical principles ; but if he concedes nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Science, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through Divine Revelation ; as we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those that deny one article of Faith we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of Divine Revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of Faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections—if he has any—against Faith. Since Faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against Faith cannot be strict demonstrations ; but difficulties that can be answered.

Reply Obj. 1. Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on Faith, nevertheless Sacred Science argues from admitted articles of Faith to other truths.

Reply Obj. 2. This Doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by Revelation : thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the Revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this Doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on Divine Revelation is the most effective. But Sacred Doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove Faith (for thereby the merit of Faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says : *Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of faith* (2 Cor. x. 5). Hence Sacred Doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the

truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus : *As some also of your own poets said, For we are also His offspring* (Acts xvii. 28). Nevertheless, Sacred Doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments ; but appositely uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the Doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our Faith rests upon the Revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other Doctors. Hence Augustine says : *Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learnt to hold in such honour as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But others I so read as not to deem anything in them to be true, merely on account of their having thought and written ; whatever may have been their holiness and learning.*

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HOLY SCRIPTURE SHOULD USE METAPHORS ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. That which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes.

Obj. 2. Further, This doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it : *They that explain me shall have life everlasting* (Ecclus. xxiv. 31). But by such similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore to put forward Divine Truths by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.

Obj. 3. Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they approach to the Divine likeness. If any creature be taken

to represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures, and not from the lower ; yet this is often found in the Scriptures.

On the contrary, It is said, *I have spoken by the prophets and multiplied visions* (Osee xii. 10). To put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may rightly use metaphors.

I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward Divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. It is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius says : *We cannot be enlightened by the Divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils.* It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is proposed to all without distinction of persons—*To the wise and to the unwise I am made a debtor* (Rom. i. 14)—that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from material things, in order that thereby even the simple who are unable to grasp intellectual things of themselves may be able to understand it.

Reply Obj. 1. Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a picture, for it is natural to man to be pleased with pictures. But Sacred Science makes use of metaphors as both useful and necessary.

Reply Obj. 2. The ray of Divine Revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled (as Dionysius says) ; but its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the Revelation has been made, to rest in the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths ; and through those to whom the Revelation has been made others also may receive instruction in these matters. Hence some things are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture, and in other parts are taught more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds, and as a defence

against the ridicule of the impious, according to the words *Give not what is holy to dogs* (Matt. vii. 6).

Reply Obj. 3. As Dionysius says, it is more fitting that Divine Truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler things, and this for three reasons: (1) Because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of Divine Truths, which might have been open to doubt had Divine Truths been expressed under the figure of nobler created things, especially for those who could not ascend above the lightest things of sense. (2) Because this is more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. (3) Because thereby Divine Truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN HOLY SCRIPTURE THE WORD HAS SEVERAL INTERPRETATIONS ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in Holy Writ the word cannot have several interpretations, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many different interpretations in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but only logical fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of unrelated propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several interpretations of the word.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says that *the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy, and allegory*. These four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy

Writ according to the four different interpretations mentioned above.

Obj. 3. Further, besides these interpretations, there is the parabolical, which is not one of these four.

On the contrary, Gregory says: *Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery.*

I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first interpretation, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual interpretation, which is based on the literal interpretation, and presupposes it. This spiritual interpretation has a threefold division. As the Apostle says (Heb. vii.) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and *the New Law itself* (Dionysius says) *is a figure of future glory.* In the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical interpretation; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral interpretation. So far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical interpretation. Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting (as Augustine says) if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several interpretations.

Reply Obj. 1. The multiplicity of these interpretations does not produce ambiguity or any kind of equivocation, seeing that these interpretations are not multiplied because

one word signifies several things; but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the interpretations are founded on one—the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says. Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to Faith is contained under the spiritual interpretation which may not be elsewhere put forward by the Scriptures in its literal interpretation.

Reply Obj. 2. These three—history, etiology, analogy—are grouped under one literal interpretation. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds, whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives—namely, on account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual interpretations. Thus Hugh of S. Victor includes the anagogical under the allegorical interpretations, laying down three interpretations only—the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.

Reply Obj. 3. The parabolical interpretation is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely, operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.

QUESTION II.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

(*In Three Articles.*)

BECAUSE the chief aim of Sacred Doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said; therefore, in our endeavour to expound this science :—

(1) We shall treat of God. (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God. (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.

In treating of God there will be a threefold division :—

(1) For we shall consider whatever concerns the Divine Essence. (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons. (3) Whatever concerns the issue of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider :—

(1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is *not* the manner of His existence. (3) Whatever concerns His operations—namely, His Knowledge, Will, Power.

Concerning the first, three points are to be discussed :—

(1) Whether the proposition ' God exists ' is self-evident? (2) Whether it is demonstrable? (3) Whether God exists?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS SELF-EVIDENT ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Existence of God is

self-evident. Those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But the Damascene says that, *the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all*. Therefore the Existence of God is self-evident.

Obj. 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word 'God' is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can exist. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, because as soon as the word 'God' is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition that God exists is self-evident.

Obj. 3. Further, the existence of Truth is self-evident ; for whoever denies the existence of Truth concedes that Truth does not exist. Now, if Truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true. But if there is anything true, there must be Truth. God is Truth itself : *I am the way, the truth, and the life* (John xiv. 6). Therefore the proposition that God exists is self-evident.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident ; as is clear from the Philosopher, concerning the first principles of demonstration. The opposite of the proposition 'God is' can be mentally admitted : *The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God* (Ps. liii. 1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways ; on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us ; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the notion of the subject, as 'Man is an

animal,' for animal is contained in the formal idea of man. If, therefore, the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject are unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says, that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space. Therefore I say that this proposition, 'God exists,' of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject; because God is His Own Existence. Forasmuch as we do not know the Essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be proved by such things as are more evident to us, though less evident in their nature—namely, by effects.

Reply Obj. 1. To know that God exists in a general and indefinite way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by a man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good (which is happiness) consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.

Reply Obj. 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears of this word 'God' may understand it to signify something than which nothing better can be imagined, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word 'God' is signified something than which nothing greater can be imagined,

nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued logically that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there exists something than which nothing greater can be imagined; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Reply Obj. 3. The existence of truth in a general way is self-evident, but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD EXISTS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated; for it is an article of Faith that God exists. But what is of Faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces knowledge; whereas Faith is of the unseen (Heb. xi. 1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

Obj. 2. Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as the Damascene says. Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Obj. 3. Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But the effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: *The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made* (Rom. i. 20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the

things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is, whether it exists.

I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways : One is through the cause, and is called *a priori*, and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration *a posteriori* ; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. From every effect the existence of a proportionate cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us. Since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must have pre-existed. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us. prop

Reply Obj. 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of Faith, but are preambles to the articles ; for Faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp its proof, accepting, as a matter of Faith, something in itself capable of being known and demonstrated.

Reply Obj. 2. When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. The names given to God are derived from His effects ; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word 'God.'

Reply Obj. 3. From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained.

Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His own Essence.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD EXISTS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word 'God' means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

Obj. 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that, what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything that appears in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all things that happen intentionally can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: *I am Who am* (Exod. iii. 14).

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain and evident to our senses that some things are in motion. Whatever is in motion is moved by another, for nothing can be in motion except it have a potentiality for that towards which it is being moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. By 'motion' we mean nothing else than the reduction of something from a state of potentiality into a state of actuality. Nothing, however, can be reduced from a state of potentiality into a state of actuality, unless by

something already in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. It is not possible that the same thing should be at once in a state of actuality and potentiality from the same point of view, but only from different points of view. What is actually hot cannot simultaneously be only potentially hot ; still, it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that from the same point of view and in the same way anything should be both moved and mover, or that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. This cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover—seeing that subsequent movers only move inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover ; as the staff only moves because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a First Mover, put in motion by no other ; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the formality of efficient causation. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causation. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself ; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. In efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. To take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate cause, nor any intermediate. If in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes ; all of which

is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to put forward a First Efficient Cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that could either exist or not exist, since they are found to be generated, and then to corrupt; and, consequently, they can exist, and then not exist. It is impossible for these always to exist, for that which can one day cease to exist must at some time have not existed. Therefore, if everything could cease to exist, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. If this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. Every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. It is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But 'more' and 'less' are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is in the degree of 'most,' as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for the truer things are,

the more truly they exist. What is most complete in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the most complete form of heat, is the cause whereby all things are made hot. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world; for we see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for some purpose, which fact is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their purpose. Whatever lacks intelligence cannot fulfil some purpose, unless it be directed by some being endowed with intelligence and knowledge; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are ordained towards a definite purpose; and this being we call God.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says: *Since God is wholly good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.* This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Reply Obj. 2. Since nature works out its determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done designedly must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, for these can suffer change and are defective; whereas things capable of motion and of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle.

QUESTION III.

THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD.

(In Eight Articles.)

WHEN the existence of a thing has been ascertained, there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its nature. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not; we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.

(1) Therefore, first we must consider how He is not. (2) How He is known by us. (3) How He is named.

It can be shown (1) how God is not, by denying of Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him—viz., composition, motion, and the like. Therefore we must discuss His Simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him. Because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall (2) discuss His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.

Concerning His Simplicity, eight points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether God is a body? (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form? (3) Whether in Him there is composition of being, of essence or nature, and subject? (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence? (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference? (6) Whether He is composed of substance and accident? (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple? (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS A BODY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: *He is higher than the Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea* (Job xi. 8, 9). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 2. Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: *Let us make man to our own image and likeness* (Gen. i. 26). A figure is called an image, according to the text: *Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure [i.e., the image] of His substance* (Heb. i. 3). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever has material parts is a body. Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. *Hast thou an arm as God?* (Job xl. 4); and *The eyes of the Lord are upon the just* (Ps. xxxiii. 16); and *The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength* (Ps. cxvii. 16). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 4. Further, position belongs only to bodies. Something which supposes position is said of God in the Scriptures: *I saw the Lord sitting* (Isa. vi. 1), and *He standeth up to judge* (Isa. iii. 13). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 5. Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term whence (*terminus a quo*) and a term whither (*ad quem*). But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term whither (*ad quem*), according to the words, *Come ye to Him and be enlightened* (Ps. xxxiii. 6), and as a term whence (*a quo*): *All they that forsake Thee shall be written in the earth* (Jer. xvii. 13). Therefore God is a body.

On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (iv. 24) ; *God is a spirit.*

I answer that, Absolutely, it is true God is not a body ; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless previously moved by something else, as is evident from induction. It has been already proved that God is the Prime Mover ; and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear God is not a body. Second, because the First Being must of necessity actually exist, and in no way remain in a state of potentiality. Although in any single thing that passes from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality ; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality ; for whatever is in potentiality can only be reduced into actuality by some actual being. It has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality, because whatever is continuous, formally considered, is divisible to infinity ; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Third, because God is the most noble of beings. It is impossible for any body to be the most noble of beings ; for a body must be either animate or inanimate. An animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. An animate body is not animate because it is a body ; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. That force by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above, Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and Divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity ; thus, by depth His power of knowing hidden things ; by height the transcendence of His excelling Power ; by length His unending

Existence; by breadth His generous love for all. Or, as says Dionysius, by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His Essence, by length the progress of His all-pervading Power, by breadth His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.

Reply Obj. 2. Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, *Let us make man to our image and likeness*, it is added, *And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea* (Gen. i. 26). Man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence. Hence it is according to his intelligence and reason (which are incorporeal), that man is said to be according to the image of God.

Reply Obj. 3. Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For as the act of the eye is to see, the eye of God signifies His power of seeing (intellectually, not sensibly), and so on with the other parts.

Reply Obj. 4. Whatever pertains to position, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.

Reply Obj. 5. We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to approach or to recede signify merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is composed of matter and form. Whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; for the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God. It is mentioned in

Hebrews (x. 38), where God says: *But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul.* Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 2. Further, anger, joy, and the like are passions of a composite nature. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: *The Lord was exceeding angry with His people* (Ps. cv. 40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 3. Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for extended dimensions are the first quality of matter. But God is not a body; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is necessarily in a state of potentiality. We have shown (Q. II.) that God is Pure Act (*Actus Purus*), without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Second, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is necessarily participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. The First Good and the Best—that is, God—does not owe its goodness to another, because what is good of its own essence is prior to that which owes its goodness to dependence on another. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Third, because every agent acts through the form; hence its relation to its form is the norm of its existence as an agent. Therefore whatever is the first and independent agent must have a first and independent form. God is the first and independent agent, since He is the First efficient Cause. He is therefore of His Essence a pure form; and not composed of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 1. A soul is metaphorically attributed to God on account of His possessing all the acts of a soul ; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His Will is said to be pleasing to His Soul.

Reply Obj. 2. Anger and the like are metaphorically attributed to God on account of the effects of these passions. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

Reply Obj. 3. Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter ; for matter is necessarily exclusive, since it is the first underlying subject. A form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received indifferently by many. That form which cannot be received by matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely by the very fact that it cannot be received by matter ; and such a form is God. Hence the argument of the opponent does not prove that matter exists in God.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE SAME AS HIS ESSENCE OR NATURE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not the same as His Essence or Nature. For nothing can be in itself ; but the substance or nature of God—*i.e.*, the Godhead—is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His Essence or Nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause ; for every agent produces its like. In created things the individual is not identical with its nature ; for a man is not the same as humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His own Godhead.

On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is one living : *I am the way, the truth, and the life* (John xiv. 6). But the relation between God and His Divinity is the same as the relation between

life and a living thing. Therefore God is His own Divinity.

I answer that, God is the same as His Essence or Nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the individual, because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, human nature connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is precisely by this connotation that a man is a man. Particular matter, with all the accidental individualizing qualities, is not included in the definition of the species. This particular flesh, these bones, that blackness, this whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing that particular matter, are not included in human nature; and yet are included in this man. So a man has something more in himself than his human nature. Consequently human nature and a man are not identical; but human nature is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because connotating principles are regarded as the constituent formality in regard to the individualizing matter. In anything not composed of matter and form, individualization cannot be due to individual matter—that is to say, to *this matter*—but the very forms themselves are individualized of themselves. Hence the forms themselves must be self-dependent individuals. Therefore individual and nature in them are identified. Since God is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Divinity, His own Life; and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

Reply Obj. 1. We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore, in speaking of God, we use concrete names to signify His Substance, because the only substances we see are composite; and we use abstract names to signify His Simplicity. In saying that Divinity, or Life, or the like are in God, we are referring rather to the composite way in which our intellect

necessarily understands simple things; and not to the composite nature of the things themselves.

Reply Obj. 2. The effects of God do not perfectly imitate Him, but only according to their own possibility; and the imitation is here precisely defective, forasmuch as what is simple and one can only be represented by something composite; consequently they are of a composite nature. Therefore in them the individual is not the same as the nature.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE ARE THE SAME
IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. If they were so, then the Divine Existence has nothing added to it. Existence which has no further mark added to it is that common existence which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is that common existence which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: *For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood* (Wisd. xiv. 21). Therefore God's Existence is not His Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, we can know whether God exists; but we cannot know what He is. Therefore God's Existence is not the same as His Being—that is, as His Essence or nature.

On the contrary, Hilary says: *In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.* Therefore what subsists in God is His Existence.

I answer that, God is not only His own Essence, but also His own Existence. This may be shown in many ways.

1) First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence; like a property that follows from the species—as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the essential constituent principles of the species: or by some exterior agent; as heat is caused in water by fire.

2)

Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, then this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential constituent principles. It is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused solely by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, so long as existence is caused at all. Therefore, that thing, the existence of which differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. This cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient Cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His Existence should differ from His Essence. Second, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness or humanity are only spoken of as in act, because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore, existence must be compared to essence if they differ, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality (A. I.), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His Essence is His Existence. Third, because, just as that which has caught fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not its own existence, exists by participation. God is His own Essence; if, therefore, He is not His own Existence, He will not be the First Being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own Existence; and not merely His own Essence.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds: Either its precise formality requires that no other addition should be made to it; as, for example, it is the precise formality of an irrational animal to be without reason: or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its precise formality does not require that anything should be added to it; as, animal in general is without reason, because it is not the precise formality of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it so to lack reason. The Divine Existence has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas existence in general has nothing added to it in the second sense.

Reply Obj. 2. *To exist* can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of existence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking to exist in the first sense, we cannot understand God's Existence nor His Essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say *God exists*, is true; and this we know from His effects (Q. II., A. 2).

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS CONTAINED IN ANY GENUS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is contained in a genus. A substance is a being that exists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all substances. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

On the contrary, Genus exists mentally, before what it contains. But nothing can exist before God exists; either really or mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus.

I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly — *e.g.*, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; but blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. In neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a *species* is constituted of *genus* and *difference*. That from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality.

For an animal is derived from concrete sensitive nature, for that is an animal which has a sensitive nature. A rational being, on the other hand, is derived from an intellectual nature, because that is rational which has an intellectual nature. Intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Since in God actuality cannot be said to be added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Second, since the Existence of God is His Essence, if God were in any genus, He would be in the genus 'being,' because, since it is predicated of its nature, genus refers to the essence of a thing. The Philosopher has shown that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. No difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows that God is not in a genus. Third, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of their nature, but differ in their existence. The existence of a man and of a horse is not the same; nor of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and nature—*i.e.*, essence—must differ. In God they do not differ. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him. A definition is from genus and difference; and the middle term of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. God is the principle of all existence. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.

Reply Obj. 1. The word *substance* does not signify only what exists of itself—for existence cannot of itself be a genus; but, it signifies an essence that has the property of

existing in this way—namely, of existing of itself. This existence, however, is not its own essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection turns upon proportionate measure ; which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God cannot be a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has the more existence according as it is more like to Him.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE ANY ACCIDENTAL QUALITIES ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are accidental qualities in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says. Therefore that which is in one an accidental quality, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accidental quality in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidental qualities in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidental qualities.

Obj. 2. Further, In every genus there is a first principle. But there are many *genera* of accidental qualities. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in God, God will not be the Primal Being—which is surely absurd.

On the contrary, Every accidental quality is in some subject. But God cannot be a subject, for *no simple form can be a subject*, as Boethius says. Therefore in God there cannot be any accidental qualities.

I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear that God cannot have any accidental qualities. First, because a subject is compared to its accidental qualities as potentiality to actuality ; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidental qualities. But there can be no potentiality in God. Second, because God is His own Existence ; and (as Boethius says), although every essence may have something superadded to it, still this cannot apply to absolute being.

As a heated substance can have whiteness added to its heat, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing more or less than heat. Third, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is Absolute Primal Being,^{Being} there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any inseparable accidental qualities (as the capacity for laughing is an inseparable accidental quality of man), because such accidental qualities are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. There can be nothing caused in God ; since He is the First Cause. Hence it follows that there are no accidental qualities in God.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of ourselves univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidental qualities in God as there are in ourselves.

Reply Obj. 2. Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidental qualities are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior ; although God is not Primal Being as if contained in the genus of substance ; yet He is Primal Being in respect to all being, apart from every genus.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER SIMPLE ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether simple. Whatever God creates must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings ; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. With us that which is composite is better than that which is simple ; as, chemical compounds are better than simple elements ; and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *God is truly and absolutely simple.*

I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown

in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. There is neither composition of quantitative parts in God (for He is not a body), nor composition of form and matter ; nor does His Nature differ from His Personality, nor His Essence from His Existence ; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite ; but is altogether simple. Second, because every composite thing is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them ; whereas God is the first Being. Third, because every composite thing must have a cause, for things in themselves different cannot amalgamate unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, since He is the First efficient Cause. Fourth, because in everything composite there must be potentiality and actuality ; (which is not so in God) ; for either it is one of the parts that actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifth, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts ; for no part of a man can be called a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. In wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as even a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless something is predicated of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts ; for, not because the whole volume of water is two cubits, can any part of it be two cubits. Thus in everything composite there is something which is not the whole. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz., that it has something which is not the whole, as in everything white there is something which has not the formality of whiteness ; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. Since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, saying : *God, who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak ; nor is He who is light, composed of things that are dim.*

Reply Obj. 1. Whatever God has created imitates

Him ; as caused things imitate the First Cause. But it is part of the formality of a thing caused to be in some sort composite ; because at least its existence differs from its essence.

Reply Obj. 2. With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found singly, but distributively. But the perfection of Divine Goodness is found in one simple thing (QQ. IV. and VI.).

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD ENTERS INTO THE COMPOSITION OF OTHER THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says : *The being of all things is that which is above being—the Godhead.* The being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition of other things.

Obj. 2. Further, God is a form ; for Augustine says that, *the Word of God is a certain unformed form.* But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition of things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor—whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they no-wise differ from each other.

On the contrary, Dionysius says : *There can be no touching Him, nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part.*

Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says.

I answer that, On this point there have been three errors.

Some have affirmed that God is the World-Soul. This is practically the same as the opinion of others, that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal constituent principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. All these contain manifest untruth; for it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material constituent principle. First, because God is the First Efficient Cause. The efficient cause is not identical with the form of the thing individually caused, but only specifically. For man begets man. But primary matter can be neither individually nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential; while the latter is actual. Second, because, since God is the First Efficient Cause, He must act first and independently. But not that which enters into composition with anything, acts first and independently, but rather the resultant compound; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Third, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings—not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality. A form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates of another is posterior to that which is essential, so in the same way is that which is participated; as fire in objects set alight, is posterior to fire existing of its own nature. It has been proved that God is simple Primal Being (Q. II.).

Reply Obj. 1. The Godhead is spoken of as the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause; but not as their essence.

Reply Obj. 2. The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.

Reply Obj. 3. Simple things do not differ by added differences; for this indeed is the property of compounds. Man

and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational ; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say, not that they are different ; but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher, *diverse* must be interpreted absolutely ; whereas *different* signifies that they differ by something. Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ ; but are in their own being diverse. Hence the objector fails to prove that they are the same.

QUESTION IV.

THE PERFECTION OF GOD.

(*In Three Articles.*)

HAVING considered the Divine Simplicity, we treat next of God's Perfection. Because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the Divine Perfection ; and then of the Divine Goodness.

Considering the former, three points of inquiry arise :—

(1) Whether God is perfect ? (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things ? (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS PERFECT ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that perfection does not belong to God. We say a thing is perfect if it has been completed. It does not befit God to be completed. Therefore He is not perfect.

Obj. 2. Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.

Obj. 3. Further, God's Essence is Existence itself (Q. III.). But Existence itself seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is imperfect.

On the contrary, It is said, *Be ye perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect* (Matt. v. 48).

I answer that, As the Philosopher relates, some ancient

philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans, and Leucippus, did not predicate *best* and *most perfect* of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle ; and a material principle is most imperfect. Since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential ; and thus simply imperfect. God is the First Principle ; not material, but in the order of efficient causation, which must be most perfect. Since matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is always actual (*in actu*). Hence, the first active principle must needs be exceptionally actual ; and therefore most perfect ; for a thing is perfect according to its actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.

Reply to Obj. 1. As Gregory says : *Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God. For that which is not finished is improperly called perfect.* Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word *perfect* signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality ; whether this be by way of perfection, or not.

Reply Obj. 2. The material principle which with us is found to be most imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal ; but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from which it came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual ; since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual.

Reply Obj. 3. Existence itself is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual ; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence itself is that which actuates all things ; even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to be received ; but rather as the received to the receiver. When I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered formally as something received ; and not as that which exists

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PERFECTIONS OF ALL THINGS ARE IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple ; whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.

Obj. 2. Further, contradictories cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are contradictory, for everything is perfected by its specific difference. But the differences by which *genera* are divided, and *species* constituted, are contradictory. Therefore, because contradictories cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that not all created perfections are in God.

Obj. 3. Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists ; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore, life is more perfect than existence ; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is His existence. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.

On the contrary, Dionysius says that *God in His one existence prepossesses all things.*

I answer that, All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause : either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent—as when man reproduces man ; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal cause—as when in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. It is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the causative agent. Although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect ; still to pre-exist virtually in the causative agent is not to pre-exist in a more imperfect.

but in a more perfect, way. Since God is the first effective Cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of God : *It is not that He is this but not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all.* Second ; from what has been already proved, God is the Existence itself, of itself subsistent (Q. III., A. 4). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. It is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection. If this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since God is the Self-Subsisting Being, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. All created perfections are included in the perfection of being ; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius, when he says that, *God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly.* Afterwards he adds that, *He is the very existence to subsisting things.*

Reply Obj. 1. Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities ; *a fortiori* should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things ; thus things diverse and contradictory in themselves, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.

Reply Obj. 2 is contained in the reply to Objection 1.

Reply Obj. 3. The same Dionysius says that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distinguished in idea ; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things also exist, and intelligent things both exist and live. Although existence does not include life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence ; nevertheless God's

existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is the Self-subsisting Being.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY CREATURE CAN BE LIKE GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no creature can be like God. It is said in the Book of Psalms (lxxxv. 8) : *There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord.* But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like to God.

Obj. 2. Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different *genus*. Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same *genus* as God : since God is in no *genus* (Q. III.). Therefore no creature is like God.

Obj. 3. Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form ; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.

Obj. 4. Further, among like things there is mutual likeness ; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias : *To whom can you liken God ?* (xl. 18).

On the contrary, It is written : *Let us make man to our image and likeness* (Gen. i. 26), and : *When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him* (1 John iii. 2).

I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form, according to the same formality, and according to the same mode ; and these are not merely said to be like, but equal in their likeness ; as two things equally

white are said to be alike in whiteness ; this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same mode ; but rather more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white ; which is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality ; as we see in non-univocal agents. Since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts from its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. Therefore, if the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, following from the formality of its species ; as man reproduces man. If the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species ; as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any *genus*, its effects will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy ; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they exist, are like God as the First and universal principle of all being.

Reply Obj. 1. As Dionysius says, when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny any analogy to Him. 'The same things can be like and unlike to God : like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated, Who is not perfectly imitable ; unlike according as they fall short of their cause,' not merely in intensity and degree, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white ; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.

Reply Obj. 2. God is not related to creatures as though

belonging to a different *genus*, but as transcending every *genus* ; and as the principle of all *genera*.

Reply Obj. 3. Likeness to creatures is attributed to God, not on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy ; inasmuch as God exists of His own Essence, and others in dependence upon Him.

Reply Obj. 4. Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must in no wise be admitted that God is like creatures ; because, as Dionysius says : *A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order ; but not between a cause and that which is caused.* We say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely ; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God ; but not God as like a creature.

QUESTION V.

GOODNESS IN GENERAL.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE next consider Goodness :—

First, Goodness in general. Second, The goodness of God.

Concerning the first, there are six points of inquiry :—

- (1) Whether goodness and being are really the same ?
- (2) Granted that they differ only logically, which is prior logically ?
- (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good ?
- (4) To what cause should the formality of goodness be reduced ?
- (5) Whether the formality of goodness consists in mode, species, and order ?
- (6) Whether goodness is divided into rectitude, utility, and pleasure ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODNESS DIFFERS REALLY FROM BEING ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness does differ really from being. For Boethius says : *I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing ; that they exist is another.* Therefore goodness and being really differ.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing can be its own form. *But that is called good which has the form of being,* as the Commentator says. Therefore goodness differs really from being.

Obj. 3. Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.

On the contrary, Augustine says that, *inasmuch as we exist we are good.*

I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and

differ only logically ; which is clear from the following argument. The formality of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says : *Goodness is what all desire*. It is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect ; for all desire their own perfection. Everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists ; for it is existence that makes all things actual. Hence it is clear that goodness and being are really the same. But goodness represents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.

Reply Obj. 1. Although goodness and being are really the same, nevertheless since they differ logically, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually exists, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality ; a thing is, in consequence, said to exist absolutely, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality ; which is precisely each thing's substantial being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to exist absolutely ; but by any further actuality it is said to exist relatively. Thus to be white implies a relative existence, for to be white does not take a thing out of mere potential existence ; because only a thing actually existing can receive this mode of existence. Goodness signifies the formal aspect of perfection as desirable ; consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be absolutely good ; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be absolutely perfect or absolutely good, but only so relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (*i.e.*, substantial) existence, a thing may be said to exist absolutely, and to be good relatively (*i.e.*, in so far as it exists), but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to exist relatively, and to be good absolutely. Hence the saying of Boethius : *I perceive in nature that the fact that a thing is good is one thing, that it exists, another*, is to be referred to a thing's

good-being (*esse bonum*), and absolute being (*esse simpliciter*). Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing absolutely exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good absolutely—in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort exists.

Reply Obj. 2. Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.

Reply Obj. 3. Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's further actuality, for example, its knowledge or virtue.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODNESS IS PRIOR LOGICALLY TO BEING?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness is logically prior to being. Names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius placed in the first place, amongst other names of God, rather His Goodness than Being. Therefore logically goodness is prior to being.

Obj. 2. Further, That is logically prior which is the more extensive. Goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes, *goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone.* Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.

Obj. 3. Further, what is the more universal is logically prior. Goodness seems to be more universal than being, for goodness has the formal aspect of being desired; whereas for some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas; *It were better for him, if that man had not been born* (Matt. xxvi. 24). Therefore goodness is logically prior to being in idea.

Obj. 4. Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things are also desirable. Thus it seems that existence is a particular, and goodness a universally desirable thing. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is logically prior to being.

On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle that *the first of created things is existence.*

I answer that, Being is logically prior to goodness. For the formality intended by the name of anything is that which the mind conceives of it, and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is logically prior which first falls under the observation of the intellect. The first thing to fall under the observation of the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it actually exists. Hence, existent being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore being is logically prior to goodness.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius discusses the Divine Names as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, from creatures; as a cause from its effects. Goodness, since it has the formality of being desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is primal; because an agent only acts for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus causally goodness is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the Divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from mere privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being. Primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; and it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that *goodness extends to non-existence.*

Reply Obj. 2. The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them—if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. Goodness contains the formality of the end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but towards which tend

even those things which are not actual, but are merely potential. Being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend but to those things which are actual.

Reply Obj. 3. Non-existence is not of itself desirable, but only relatively—*i.e.*, inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-existence, is desirable. The removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil prevents the existence of something else. Therefore existence is desirable of itself; and non-existence only relatively; inasmuch as one seeks some thing to exist, of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-existence can be spoken of as relatively good.

Reply Obj. 4. Life, knowledge, and the like, are only desirable so far as they are considered actual. Hence in each one of them some sort of existence is desired. Thus nothing can be desired unless as a being; and consequently nothing is good except as a positive being.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY BEING IS GOOD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 2. Further, no evil is good: *Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil* (Isa. v. 20). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 3. Further, goodness implies the formality of being what is desired. But primary matter does not imply the formality of being desired, but rather of that which itself desires some other thing. Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher notes that in *mathematics goodness does not exist*. But mathematics are entities ; otherwise we could have no knowledge of them. Therefore not every being is good.

On the contrary, Every being that is not God, is God's creature. But every creature of God is good (1 Tim. iv. 4). God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.

I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. All being, as being, is actual (*in actu*), and in some way perfect ; for every act implies some sort of perfection ; and perfection includes the formality of goodness. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.

Reply Obj. 1. Substance, quantity, quality, and what we include in them, limit being by applying it to some entity or nature. In this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the formality of being desirable, and of perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.

Reply Obj. 2. No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some virtue ; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see.

Reply Obj. 3. As primary matter has only potential existence, so is it only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said to be a non-existence on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness, viz., by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to desire.

Reply Obj. 4. Mathematical entities have not a real separate existence ; because they would be in some sort good—*i.e.*, as existing ; but they have only a logical separate existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter ; thus they cannot have the formal aspect of an end, which itself has the formal aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be logically in some entity neither goodness nor form of goodness ; since the formal aspect of being is prior to the formal aspect of goodness.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODNESS HAS THE FORMAL ASPECT OF A FINAL CAUSE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness has not the formal aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Denis says, *Goodness is praised as beauty*. But beauty has the nature of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the nature of a formal cause.

Obj. 2. Further, goodness is self-diffusive; as Denis says that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving implies rather the idea of efficient causation. Therefore goodness has the nature of an efficient cause.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says *that we exist, because God is good*. But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the nature of an efficient cause.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says that *the cause which is the reason why, is as the end of all other things, and as that which makes them desirable*. Therefore goodness has the nature of a final cause.

I answer that, Since goodness is that which all men desire, and since this has the formal aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the formal aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the formal aspect of goodness implies that of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. We see that what is the first in actively causing, is the last thing caused. Fire heats before it can reproduce the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. In whatever activity causes are to be found, first goodness and the end are found, both of which move the agent to act; second, the action of the agent moving to the form; third comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be; first the form, whereby it is an entity at all; second, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is a perfect entity, for a thing is perfect

when it can reproduce its like ; third, there is its formal aspect of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. Beauty and goodness are identical fundamentally ; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form. Consequently goodness may be rightly praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetitive faculty (goodness being what all men desire) ; and therefore it has the formal aspect of an end (the appetitive faculty being a kind of movement towards a thing). Beauty relates to the cognoscitive faculty ; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion ; for the senses are satisfied in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind—because sense is a sort of reason ; and so is every cognoscitive faculty. Since knowledge comes by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly concerns the formality of a formal cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.

Reply Obj. 3. He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will ; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding ; but by his good will. The will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the phrase *because God is good we exist* has reference to final causation.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FORMAL ASPECT OF GOODNESS CONSISTS IN MODE, SPECIES, AND ORDER ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the formal aspect of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order. For goodness and being logically differ. But mode, species, and order seem to belong to the formal aspect of being, for it is written : *Thou hast ordered all things in measure, number, and weight*

(Wisdom xi. 21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode, and order, as Augustine says: *Measure expresses the mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and stability.* Therefore the formal aspect of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Obj. 2. Further, mode, species, and order are themselves good. Therefore if the formal aspect of goodness consists in mode, species, and order, then every mode must have its own mode, species, and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.

Obj. 3. Further, evil is the privation of mode, species, and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the formal aspect of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Obj. 4. Further, that wherein consists the formal aspect of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species, and order. Therefore the formal aspect of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Obj. 5. Further, mode, species, and order are caused by weight, number, and measure as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has weight, number, and measure; for Ambrose says: *It is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight, and measure.* Therefore the formal aspect of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *These three—mode, species, order—as common good things, are in everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist at all, there can be nothing good.* This would not be unless the formal aspect of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the formal aspect of goodness consists in mode, species, and order.

I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable. A thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. Since everything is what it is by its form, and

since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow, in order for a thing to be perfect and good there must be a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form. The form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode. Hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. The form itself is signified by the species ; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher ; for as a unit added to, or taken from, a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from, a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort ; for everything, in so far as it is actual (*actu*) acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form ; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the formality of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species, and order.

Reply Obj. 1. These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.

Reply Obj. 2. Mode, species, and order, are said to exist, and to be good, in the same way. Not as though they themselves were subsistences ; but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things to constitute them good. They are not spoken of as good, as though formally constituted so by something else ; but as formally constituting others good ; as whiteness is not said to exist as though it existed by anything else ; but because, owing to it, something else has an accidental existence, as an object that is white.

Reply Obj. 3. Every being exists according to some form. Hence, according to everything's existence is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species, and order, as a man ; and another mode, species, and order, as he is white, virtuous, learned, and so on ; according to everything predicated of him. Every evil hinders some sort of existence, as blindness deprives us of the existence of sight ;

but it does not destroy every mode, species, and order ; but only such as follow upon the existence of sight.

Reply Obj. 4. Augustine says, *Every mode, as mode, is good (and the same can be said of species and order). An evil mode, species, and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that to which they ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous.*

Reply Obj. 5. The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight, and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things because the power of light extends to all corporeal things ; inasmuch as it is the active quality of the first body that causes change, *i.e.*, the heavens.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODNESS IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO RECTITUDE,
UTILITY, AND PLEASURE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into rectitude, utility, and pleasure. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments. But rectitude, utility, and pleasure can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.

Obj. 2. Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites ; for rectitude is also pleasing, and what is not right, is not useful ; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then rectitude and utility would be opposed. Therefore this division is incorrect.

Obj. 3. Further, where one thing is predicated on account of another, only one thing exists. But utility is not necessarily goodness ; except so far as it is pleasing and beautiful. Therefore utility ought not to be divided against pleasure and rectitude.

On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (*lib. i. De Offic.*).

I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. If we consider the formal aspect of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division also concerns goodness as such. Everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the will's motion. The term of its motion can be seen from a consideration of the motion of a natural body. The motion of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which that end is attained; so a thing is called a term of the motion, so far as it terminates any part of that motion. The ultimate term of motion can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, *e.g.*, a place or form; or rest in a thing. Thus, in the motion of the will, the thing desired that terminates the motion of the will relatively, as a means by which something is arrived at, is called useful; that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the motion of the will, as a thing towards which the will itself tends, is called right; for rectitude is that which is desired for itself; but that which terminates the motion of the will in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called pleasing.

Reply Obj. 1. Goodness, so far as it is one with being as to subject, is divided by the ten predicaments. This division of it must be looked upon in proportion to its formality.

Reply Obj. 2. This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite formalities. Those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which to be desired except pleasure; being sometimes hurtful and ignoble. Utility applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while rectitude is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves.

Reply Obj. 3. Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated of them more or less. It is predicated chiefly of rectitude; then of pleasure; and lastly of utility.

QUESTION VI.

THE GOODNESS OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider the Goodness of God ; of which there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether goodness belongs to God ? (2) Whether God is the Supreme Good ? (3) Whether He alone is essentially good ? (4) Whether all things are good by the Divine Goodness ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS GOOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species, and order. But these do not seem to belong to God ; since God is immense ; and is not ordered to anything else ; therefore to be good does not belong to God.

Obj. 2. Further, Good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him ; and nothing is desired unless it is known ; therefore to be good does not belong to God.

On the contrary, It is said, *God is good to those who hope in Him, to the soul seeking Him* (Lam. iii. 25).

I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Everything seeks after its own perfection ; and the perfection and form of the effect are found in a certain likeness in it to its agent, since every agent makes its like ; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very

thing which is desirable in it is to be like it. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the nature of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius attributes good to God as to the first efficient Cause, saying that, *God is called good as by Whom all things subsist.*

Reply Obj. 1. To have mode, species, and order belongs to created good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose mode, species, and order on others; hence these three things are in God as in their cause.

Reply Obj. 2. All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself; inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the Divine Essence; as appears from what is said above (Q. IV.). Of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this belongs to the rational creature: others, know some participation of His Goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge: others, have a natural desire without knowledge, as being disposed to their respective ends by another superior mind.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE SUPREME GOOD? (*Summum Bonum*).

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not the Supreme Good. For Supreme Goodness adds something to good; otherwise it would agree with every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is compound. But God is supremely Simple; as was shown above (Q. III.). Therefore God is not the supreme good.

Obj. 2. Further, *Good is what all desire*, as the Philosopher says. But what all desire is nothing but God, who is the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (Luke xviii. 19): *No one is good but God alone.* But the supreme good compared with

others, is like supreme heat compared with other heat ; therefore God cannot be the supreme good.

Obj. 3. Further, a supreme thing implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable ; as, sweetness is not properly called greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (QQ. III. and IV.) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.

On the contrary, Augustine says that, *the Trinity of the Divine Persons is the Supreme Good, discerned by purified minds.*

I answer that, God is the Supreme Good, simply and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. Good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desirable perfections flow from Him as from their first Cause ; they do not, however, flow from Him as from the univocal agent, as appears above (Q. IV.) ; but as from the agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. The likeness of the effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly ; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him more excellently ; and therefore He is called the Supreme Good.

Reply Obj. 1. The Supreme Good does not add to good anything positive, but only a relation ; and a relation of God to creatures, is not really in God, but it is real in creatures ; for it is in God in idea : as, what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the Supreme Good, but only that other things are deficient in relation to it.

Reply Obj. 2. When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood as if every kind of good thing were desired by all ; but because whatever is desired has the nature of good. When it is said, *No one is good but God alone,* this is to be understood of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.

Reply Obj. 3. Things not of the same genus are not comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things ; not that He is in any other genus, but that He is outside of any and every genus, and is the principle of every genus (Q. III.) ; and thus He is compared to others by excess. The Supreme Good implies this kind of comparison.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO BE ESSENTIALLY GOOD BELONGS TO GOD ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as *one* is convertible with *being*, so is *good* ; as we said above (Q. V.). But every being is one by its essence, as appears from the Philosopher ; therefore every being is good by its own essence.

Obj. 2. Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of anything is its good. But everything is a being by its own essence : therefore every being is good by its own essence.

Obj. 3. Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good by its own essence, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its essence. Therefore the goodness which belongs to it, as a being, must be good ; and if it is good by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also ; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good by its own essence.

On the contrary, As Boethius says, that *all things but God are good by participation* : not therefore by their essence.

I answer that, God alone is good by His own Essence. Everything is called good according to its perfection. Perfection of a thing is threefold : first, according to the constitution of its own being ; second, according as any accidents

are added as necessary for its perfect operation ; third, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end ; as, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial form ; and its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like ; its third perfection is to abide in its own place.* This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence ; it belongs to God only, in whom alone Essence is His Existence, and who possesses nothing accidental ; for whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially ; as, to be powerful, wise, and the like, as appears from what is stated above (Q. III.) ; for He is not ordered to anything else as His end ; but He Himself is the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own Essence ; therefore He Himself alone is good by His own Essence.

Reply Obj. 1. One does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything by its own essence. The essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compound things are undivided only actually ; and therefore everything must be one by its own essence. It is not, however, essentially good, as was shown above.

Reply Obj. 2. Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not existence itself (*ipsum esse*) ; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good by its own essence.

Reply Obj. 3. The goodness of a creature is not its essence, but something superadded ; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is called good ; and being is also so called. Being is so called because goodness is something in itself, and not because it is good by something else ; and hence for that reason it is called good because thereby it is good, and not because it has some other goodness to make it good.

* In the ancient, but obsolete, theory, fire occupied the highest 'sphere.'

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE GOOD BY THE DIVINE GOODNESS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all things are good by the Divine Goodness. For Augustine says, *This and that are good ; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst ; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good.* But everything is good by its own good : therefore everything is good by what is itself good ; and that is God.

Obj. 2. Further, as Boethius says, all things are called good, accordingly as they are ordered to God, by reason of the Divine Goodness : therefore all things are good by the Divine Goodness.

On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they exist. But they are not called beings through the Divine Being ; but through their own being : therefore all things are not good by the Divine Goodness, but by their own goodness.

I answer that, As regards relative things, we may admit extrinsic denomination ; as, a thing is called *placed* from *place*, and *measured* from *measure*. As regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato said that the ideas of all things (*species*) were separate, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas ; as, for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. As he laid down that the idea of *man* and *horse* were separate [which ideas he called absolute man (*per se*) and absolute horse (*per se*)] ; so likewise he laid down that the idea of *being* and of *one* were separate. These he called absolute being (*per se*), and absolute oneness (*per se*) ; and by participation of these everything was called *being* or *one* ; and what was thus *per se* being and one, he said was the highest good (*summum bonum*). And because good is convertible with being, as one is also ; he called God the *per se* good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation.

Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable as regards affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves—as Aristotle argues in many ways—still, it is absolutely true that there is one first being essentially being, and essentially good, whom we call God, as appears from what is shown above (Q. II.). Aristotle also agrees with this opinion. From the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation—though afar off, and as an effect; as appears from the above (Q. VI.).

Everything is therefore called good from the Divine Goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the Divine Goodness belonging to it, which is its formal goodness, giving it a denomination. Thus there is one goodness belonging to all, and also many kinds of goodness.

This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.

QUESTION VII.

THE INFINITY OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

THE consideration of the Divine Perfection leads to the Divine Infinity, and to God's existence in things : for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is incircumscribable and infinite.

Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether God is Infinite ? (2) Whether anything besides Him is essentially infinite ? (3) Whether anything can be infinite in magnitude ? (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS INFINITE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not Infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says ; because it has parts and matter. But God is most perfect : therefore He is not Infinite.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher, finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above (Q. III.) : therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, what is so as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is one thing so that it cannot be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another ; for He is not a stone or wood : therefore God is not infinite in substance.

On the contrary, Damascene says that, *God is infinite and eternal, and incircumscribable.*

I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, and truly so ; considering that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. Because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its Infinity ; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle ; consequently attributing to the first principle a material infinity, to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.

We must consider that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite ; whereas matter is in a way made finite by the form, and the form by the matter. Matter is made finite by the form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in a state of potentiality as regards many forms ; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many ; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing. Matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite ; therefore the infinite as attributed to matter, by itself contains the idea of something imperfect ; for it is as it were formless matter. Form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter ; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, contains the idea of something perfect. Being in itself is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above (Q. IV.). Since the Divine Being is not a being received in anything ; but is His own subsistent Being as was shown above (Q. III.), it is clear that God Himself is Infinite and Perfect.

From this appears the Reply to the first Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter ; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God ; as was said above, in this article.

Reply Obj. 3. The fact that the Being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and

all others to be apart from Him. If, for instance, there were such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it different from every other whiteness existing in a subject.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING BUT GOD CAN BE ESSENTIALLY INFINITE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. If the Essence of God is Infinite, His Power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the force of power is known by its effect.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power ; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things : therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, primary matter is something apart from God, as was shown above (Q. III.). But primary matter is infinite ; therefore something besides God can be infinite.

On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle ; therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.

I answer that, Anything out of God can be accidentally infinite (*secundum quid*), but not absolutely infinite (*simpliciter*). As regards the infinite applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form ; thus its matter is determined by form. Because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality as regards many accidental forms ; that is, it is simply infinite ; yet it can be accidentally (*secundum quid*) infinite ; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is accidentally infinite, inasmuch as it is in a state of potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. If we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are

simply finite ; and are in no way infinite. If any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with the angels, these will be accidentally infinite ; inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by matter. Because a created form thus subsisting has being, but is not its own being ; it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be simply infinite.

Reply Obj. 1. It is against the very idea of a created thing for its essence to be its existence ; because a self-subsisting being is not a created being ; hence it is against the very idea of a created thing to be simply infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time) ; so likewise He cannot make anything to be simply infinite.

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinitude, is because the intellect is a form not in matter ; but is either wholly separated from matter, as the angelic substance is separated, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.

Reply Obj. 3. Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not an actual being, but is only a potentiality ; hence it is more a thing *concreated* than *created*. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not simply infinite, but is so only accidentally ; because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ACTUALLY INFINITE GREATNESS CAN EXIST ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. In Mathematics there is no error, for *there is no lie about things abstract*, as the Philosopher says. But mathematics use the infinite in magnitude ; as, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, *Let this line be*

infinite : therefore it is not impossible for there to be a thing infinite in magnitude.

Obj. 2. Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. But infinite existence is not against the nature of magnitude ; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be capacities (*passiones*) of quantity : therefore it is not impossible for some infinite magnitude to exist.

Obj. 3. Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined to be the infinitely divisible. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. So as *addition* is opposed to *division*, and *increase* is opposed to *diminution*, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for a magnitude to be infinite.

Obj. 4. Further, motion and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes. But it is not against the idea of time and motion to be infinite, since everything indivisible is actually in time, and in its circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the idea of magnitude to be infinite.

On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite ; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line : therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.

I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. Granted that an infinitely great body exists, as fire or air, still this could not be infinitely great in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. Assuming, however, from these premisses that no creature is infinite in essence, it may yet remain to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude ?

We must observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways ; mathematically, in respect to its quantity only ; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.

It is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from motion; because every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; either direct, because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite body; for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body. For two lines protracted from the centre, however far they extend from the centre, are so much in degree farther from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other.

The same applies to a mathematical body. If we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and would be finite; forasmuch as figure is limited by a term or terms.

Reply Obj. 1. A geometrician does not need to assume that a line is actually infinite; but he takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the infinite is not against the idea of magnitude in general, still it is against the idea of any species of it; as, for instance, it is against the idea of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular; and the like. What is not possible in any species of the genus cannot

exist in the genus itself ; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude ; since no species of magnitude is infinite.

Reply Obj. 3. The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter ; now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter ; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form ; therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude ; but only in division.

Reply Obj. 4. Motion and time are not whole actually, but successively ; hence they have potentiality mixed up with actuality. Magnitude is an actual whole ; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude ; but it agrees with the totality of time or motion : for matter is a potentiality.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN INFINITE MULTITUDE CAN EXIST ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. It is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to infinity ; therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.

Obj. 2. Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite ; therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible.

Obj. 3. Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed to them : therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to infinitude ; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.

On the contrary, It is said, *All things Thou hast disposed in measure, and number, and weight* (Wisdom xi. 21).

I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely (*per se*) ;

but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be absolutely infinite, when it is necessary for it to be infinite that something may exist ; which cannot be ; because it would entail something dependent on such an infinity for its existence ; and hence it could never exist, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.

A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude ; namely, art in the soul, and the movement of the hand, and a hammer ; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. The requisite multitude of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude ; it happens by accident if many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one, or two, or many are used ; or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.

This, however, is impossible ; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. The species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. No species of number is infinite ; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude ; either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created ; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator ; for He does not work aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. A potentially infinite multitude may exist ; because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude. The more a thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach

matter, as was shown in the preceding article ; by the same rule the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude.

Reply Obj. 1. Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being ; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and not all at once ; likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once ; because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinitude.

Reply Obj. 2. Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. There are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral ; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.

QUESTION VIII.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

SINCE it evidently belongs to the Infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God ; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry : (1) Whether God is in all things ? (2) Whether God is everywhere ? (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, and power, and presence ? (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD EXISTS IN ALL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (cxii. 4), *Exalted above all nations is the Lord*, etc. : therefore God is not in all things.

Obj. 2. Further, what exists in anything is thereby contained. God is not contained by things, for He contains things in Himself. Therefore God is not in things ; for things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says, *that in Him things are ; rather than that He is anywhere.*

Obj. 3. Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend itself to things which are far off from Him ; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.

Obj. 4. Further, The demons are definite beings ; but God is not in the demons ; for there is no agreement between light and darkness (2 Cor. vi. 14) : therefore God is not in all things.

On the contrary, A thing exists wherever it operates. But God operates in all things ; according to the text, *All our works Thou hast accomplished for us, O Lord* (Isa. xxvi. 12) ; therefore God is in all things.

I answer that, God is in all things ; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident ; but as an agent is present to anything upon which it works. An agent must be joined to anything wherein it acts immediately, and touch it by its own power ; hence it is proved that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Since God is Existence itself by His own Essence, so created existence must be His proper effect ; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to exist, but as long as they are preserved in existence ; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing exists, God must be present to it, according to its mode of existence. The existence (*esse*) of anything is all the closer to it and all the more profoundly belongs to it as the formal idea of all that is in it, as was shown above (Q. VII.). Hence it must be that God exists intimately in all things.

Reply Obj. 1. God is above all things by the excellence of His nature ; moreover, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things ; as was shown above in this article.

Reply Obj. 2. Although corporeal things are said to be in anything as in that which contains them, nevertheless spiritual things contain those things in which they are ; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things as containing them ; nevertheless by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God ; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.

Reply Obj. 3. No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts

immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.

Reply Obj. 4. In the demons we understand that the nature exists which is from God; and also the deformity of sin exists which does not come from Him; therefore, it is to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, only understood with the addition, *inasmuch as they are beings*. In things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God exists.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for *incorporeal things*, as Boethius says, *are not in a place*: therefore God is not everywhere.

Obj. 2. Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or motion cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things exist all at once in every place. Now the Divine Being is not successive, but is permanent: therefore God is not in many places; thus He is not everywhere.

Obj. 3. Further, what is wholly in any one place does not exist elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no parts: no part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.

On the contrary, It is said, *I fill heaven and earth* (Jer. xxiii. 24).

I answer that, As place is a something, a thing—to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way

of other things—*i.e.*, when anything is said to be in other things, no matter how, as the accidents of a place are in the place ; or by a way proper to place, as things placed are in the place. In both these in some way God is in every place ; which means to exist everywhere. First, He is so in all things as giving them being, and power, and operation ; for He is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. Also, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place ; and God fills every place ; not, indeed, like a body ; for a body is said to fill place, inasmuch as it does not suffer the co-presence of another body ; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it ; indeed, by the very fact that He gives existence to everything in every place, He fills every place.

Reply Obj. 1. Incorporeal things are not in place by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are ; but by contact of power.

Reply Obj. 2. The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous ; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession ; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places ; likewise the indivisible portion of action or motion, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous ; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel, and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power ; hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one ; in this way it is in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.

Reply Obj. 3. A whole is called so with reference to its parts. Part is twofold. A part of the essence, as the form and the matter, are called parts of the *compositum* ; while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity, into which any quantity is divided.

What is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. Totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is unnecessary for anything which is whole by totality of essence in anything, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms, which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to the accidental quantity, then it is not in every part of the surface. In incorporeal substances there is no totality either absolute (*per se*), or accidental (*per accidens*), except in reference to the perfect idea of the essence. As the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE BY ESSENCE, PRESENCE,
AND POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God's existence in things is not properly described by way of Essence, Presence, and Power. For what is by Essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything: therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by Essence, Presence, and Power.

Obj. 2. Further, to be present to anything means not to be wanting to it. This is the meaning of God being in things by His Essence, that He is not wanting to anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His Essence, Presence, and Power.

Obj. 3. Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will : therefore neither is He present by His power.

Obj. 4. Further, as Grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that the special mode of God's being in things ought to be regarded as a perfection [not a necessity].

On the contrary, The Gloss on the Canticle of Canticles, taken from Gregory on Ezekiel, says, that *God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power, and substance ; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace.*

I answer that, God is in anything in two ways ; in one way as its active cause ; and thus He is in all things created by Him ; in another way He is in things as the object of operation — is in the operator ; and this belongs to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows ; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature, which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. XII.), He is said to be thus in the Saints by grace.

How He is in other things created by Him, must be considered from human affairs as ordinarily known. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Anything is said to be present in other things subject to its inspection ; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. A thing is said to be in a place by way of substance or essence wherever its substance may be. Some there were (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the Divine Power ; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary

principle. Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His Power.

Others, though they believed that all things were subject to the Divine Power, still did not allow that Divine Providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, *He walks about the poles of the heavens; and does not consider our affairs* (Job xxii. 14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His Presence.

Others said that, although all things are subject to God's Providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His Essence.

Therefore, God is in all things by His Power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His Power; He is by His Presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His Essence, inasmuch as He is the cause of existence to all things.

Reply Obj. 1. God is said to be in all things by Essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own Essence; because His Substance is to all things the cause of existence.

Reply Obj. 2. Anything can be called present to another, when subject to its sight, though the thing might be distant in substance, as was shown in this Article; and therefore it is necessary to propound two modes of presence; by essence, and by presence.

Reply Obj. 3. Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows; and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence things are more truly in God by knowledge and will than God is in things. Power must be the principle of action to another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to exist in another.

Reply Obj. 4. No other perfection, but Grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object

known and loved ; therefore only Grace constitutes a singular mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another singular mode of God's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (Part III.).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO BE EVERYWHERE BELONGS TO GOD ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher, is everywhere, and always ; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above (Q. III.). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 2. Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (ii.). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe ; and is thus everywhere.

Obj. 3. Further, the universe is a kind of a whole perfect body : but the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside of it ; therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 4. Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.

Obj. 5. Further, the soul, as Augustine says, is *whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts*. Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere ; and thus to be everywhere is not the exclusive prerogative of God.

Obj. 6. Further, as Augustine says, *The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives*. But the soul sees as it were everywhere : for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight.

On the contrary, Ambrose says, on the Holy Ghost : *Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and*

everywhere, and always is? which assuredly belongs to the Divinity alone.

I answer that, To be everywhere, primarily and absolutely (*primo et per se*), is the prerogative of God alone. To be everywhere (*primo*) is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; as if a man is white in teeth, whiteness does not belong to the man primarily; but to the tooth. A thing is everywhere absolutely (*per se*) when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to anything to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere. This properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places are supposed, even if an infinite number were supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere firstly and absolutely, belongs to God, and is His own exclusive prerogative: because whatever number of places are supposed to exist, it must be that God is in all of them, not according to part, but as He is in Himself.

Reply Obj. 1. The universal, and primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.

Reply Obj. 2. Number, since it is an accident, does not exist absolutely in place, but accidentally; neither is it whole in everything numbered, but by its parts; and hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.

Reply Obj. 3. The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not whole in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.

Reply Obj. 4. If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere ; but according to its parts.

Reply Obj. 5. Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but accidentally.

Reply Obj. 6. When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses : in one sense if the word *anywhere* determines the act of seeing on the part of the object ; so it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens ; and in the same way it feels in the heavens ; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer ; thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking ; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.

QUESTION IX.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE next consider the Divine Immutability, and Eternity following on the Immutability.

Two points arise on the Immutability of God: (1) Whether God is altogether Immutable? (2) Whether to be Immutable belongs to God alone?

FIRST ARTICLE. ✓

WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER IMMUTABLE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether Immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says, *The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place.* Therefore God is in some way mutable.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said of Wisdom, that *it is more mobile than all things movable* (Wisd. vii. 24). But God is Wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.

Obj. 3. Further, to approach and to recede signify motion. But these are said of God in Scripture, *Draw nigh to God, and He will draw nigh to you* (James iv. 8): therefore God is mutable.

On the contrary, It is said, *I am the Lord, and I do not change* (Mal. iii. 6).

I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable (Q. II.). First, because it was shown above (*ib.*) that there is some first Being, whom we

call God ; and that this first Being must be Pure Act (*Actus Purus*), without any potentiality ; for the reason that potentiality is absolutely posterior to act. Everything which is in any way changed, is in some way a potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Second, because everything which is moved, remains as it was as regards some term, and passes away as regards some other term ; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same in substance ; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. It has been shown above (Q. III.) that in God there is no composition ; for that He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Third, because everything which is moved acquires something by its motion, and attains to what it had not attained previously. As God is Infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all Being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence motion in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the First Principle was immovable.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself ; calling every operation a movement, according also as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. And because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as motion and change belong to anything as a potentiality ; as we now speak of change and motion.

Reply Obj. 2. Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the remotest things ; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the Divine Wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle ; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. In the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the Divine Wisdom proceeds gradually from the highest things, which participate

more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree ; there is said to be a kind of procession and motion of the Divine Wisdom to things ; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth ; in which way Dionysius expounds the matter, that every procession of the Divine manifestation comes to us from the Father of light.

Reply Obj. 3. These things are said of God in the Scripture metaphorically. As the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house or do not reach it ; so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness ; or decline from Him.

SECOND ARTICLE. ✓

WHETHER TO BE IMMUTABLE BELONGS TO GOD ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says that *matter is in everything which is moved*. But, according to some, certain created substances, as the angels, and souls, have not matter ; therefore to be immutable does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 2. Further, everything moved, is moved to some end. What has already attained its ultimate end, is not moved. But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end ; as all the blessed in heaven : therefore some creatures are immovable.

Obj. 3. Further, everything which is mutable, is variable. But forms are invariable ; for it is said that *form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable* : therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *God alone is immutable ; whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable.*

I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable ; whereas, on the contrary, every creature is in some way mutable.

A mutable thing can be called so in two ways : by a power in itself ; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the Divine power alone ; inasmuch as God could produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on the Will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved ; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence ; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine. Therefore as it was in the Creator's power before they existed in themselves to produce them ; so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In this way, by the power of another—namely, of God—they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.

If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. Every creature has a twofold power, active and passive ; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in existence, or in attaining to its end. If the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power of existence, in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those in which what is potential in them is consistent with non-existence. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial existence, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental existence, supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident ; as, for example, this subject *man* can exist with *not-whiteness*, and can therefore be changed from white to not-white. Supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident cannot be made to harmonize with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident ; as, for example, snow cannot be

made black. In the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter ; therefore these bodies are not mutable in substance, but only in locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place.* Incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which stand with respect to their own being as potentiality to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act ; forasmuch as the being follows the form, and nothing is corrupted except it loses its form ; hence in the form itself there is no power not to exist ; so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence ; and this is what Dionysius says, that *intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances*. Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability, one as regards their potentiality to their end ; in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice of good and evil, as the Damascene says ; the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places—which cannot be said of God, who by His Infinity fills all places, as was shown above (Q. VIII.).

Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial existence, as in the case of things corruptible ; or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies ; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers objects, as is the case with the angels ; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substance or accident ; for philosophers treated of such motion.

Reply Obj. 2. The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of existence, have also immuta-

* This obsolete theory has been noticed in the Preface.

bility of election by Divine power ; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.

Reply Obj. 3. Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation ; but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is changeable. Hence it is clear that they may vary inasmuch as they exist, for they are called beings not as subjects of being, but as qualifying that which exists.

QUESTION X.

THE ETERNITY OF GOD.

(In Six Articles.)

WE now inquire concerning the Eternity of God, on which arise six points to be determined : (1) What is Eternity ? (2) Whether God is Eternal ? (3) Whether to be Eternal belongs to God alone ? (4) Whether Eternity differs from Time ? (5) The difference of Age and of Time. (6) Whether there is only one Age (*Ævum*), as there is one time, and one Eternity ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS A GOOD DEFINITION OF ETERNITY, ' THE WHOLE SIMULTANEOUS AND PERFECT POSSESSION OF INTERMINABLE LIFE ' ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the definition of Eternity given by Boethius is not a good one ; ' Eternity is the whole and perfect simultaneous possession of interminable life.' For the word *interminable* is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to Eternity ; therefore in the definition of Eternity the word interminable ought not to be found.

Obj. 2. Further, Eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. Duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word *life* ought not to come into the definition of Eternity ; but rather the word *existence*.

Obj. 3. Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to Eternity, which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be *whole*.

Obj. 4. Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in Eternity days and times are in the plural, for it is said, *His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of Eternity* (Mic. v. 2); and also it is said, *According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from Eternity* (Rom. xvi. 25): therefore Eternity does not exist altogether all at once.

Obj. 5. Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is *whole*, it is superfluously described as *perfect*.

Obj. 6. Further, duration does not imply *possession*. Eternity is a kind of duration; therefore Eternity is not possession.

I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so we must reach to the knowledge of Eternity by means of Time, which is nothing but motion numbered by *before and after* (*secundum prius et posterius*). Since succession occurs in every motion, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in motion, makes us apprehend Time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in motion. In a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before and after. As the idea of Time consists in the numbering of before and after in motion; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity outside of motion, consists the idea of Eternity.

Likewise those things are said to be measured by Time which have a beginning and an end in Time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. Whatever is wholly immutable, as it can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.

Thus Eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable—that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); second, because Eternity has no succession, existing whole all at once.

Reply Obj. 1. Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as 'a point has no parts.' This is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but

because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the composite.

Reply Obj. 2. What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also is living ; and life itself extends to operation ; but not so existence. The protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to existence ; hence Time is number of motion.

Reply Obj. 3. Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.

Reply Obj. 4. As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so Eternity though whole all at once, is called by names implying Time and succession.

Reply Obj. 5. Two things are considered as regards Time ; Time itself, which is successive ; and the *now* of Time, which is imperfect. The expression *whole* simultaneous, is used to remove the idea of Time, and the word *perfect* is used to exclude the *now* of Time.

Reply Obj. 6. Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly ; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of Eternity, we use the term *possession*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS ETERNAL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not Eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God. But Eternity is a thing made ; for Boethius says that, *The Now that flows away makes Time, the Now that stands still makes Eternity* ; and Augustine says that *God is the author of Eternity* ; therefore God is not Eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, what is before Eternity, and after Eternity, is not measured by Eternity. But, as Aristotle says, *God is before Eternity and He is after Eternity* ; for it is said that *the Lord will reign for Eternity, and beyond* (Exod. xv. 18) ; therefore to be Eternal does not belong to God.

Obj. 3. Further, Eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God ; therefore it does not belong to Him to be Eternal.

Obj. 4. Further, in Eternity there is no present, past, nor future, since it is whole all at once ; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past, and future time are applied to God in Scripture ; therefore God is not Eternal.

On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed : *The Father is Eternal, the Son is Eternal, the Holy Ghost is Eternal.*

I answer that, The idea of Eternity follows immutability, as the idea of Time follows motion, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be Eternal. Nor is He Eternal only ; but He is His own Eternity ; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own existence. God is His own uniform Being ; and hence, as He is His own Essence, so He is His own Eternity.

Reply Obj. 1. The *now* that stands still, is said to make Eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of Time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the *now* ; so the apprehension of Eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the *now* standing still. What Augustine means when he says that *God is the author of Eternity*, is to be understood of Eternity participated. For God communicates His Eternity to some ; and in the same way as He communicates His immutability.

Reply Obj. 2. From this appears the answer to the second objection. For God is said to be before Eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same place, it is said that *intelligence is equal to Eternity*. Of the words in Exodus, *The Lord will reign for Eternity, and beyond*, it is understood that *Eternal* is there taken for *Age*, as another version has it. Thus, it is said that the Lord will reign beyond Eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond any age ; that is, beyond any kind of given duration. For age is no other thing than the period

of each thing. Or to reign beyond Eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the motion of the heavens according to some philosophers; then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is whole all at once.

Reply Obj. 3. Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called Eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.

Reply Obj. 4. The words of different times are applied to God, inasmuch as His Eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past, and future.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO BE ETERNAL BELONGS TO GOD ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be Eternal. For it is said, that *those who instruct many unto justice, shall be as stars unto perpetual Eternities* (Dan. xii. 3). If God alone were Eternal, there could not be many Eternities: therefore God alone is not the only Eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said, *Depart, ye cursed, into eternal fire* (Matt. xxv. 41); therefore God is not the only Eternal.

Obj. 3. Further, every necessary thing is Eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration, and all demonstrative propositions: therefore God is not the only Eternal.

On the contrary, Jerome says that *God is the only one who has no beginning*. Whatever has a beginning, is not Eternal: therefore God is the only one Eternal.

I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because Eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (Q. IX.). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from

Him, in that way some share in His Eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, that *it stands for ever* (Eccl. i. 4). Some things are also called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; as in the Psalm, mountains are called *eternal*, and it is also said of *the fruits of the eternal hills* (Deut. xxxiii. 15). Some, again, share more fully than others in the nature of Eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being, or further still in operation; like the Angels, and the Blessed, who enjoy the Word, because *as regards that vision of the Word, no flowing thoughts exist in the Saints*, as Augustine says. Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, *This is Eternal life, to know Thee alone the true God*, etc. (John xvii. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. There are said to be many Eternities; accordingly as many share in Eternity, by the contemplation of God.

Reply Obj. 2. The fire of hell is called eternal only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words, *To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters* (Job xxiv. 19). Hence in hell true Eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm, *Their time will be for ever* (Ps. lxxx. 16).

Reply Obj. 3. Necessary means a certain mode of truth. And truth, according to the Philosopher, is in the mind. Therefore in that sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the Eternal Mind, which is the Divine Intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything outside of God is eternal.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ETERNITY DIFFERS FROM TIME ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Eternity does not differ from Time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other. Two days or two hours cannot be together ; nevertheless, we may say that a day and an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But Eternity and Time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since Eternity is not a part of Time, forasmuch as Eternity exceeds Time, and includes it ; it seems that Time is a part of Eternity ; and is not a different thing from Eternity.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher, the *now* of Time remains the same in the whole of Time. The nature of Eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of Time. Therefore Eternity is the *now* of Time. But the *now* of Time is not substantially different from Time. Therefore Eternity is not substantially different from Time.

Obj. 3. Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But Eternity is the measure of the first Being—that is, of the Divine Being. Therefore Eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by Time. Time therefore is either Eternity ; or is a part of Eternity.

On the contrary, Eternity is whole all at once (*tota simul*). Time, however, has a before and after : therefore Time and Eternity are not the same thing.

I answer that, It is manifest that Time and Eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that Eternity has no beginning and end ; whereas Time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference ; because, granted

that Time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the motion of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between Eternity and Time, as Boethius says; arising from the fact that Eternity exists whole all at once; which cannot be applied to Time: for Eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while Time is the measure of motion. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by Time which has beginning and end in Time. Hence, if the motion of the heavens lasted always, Time would not be its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in Time.

Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves; if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that Time always goes on, still it is possible to note in Time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts, as we speak of the beginning and end of a day, or of a year; which cannot be applied to Eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary difference, that Eternity is whole all at once; but that Time is not so.

Reply Obj. 1. Such a reason would be a valid one if Time and Eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are Time and Eternity.

Reply Obj. 2. The *now* of Time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of Time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as Time corresponds to motion, its *now* corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all Time, but differs in aspect as being here and there; and such alternation is motion. Likewise the flow of the *now* as naturally alternating, is Time. Eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence Eternity is not the same as the *now* of Time.

Reply Obj. 3. As Eternity is the proper measure of permanent Being, so Time is the proper measure of motion; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from Eternity, and is subject to Time. The existence of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by Eternity, but by Time; for Time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures motion, but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

THE DIFFERENCE OF AGE (*ÆVUM**) AND TIME.

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Obj. 1. It seems that Age (*Ævum*) is the same as Time. For Augustine says, that *God moves the spiritual creature through time*. But Age (*Ævum*) is said to be the measure of spiritual substances: therefore Time is the same as Age.

Obj. 2. Further, Time has before and after; but Eternity is all at once, as was shown above in the first article. But Age is not Eternity; for it is said (Ecclus. i. 1), that *Wisdom eternal is before age*: therefore it is not all at once, but has before and after; and thus it is the same as Time.

Obj. 3. Further, if there is no before and after in Age, it follows that in æviternal things there is no difference between being or to have been, or to be in the future. Since it is impossible for æviternal things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.

Obj. 4. Further, since the duration of æviternal things is infinite as regards the past; so, if Age is all at once, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore Age does not differ from time.

On the contrary, Boethius says, *Who commandest Time to be separate from Age*.

* There are three durations, Time, Age, and Eternity. The first belongs to material and corporeal beings; the last, to God alone. *Ævum*, here translated *Age*, belongs to incorporeal creatures.

I answer that, Age (Ævum) differs from time, and from Eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the absence of beginning and end as regards Eternity ; and in the absence of end, but not of beginning, as regards Age ; and that Time has both beginning and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article ; because even if æviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow ; even after all this, Age would still be distinguished from Eternity, and from Time.

Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that Eternity has no before and after ; but that Time has both, together with innovation and veteration ; and that Age has before and after without innovation and veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction ; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. Since before and after (*prius et posterius*) of duration cannot exist together, if Age has before and after, it must follow that with the receding of the first part of Age, the after part of Age must freshly appear ; and thus innovation would occur in Age itself, as it does in Time. If they be referred to things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in Time grows old with Time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows before and after in the measure. Therefore the fact of an æviternal thing itself being not inveterable, nor removable, comes from its changelessness. Therefore its measure does not contain *before* and *after* (*prius et posterius*). Thus we say that since Eternity is the measure of a permanent being, accordingly as anything recedes from permanence of being, in that degree it recedes from Eternity. Some recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change ; which things are measured by Time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. Others recede

less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being does not consist either in change, nor is it the subject of change; nevertheless they have change adjoined to them either actually, or possibly; as appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; still they have unchangeable being together with changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature, with changeableness as regards choice; and also they have changeableness of intelligence, and of affections, and of places, in their own degree; therefore these are measured by Age, which is a mean between Eternity and Time. The existence that is measured by Eternity is not changeable, nor is it joined to change. In this way Time has before and after; Age has no intrinsic before and after, which can, however, be joined to it; while Eternity has neither before nor after, nor is it compatible with such at all.

Reply Obj. 1. Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences, are measured by Time. Hence also Augustine says, that to be moved by Time, is to be moved by affections. As regards their nature they are measured by Age; whereas as regards the vision of Glory, they have a share of Eternity.

Reply Obj. 2. Age exists altogether all at once; but nevertheless it is not Eternity; because before and after are compatible with it.

Reply Obj. 3. In the existence itself of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental changes. To say that an Angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of Time. When we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something which, being supposed, its opposite is not subject to the Divine Power. When we say it will be, it does not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an angel is subject to the Divine Power, considered absolutely, God can make the existence of an angel

not future ; but still He cannot effect that it exists not, if it is ; or that it should not have been, if it was.

Reply Obj. 4. The duration of Age is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by Time. In this sense for a creature to be infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature, may be said without incongruity.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE AGE (ÆVUM) ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is not only one Age ; for it is said in the apocryphal books of Esdras : *Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord.*

Obj. 2. Further, different genera have different measures. But some æviteral things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies ; and others are spiritual substances, as the angels ; therefore there is not only one Age.

Obj. 3. Further, since Age is a term of duration, where there is one age, there is also one duration. But not all æviteral things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others ; as appears in the case especially of human souls : therefore there is not only one Age.

Obj. 4. Further, things not dependent on each other, do not seem to have one measure of duration ; for there appears to be one Time for all temporal things ; because the first motion, measured by Time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But æviteral things do not depend on each other, for one Angel is not the cause of another Angel ; therefore there is not only one Age.

On the contrary, Age is a more simple thing than Time, and is nearer to Eternity. But Time is one only. Therefore much more is Age one only.

I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one Age ; others that there are many Ages. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why Time is one ; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things.

Some say that there is only one Time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered ; as Time is a number, according to the Philosopher. This, however, is not a sufficient reason ; because Time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered ; otherwise it would not be continuous ; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Number as it exists in the thing numbered is not the same for all ; but is different for different things. Hence, others assign the unity of Eternity as a cause why Time is one, as the principle of all duration. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. Others assign primary matter as the cause why Time is one ; as it is the first subject of motion, the measure of which is Time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient ; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. The true reason why Time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first motion, by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore Time is referred to that motion, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject ; and thus receives unity from it. To other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.

This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in an order of some kind of equality ; as Origen said ; or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order ; and Dionysius seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle, and the last ; even in one order of Angels. According to the

first opinion, it must be said that there are many Ages, as there are many æviternal things of first degree. According to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one Age only ; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all æviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first æviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Because the second opinion is the truer, as will be shown later (Q. XLVII.) ; we concede at present that there is one Age only.

Reply Obj. 1. Age is sometimes taken for period (*saeculum*), that is, a space of a thing's duration ; and thus we say many ages when we mean periods.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless existence, and are thus measured by Age.

Reply Obj. 3. All temporal things did not begin together ; nevertheless there is one Time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by Time ; and thus all æviternal things have one Age by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.

Reply Obj. 4. For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all ; but that it be more simple than the rest.

QUESTION XI.

THE UNITY OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER the foregoing, we consider the Divine Unity ; concerning which four points of inquiry arise : (1) Whether *one* adds anything to *being* ? (2) Whether *one* and *many* are opposed to each other ? (3) Whether God is one ? (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE ADDS ANYTHING TO BEING ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that *one* adds something to *being*. For everything is in a determinate genus, by addition to being, which includes all *genera*. But one is in a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity ; therefore one adds something to being.

Obj. 2. Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But being is divided by one and by many ; therefore one is an addition to being.

Obj. 3. Further, if one is not an addition to being, one and being must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call being by the name of being : therefore it would be equally so to call being one ; but this is false : therefore one is an addition to being.

On the contrary, Dionysius says, *Nothing which exists is not in some way one*, which would be false if one were an addition to being, in the sense of limiting it ; therefore one is not an addition to being.

I answer that, One does not add anything to *being*; but it is only a negation of division: for one means undivided being. This is the very reason why one is the same as being. Every being is either simple, or compound. What is simple, is undivided, both actually and potentially. What is compound, has not got being, whilst its parts are divided; but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything keeps unity as it keeps being.

Reply Obj. 1. Some, thinking that the *one* convertible with *being* is the same as the one which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the one convertible with being did not add anything to being, but signified the substance of being as undivided, thought that the same applied to the one which is the beginning of number. Because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that the one which is the principle of number, added something to the substance of being (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the one convertible with being added something above the substance of beings; as *white* to *man*. This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is one by its substance. If a thing were one by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be one, supposing it were again one by another thing, we should be driven on thus to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the first opinion; therefore we must say that the one which is convertible with being, does not add anything above being; but that the one which is the principle of number, does add something to being, belonging to the genus of quantity.

Reply Obj. 2. There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, to being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way one, and in another way many. Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it

may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents ; or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially ; as what is one in the whole, and is many in parts ; in such a case a thing will be one absolutely, and many accidentally (*secundum quid*). On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in the idea or in its principle or cause, it will be many absolutely, and one accidentally ; as what are many in number, and one in species, or one in principle. In that way, being is divided by one, and by many ; as it were by one absolutely, and by many accidentally. Multitude itself would not be contained under being, unless it were in some way contained under one. For Dionysius says that there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. What are many in their parts, are one in their whole ; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject ; and what are many in number, are one in species ; and what are many in species, are one in genus ; and what are many in processes, are one in principle.

Reply Obj. 3. It does not follow that any negation exists if we say that being is one ; forasmuch as one adds an idea to being.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one and many are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every multitude is in a certain way one, as appears from the preceding article ; therefore one is not opposed to multitude.

Obj. 2. Further, no opposite thing is made by its opposite. But one makes multitude ; therefore it is not opposed to multitude.

Obj. 3. Further, one is opposed to one. But the idea of few is opposed to many : therefore one is not opposed to it.

Obj. 4. Further, if one is opposed to multitude, it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that one comes after multitude, and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, multitude is defined by one. Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is wrong; therefore one and many are not opposed.

On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of one consists in indivisibility; and the idea of multitude contains division; therefore one and many are opposed to each other.

I answer that, One is opposed to many, but in various ways. For the one which is the principle of number, is opposed to multitude which is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For one implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is multitude measured by one. But the one which is convertible with being is opposed to multitude by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.

Reply Obj. 1. No privation entirely takes away the existence of a thing, inasmuch as privation means *negation in the subject*, according to the Philosopher. Nevertheless every privation takes away some existence; and so in a being by reason of its universality, the privation of existence is in the being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness, and the like. What applies to beings applies also to one and to good, which are convertible with being. The privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and not being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is accidental; for what is relative being (as-a potentiality) is absolutely, *i.e.*, actually, not being; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance, is not being relatively as regards some

accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or *vice versa*; likewise, what is absolutely one is relatively many, and *vice versa*.

Reply Obj. 2. The *whole* is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. In every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water is water; such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of man a man. Multitude is such a kind of whole. Inasmuch as its part has not the form of the whole multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed from what are not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constitute multitude so far as it is undivided, as unities are opposed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not the house.

Reply Obj. 3. *Many* is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to one; in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to few; hence in the first sense two are many; but not in the second sense.

Reply Obj. 4. *One* is opposed to many privatively, inasmuch as the idea of many involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. We apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a point to be, *what has no part, or the beginning of a line*. Multitude also, according to reason, follows on one; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence one is placed in the definition of multitude; but multitude is not placed in the definition of one. Division comes to be understood from

the very negation of being : so what first comes to the mind is being ; second, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence ; third, comes the notion of one ; fourth, the notion of multitude.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS ONE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not one. For it is said, *For there be many gods and many lords* (1 Cor. viii. 5).

Obj. 2. Further, one, as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God ; likewise, neither can the *one* which is convertible with *being* be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God : therefore God is not one.

On the contrary, It is said, *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one God* (Deut. vi. 4).

I answer that, God is one can be shown from three sources. First from His Simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why anything is this particular thing cannot be communicated to many. What makes Socrates a man, can be communicated to many ; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. This belongs to God alone ; for God Himself is His own Nature, as was shown above (Q. III.). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible it is therefore that many Gods should exist.

Second, this is proved from the Infinity of His Perfection. It was shown above (Q. IV.) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something would belong to one, but not to another. If this

were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.

Third, this is shown from the unity of the world. All things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other; and some serve others. What are diverse have not the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. Many are reduced into order by one better than by many: because what is one of itself is the cause of one, and many are only accidentally the cause of one, inasmuch as they may be in some way one. Since what is first is most perfect, and absolutely so of itself, and not accidentally; it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God.

Reply Obj. 1. Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle subjoins, *Our God is one*, etc.

Reply Obj. 2. The one which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. One as the principle of number belongs to the *genus* of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. The one which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity, and does not depend on matter, in its being. Although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is only known to us by way of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal, and infinite; likewise in the same way it is said of God that He is one.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS SUPREMEY ONE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not supremely one. For one is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less : therefore, God is not more one than other things which are called one.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible ; such as a point, and unity. But a thing is said to be more one according as it is indivisible ; therefore God is not more one than unity is one, and a point is one.

Obj. 3. Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore, what is of itself essentially one, is supremely one. But every being is essentially one, as the Philosopher says ; therefore every being is supremely one ; and therefore God is not one more than any other being is one.

On the contrary, Bernard says : *Among all things called one, the Unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place.*

I answer that, Since *one* is an undivided being, if anything is supremely one it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Both of these belong to God. He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined ; He is Being itself, Subsistent, absolutely undetermined. He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually, nor potentially, by any mode of division ; since He is as regards every mode simple, as was shown above (Q. III.). Hence it is manifest that God is one in the supreme degree.

Reply Obj. 1. Although privation considered in itself has neither more nor less, still according as its opposite is subject to more and less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore, according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less, or not at all ; in that degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, one.

Reply Obj. 2. A point, and unity, the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely one. For as a subject cannot be supremely one, because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can accident.

Reply Obj. 3. Although every being is one by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound, and of others simple.

QUESTION XII.

HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US.

(*In Thirteen Articles.*)

As in the preceding part we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points for treatment. (1) Whether any created intellect can see the Essence of God? (2) Whether the Essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image (or idea)? (3) Whether the Essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye? (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own nature to see the Essence of God? (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the Divine Essence? (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another? (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the Essence of God? (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the Essence of God, knows all things in It? (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes? (10) Whether the created intellect knows all at once what it sees in God? (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the Essence of God? (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life? (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT CAN SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that no created intellect can see the Essence of God. For Chrysostom on the text, *No one has*

seen God at any time, says, *Not prophets only, but neither Angels nor Archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?* Dionysius also says, speaking of God: *Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him.*

Obj. 2. Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is Infinite, as was shown above (Q. VII.), therefore in Himself He is unknown.

Obj. 3. Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. But God is not something existing; but rather above existence, as Dionysius says: therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect.

Obj. 4. Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them; therefore the created intellect cannot see the Essence of God.

On the contrary, It is said, *We shall see Him as He is* (1 John iii. 2).

I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is Pure Act (*Actus Purus*) without any potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. What is supremely knowable in itself, may be not knowable to any particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of the excess of light in it.

Therefore the opinion of some who consider this, inclines them to the idea that no created intellect can see the Essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is that of the intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to Faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature

is to be found in its principle of existence ; for a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. The same opinion is also against Reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees ; and thence arises wonder in men. If the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.

Hence it must be absolutely granted that the Blessed see the Essence of God.

Reply Obj. 1. Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, *He is universally to all incomprehensible*, etc. And Chrysostom, likewise just after the words quoted, says : *He says this of the most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son.*

Reply Obj. 2. The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form ; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way : as appears from what is said above (Q. VII.).

Reply Obj. 3. God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists ; inasmuch as He is His own Existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge ; which means that He is not comprehended.

Reply Obj. 4. Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain habitude or relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble, and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every habitude of one thing to another is called proportion. In that sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect to its Cause, and as potentiality to its Act ; in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD IS SEEN BY THE CREATED INTELLECT THROUGH ANY IMAGE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Essence of God is seen through some image by the created intellect. For it is said : *We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is* (1 John iii. 2).

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says : *When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us.*

Obj. 3. Further, the actual intellect is the actual intelligible ; as actual sense is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is actually seen by the created intellect, it must be that He is seen by some similitude.

On the contrary, Augustine says, that when the Apostle says, ' We see through a glass and in an enigma,' by the terms ' glass ' and ' enigma ' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the Vision of God. But to see the Essence of God is not an enigmatic nor speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the Divine Essence is not seen through a similitude.

I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision : power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. Vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. In corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness ; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual ; whereas the substance of the stone is not there. If the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.

It is manifest that God is both the author of the intellectual power, and can be seen by the intellect. Since the intellectual power of the creature is not the Essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the First Intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called a certain intelligible light, as it were, derived from the First Light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of Grace or of Glory. In order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. On the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the Essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because, as Dionysius says, *By the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known*; as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less can the Essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Second, because the Essence of God is His own very Existence, as was shown above (Q. III.), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the Essence of God to the seer. Third, because the Divine Essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself supereminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. This cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the Divine Essence is not seen at all; which is false.

Therefore it must be said that to see the Essence of God there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, and that is, the light of Divine Glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Psalm (xxxv. 10), *In thy light we shall see light*. The Essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the Divine Essence Itself as It really is.

Reply Obj. 1. That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of Glory.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.

Reply Obj. 3. The Divine Essence is Existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect according to some existence, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made actual; so the Divine Essence is united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect actual by and of itself.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD CAN BE SEEN WITH THE BODILY EYE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is said (Job xix. 26) : *In my flesh I shall see God*, and (*ibid.* xlii. 5), *With the hearing of the ear I heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee.*

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says : *There will therefore be to them a greater power of sight (in the glorified), not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things); but to see even incorporeal things.* And whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God : therefore the glorified eye can see God.

Obj. 3. Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is said : *I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne*, etc. (Isa. vi. 1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense ; for the imagination is moved by sense to act, therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, or in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision.*

I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensi-

tive power. Every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later (Q. LXXVIII.). Act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Q. III.). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. The words, *In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour*, do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of flesh, but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, *Now my eye seeth Thee*, are to be understood of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: *May He give you the spirit of wisdom in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart may be enlightened* (Eph. i. 17, 18).

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. Which appears from what is there also premised: *Therefore they will have an altogether different power (viz., the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;* but afterwards he explains this, saying: *It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it.* Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. Life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some other cognoscitive power. But that the Divine Presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes—viz., from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the Divine Glory infused into the body after renovation.

Reply Obj. 3. The Essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form

representing God according to some mode of similitude; as in Divine Scripture Divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT BY ITS NATURAL POWERS
CAN SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine Essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says : *An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God.* But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore, since an Angel by its natural power understands itself, it seems that by its own natural power it understands the Divine Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that He is supremely so in like manner to an Angel. Therefore, if it can understand other intelligible things by its own natural power, much more can it understand God.

Obj. 3. Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore, if to see the Essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the Essence of God at all; which is false, as appears from what is said above; and it therefore appears that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine Essence.

On the contrary, It is said : *The grace of God is eternal life* (Rom. vi. 23). But eternal life consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, according to the words : *This is eternal life, to know Thee the only true God,* etc. (John xvii. 3). Therefore, to see the Essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to see the Essence of God by its own natural power. Knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the

knower. The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If the mode of anything's existence exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of that object is above the nature of the knower. Now the mode of existence of things is manifold. Some things have existence only in this one individual matter ; as all bodies. Others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it. These are the incorporeal beings, called Angels. To God alone does it belong to be His own Self-Subsistence. Therefore, what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of some matter. Our soul possesses two cognoscitive powers ; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter ; hence sense knows only the singular. Another kind of cognoscitive power is in the soul, called the intellect ; this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Hence the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter ; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect ; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as universals ; which is beyond the power of sense. The angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter ; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It follows that to know Being Subsistent in Itself is natural to the Divine Intellect alone ; this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect ; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the Essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.

Reply Obj. 1. This mode of knowing God is natural to an Angel ; that it can know Him by His own likeness refulgent

in the Angel itself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the Essence of God, as was shown above (A. 2). Hence it does not follow that an Angel can know the Essence of God by its own power.

Reply Obj. 2. The Angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have. If defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.

Reply Obj. 3. The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. Our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the whole (*compositum*) into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an Angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS ANY CREATED LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see God. For what is

of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. But God is the supremely Intelligible Light ; therefore He is not seen by the means of any created light.

Obj. 2. Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen by His Essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a medium ; therefore He is not seen by His Essence.

Obj. 3. Further, what is created can be natural to any other creature. Therefore, if the Essence of God is seen through any created light, such a light can be made part of any other created nature ; and thus, that creature, would not need any other light to see God ; which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the Essence of God.

On the contrary, It is said : *In Thy light we shall see light* (Ps. xxxv. 10).

I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature ; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. When any created intellect sees the Essence of God, the Essence of God Itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the Essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by Divine Grace. This increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light or illumination. This is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse (xxi. 23). *The light of God will enlighten it, viz., the society of the Blessed who see God.* By this light the Blessed are made *deiform*—that is, like to God, according to that word : *When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is* (1 John iii. 2).

Reply Obj. 1. The created light is necessary to see the Essence of God, not because by this light the Essence of God is made intelligible, which is of itself intelligible; but in order to enable the intellect to understand, as a power is made abler to act by habit. Likewise it is evident that corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of colour.

Reply Obj. 2. This light is not required to see the Divine Essence, as a similitude in which God is seen; but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is not to be described as a medium in which God is seen, but by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.

Reply Obj. 3. The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory can only be natural to a creature if the creature had a Divine nature; which is impossible. By this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in this article.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OF THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD, ONE SEES MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that of those who see the Essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is said (1 John iii. 2): *We shall see Him as He is.* But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.

Obj. 2. Further, as Augustine says: *One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than another.* But all who see the Essence of God, understand the Divine Essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was shown above; therefore, of those who see the Divine Essence, one does not see more clearly than another.

Obj. 3. Further, for anything to be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways : either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power of the one who sees. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude ; but this can have no place in our present subject, for God is not present to the intellect seeing Him by way of any similitude, but by His Essence. It follows that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power ; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is the higher, will see Him the more clearly ; and this is incongruous ; since equality with Angels is promised to men as their beatitude.

On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to the word : *This is Eternal life, to know Thee the only God*, etc. (John xvii. 3). Therefore, if all saw the Essence of God equally in Eternal life, all would be equal ; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle : *Star differs from star in glory* (1 Cor. xv. 41).

I answer that, Of those who see the Essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not be produced by any similitude ; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally ; but it is given to it by the light of Glory, which constitutes the intellect in a kind of *deiformity*, as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.

Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly ; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory also who has the more of charity ; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire ; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence

he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.

Reply Obj. 1. The words, *We shall see Him as He is*, are determined as regards the word as to the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His Existence, which is His Essence. It does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as the mode of existence is in God Himself.

Thus appears the answer to the second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it; but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another.

Reply Obj. 3. The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all, the Essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD
COMPREHEND HIM?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that those who see the Divine Essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says: *But I follow on, if in any way I may comprehend* (Phil. iii. 12). But the Apostle did not follow on in vain; for he himself said: *I so run not as at an uncertainty* (1 Cor. ix. 26). Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: *So run that you may comprehend.*

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says: *That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.* But if God is seen in His Essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple; therefore, whoever sees His Essence, comprehends Him.

Obj. 3. Further, if we say that He is seen as a *whole*, but not *wholly*, it may be contrarily urged that *wholly* refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the Essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer be meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine Essence. Therefore all who see the Essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.

On the contrary, It is said: *Most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought* (Jer. xxxii. 18, 19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude, as Augustine says.

In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by a probable opinion, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. No created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine Intellect whereof ~~It~~ is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears—Everything is cognoscible according to its actuality. God, whose Being

is Infinite, as was shown above (Q. VII.), is infinitely cognoscible. No created intellect can know God infinitely. The created intellect knows the Divine Essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it is perfused with a greater or lesser light of glory. Since the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.

Reply Obj. 1. Comprehension is twofold: in one sense strictly and properly, according as anything is included in the one comprehending; thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be comprised in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own Infinity; in that sense we now take comprehension. In another sense comprehension is taken more largely as opposed to non-attainment; when he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. In that sense God is comprehended by the Blessed, according to the words, *I have held him, and will not let him go* (Cant. iii. 4); in that sense are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. In this way *comprehension* is one of the three prerogatives of the soul corresponding to hope, as vision corresponds to faith, and fruition corresponds to charity. For even among ourselves it does not follow that everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch as things appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we enjoy always what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to fill up and satisfy it. The Blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, they possess Him as present; having the power to see Him always; and having Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.

Reply Obj. 2. God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as

perfectly as He is intrinsically visible ; as when any demonstrable proposition is known by a probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition ; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is intrinsically capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced ; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.

Reply Obj. 3. The word *wholly* denotes the mode of the existence of the object ; not, indeed, as if the whole object does not come under knowledge, but rather as if the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore, he who sees God's Essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable ; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely ; as, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD SEE ALL
IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who see the Essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says : *What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all things ?* But God sees all things : therefore, those who see God see all things.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in a mirror ; for He knows all things in Himself : therefore, whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.

Obj. 3. Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least. But all that God does, or can do,

are less than His Essence ; therefore, whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.

Obj. 4. Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore, if in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied ; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy ; which is incongruous : therefore, he who sees God knows all things.

On the contrary, The Angels see the Essence of God ; and yet do not know all things. For, as Dionysius says, *the inferior angels are purified from ignorance by the superior angels.* Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of the thoughts of hearts ; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore, whosoever sees the Essence of God, does not necessarily know all things.

I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the Divine Essence, does not see in It all that God does or can do. It is manifest that things are seen in God as they really are in Him. All other things are in God as an effect is in the power of its cause. All things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. It is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has his intellect sufficiently uplifted, by one demonstrative principle, can receive at once from it the knowledge of many conclusions ; but this is beyond the power of a weaker intellect needing things to be explained to it separately. And so that intellect can know all the effects of the cause in the cause itself, which knows the cause wholly. No created intellect therefore can comprehend God wholly. No created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do ; for this would be to comprehend His power ; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things ; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself.

Reply Obj. 3. Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing so to see Him as that all things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the more or the fewer, are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that the multitude of things that are known in God are known by the mode of more or less perfect sight.

Reply Obj. 4. The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect; that is, the species and genus of things and their reasons, and these everyone who sees the Divine Essence will see in God. To know the rest, such as particular things and the thoughts and facts connected with them, does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect, nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Still, if God alone were seen, Who is the Fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says: *Unhappy the man who knows all things (that is, all creatures), but knows not Thee! but happy is he who knows Thee, although he may be ignorant of all those other things. But he who knows Thee and knows them also, is not the happier because he knows them, but because of Thee only is he happy.*

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHAT IS SEEN IN GOD, BY THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE, IS SEEN THROUGH ANY SIMILITUDE?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine Essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes about by

the knower being assimilated to the object known. Thus the intellect made actual is the object understood made actual; likewise sense made actual is the object perceived made actual, inasmuch as it is informed by its similitude, as the eye by the similitude of colour. Therefore, if the intellect of one who sees the Divine Essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes.

Obj. 2. Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the Essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the Divine Essence, as Augustine says, remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: *I have heard hidden words which it is not lawful for man to speak* (2 Cor. xii. 4). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind: in the same way, when he actually saw the Essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in It.

On the contrary, The mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all these things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. Therefore, if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own Essence, neither are the things seen in Him, seen by any similitudes or ideas.

I answer that, Those who see the Divine Essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the Divine Essence Itself united to their intellect. For anything is known as its likeness ~~is~~ in the one who knows. This takes place in two ways. As things which are like to one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognoscitive faculty can be assimilated to any cognoscible object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated in itself (*secundum se*), when it is directly informed by similitude, which is to know a thing in itself. In another way when informed by the similitude of its likeness; in that way the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. The knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. To know things thus by their likeness

in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature ; whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. There is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the Essence of God, they are not seen in God Himself by any other similitudes but by the Divine Essence alone present to the intellect ; by which also God Himself is seen.

Reply Obj. 1. The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine Essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.

Reply Obj. 2. Some of the cognoscitive faculties form other images from those first conceived ; as the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain ; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms the idea of species ; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by the very vision of the Divine Essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the Divine Essence, which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the Essence of God. This kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD SEE ALL THEY SEE IN IT AT THE SAME TIME ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who see the Essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For, according to the Philosopher : *It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood.*

But what are seen in God, are understood ; for God is seen by the intellect : therefore, those who see God do not see all in Him at once.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says, *God moves the spiritual creature according to time*—that is, by intelligence and affection. But the spiritual creature is the Angel, who sees God : therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively ; for time means succession.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another ; but we shall see all we know at one glance.*

I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but all at once. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch as we understand many things by means of many ideas. Our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas all at once, so as to understand by them ; as one body cannot bear different shapes all at once. Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood all at once ; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at once, if each one is understood by its own idea ; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood all at once. It was shown above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude ; but all are seen by the one Essence of God. Hence they are seen all at once, and not successively.

Reply Obj. 1. We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea ; but many things understood by one idea are understood all at once ; as in the idea of a man we understand *animal* and *rational* ; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.

Reply Obj. 2. As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the Angels do not know all things all at once ; and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time ; but as regards what they see in God, they see all at once.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYONE IN THIS LIFE CAN SEE THE ESSENCE OF
GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a person can in this life see the Divine Essence. For Jacob says : *I have seen God face to face* (Gen. xxxii. 30). But to see face to face is to see His Essence, as appears from what is said : *We see now in a glass and in an enigma, but then face to face* (1 Cor. xiii. 12). Therefore God can be seen in this life in His Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, the Lord says of Moses : *I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord* (Num. xii. 8) ; but this is to see God in His Essence. Therefore it is possible to see the Essence of God in this life.

Obj. 3. Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But all things even now we know in God ; for Augustine says : *If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true ; where, I ask, do we see this ? neither I in thee, nor thou in me ; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds.* Also he says that, *We judge of all things according to the Divine Truth ; and he says that, it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas ; which unless they were above the mind, could not be incommutable.* Therefore even in this life we see God.

Obj. 4. Further, according to Augustine, those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. Intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by any similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says. Therefore, since God is in our soul by His Essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His Essence.

On the contrary, It is said, *Man shall not see Me, and live* (Exod. xxxiii. 20), and the Gloss upon this says : *In this*

mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the Idea itself of His own nature.

I answer that, God can be seen in His Essence by man, only if separated from this mortal life. The reason is, (because, as was said above, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of existence of the knower.) Our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its existence in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. It is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be known by the nature of material things. It was shown above that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His Essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the Essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses Divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, that is, to the Divine Essence.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Dionysius, a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the Divinity. So when Jacob says, *I saw God face to face*, this does not mean the Divine Essence, but some figure representing God. This in itself is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained (II. II., Q. CLXXIV.) in treating of the prophetic grades. We may also say that Jacob spoke this to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.

Reply Obj. 2. As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own Essence; as Augustine says of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of

Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully, in the question of rapture (II. II., Q. CLXXV.).

Reply Obj. 3. All things are said to be seen in God, and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light we know and judge all things ; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the Divine Light ; as also likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, that is, by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says, *The lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun*, which means God. As in order to see a sensible object it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun ; so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the Essence of God.

Reply Obj. 4. Intellectual vision concerns the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. God is in the souls of the blessed in that manner ; but He is in our soul by His presence, essence, and power.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN BE KNOWN IN THIS LIFE BY NATURAL REASON ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says that *Reason does not take in simple form*. But God is a supremely simple form ; as was shown above (Q. III.) : therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal : therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good ; for Augustine says : *The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed in that excellent light unless purified by the*

justice of faith : therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.

On the contrary, It is said, *What is known of God, is made manifest in them* (Rom. i. 19), which means what is known of God by natural reason.

I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. Our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the Essence of God ; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known ; nor therefore can His Essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know that God exists, and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the First Cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.

Hence we know that He has to do with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all ; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him ; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.

Reply Obj. 1. Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know what it is ; but it can know whether it exists or not.

Reply Obj. 2. God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.

Reply Obj. 3. As the knowledge of God's Essence is by grace, in that sense it belongs only to the good ; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad ; and hence Augustine says, retracting what he had before said : *I do not approve what I said in prayer, ' God who willest that only the pure should know truth.'* For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths ; that is, by natural reason.

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY GRACE A HIGHER KNOWLEDGE OF GOD CAN BE OBTAINED THAN BY NATURAL REASON ?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says, that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be joined to God yet ignorant of what He is, comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason.

Obj. 2. Further, we can acquire the knowledge of Divine things by natural reason only through the imagination ; and in the same way in the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says that, *It is impossible for the Divine Ray to illuminate us except as veiled around with the variety of the sacred veils.* Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.

Obj. 3. Further, our intellect adheres to God by the grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge ; for Gregory says that *things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge.* Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, *God reveals to us by His Spirit, what none of the princes of this world knew* (1 Cor. ii. 8) ; that is, the philosophers, as the Gloss expounds.

I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things : images derived from the sensible objects, and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them the intelligible conceptions.

In both of these human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. The intellect's natural light is strength-

ened by the infusion of the light of grace ; sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express Divine things better than those we receive from sensible objects ; as appears in prophetic visions ; sometimes also sensible things are divinely formed, or even voices, to express some Divine meaning ; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, *This is My beloved Son* (Matt. iii. 17).

Reply Obj. 1. Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know what God is, and thus are joined to Him as to one unknown ; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and accordingly as we attribute to Him some things known by Divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One.

Reply Obj. 2. From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man ; thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the Divine Light.

Reply Obj. 3. Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some cognoscible object. This determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus, as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.

QUESTION XIII.

THE NAMES OF GOD.

(*In Twelve Articles.*)

THOSE things considered which belong to the Divine Knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the Divine Names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.

Concerning this question, there are twelve points for inquiry. (1) Whether God can be named by us? (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially. (3) Whether any names applied to God are said properly of Him, or are all to be taken metaphorically? (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous? (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally? (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are first applied to God or to creatures? (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time? (8) Whether this name *God* is a name of the Nature, or of the Operation? (9) Whether this name *God* is a communicable name? (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as it signifies the nature of God, by participation, and by opinion? (11) Whether this name, He *Who is*, is the supremely appropriate name of God? (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A NAME CAN BE GIVEN TO GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says that, *Of Him there is neither name, nor*

can one be found of Him ; and it is said : *What name is His, and the name of His Son, if thou knowest ?* (Prov. xxx. 4).

Obj. 2. Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsistence : therefore no name can be said of God.

Obj. 3. Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality, and verbs and participles signify substance with time ; pronouns the same by demonstration or relation ; but none of this can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time ; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out ; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way receive a name from us.

On the contrary, We read : *The Lord is a man of war, Almighty in His name* (Exod. xv. 3).

I answer that, According to the Philosopher, words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things ; it is thus evident that words relate to the meaning of things through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. It was shown above (*preceding Q.*, A. 11 and 12). that in this life we cannot see the Essence of God ; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion [of defect]. In that way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, nevertheless not so as to express by the name what belongs to the Divine Essence in Itself ; as the name *man* expresses the essence of man as he really is, since it signifies the definition of man in his essence ; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.

Reply Obj. 1. The reason why God has no proper name, or is said to be above description by a name, is because His Essence is above all that we understand about God and signify in word.

Reply Obj. 2. Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what can belong to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. Because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent, is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsistence, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsistence must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as a subsistence, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple and self-subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His Subsistence and Perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of Being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.

Reply Obj. 3. To signify substance with quality is to signify the subject (*suppositum*) with the nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His Subsistence and Perfection, so likewise names are applied to God signifying Substance with quality. Verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His Eternity includes all time. As we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. Demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, but not what is felt. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns and participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be described by relative pronouns.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD
SUBSTANTIALLY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says : *Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not ; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation.*

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says : *You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthy the Divine processions in the denominations of God.* Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the Divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence : therefore the names applied to God are not said of him substantially.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing is named by us accordingly as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His Substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified.* Therefore all names of this kind signify the Divine Substance.

I answer that, Negative names applied to God or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His Substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

As regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as ; *good, wise,* and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion

from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and so in like manner the same applies to other names; this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His attitude towards creatures: as in the words, *God is good*, we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons: first, because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words *God is good*, signified no more than, *God is the cause of good things*, it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Second, because it would follow that all Names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of health, in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Third, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say that He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore it must otherwise be said that these names signify the Divine Substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of expressing the full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express what God is, so far as we can understand Him. Our intellect knows God from creatures; therefore it knows Him as far as creatures are capable of giving a true and adequate representation of Him. It was shown above that God presupposes in Himself the possession of all perfections belonging to all creatures, so that He is to be considered as simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature

represents Him as far, and is like Him as far, as it possesses some perfection, but not as representing Him as if He belonged to the same species, or genus, but as the excelling principle in regard to whom the effects are defective ; still, however, possessing some kind of likeness in themselves as effects ; as the forms of the inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above, in treating of the Divine Perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the Divine Substance, but in an imperfect manner, as creatures also represent It imperfectly. So when we say, God is good, the meaning is not, God is the cause of goodness, or, God is not bad ; but the meaning is, Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God, and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness ; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is Himself good ; according to what Augustine says, *Because He is good, we are.*

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is ; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply Obj. 2. In the signification of names that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance this name *stone (lapis)* is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot (*lædit pedem*), but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body ; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone.* So we must say that these kinds of Divine Names are imposed from the Divine processes ; for as according to the diverse processes of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner ; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of process ; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the processes themselves, as if when we say *God*

* This refers to the Latin etymology of the word *lapis* ; which has no place in English.

lives, the sense were, *life proceeds from Him* ; but to signify the principle itself of things as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

Reply Obj. 3. We cannot know the Essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself ; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures ; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD IN ITS
PROPER SENSE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no name belongs properly to God. All names which we apply to God are taken from creatures ; as was explained in the first Article. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

Obj. 2. Further, no name can belong properly to anything when it expresses rather what is taken from it, than what is positively predicated of it. But all such names as *good*, *wise*, and the like, more truly express what does not belong to God, than what really belongs to Him ; as appears from what Dionysius says. Therefore none of these names belong to God in their proper sense.

Obj. 3. Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only ; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition ; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and the like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

On the contrary, Ambrose says, *Some names there are which express evidently the property of the Divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the Divine Majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude.* Therefore not all names are applied to

God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their proper sense.

I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent mode than in creatures ; and our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and what is thus apprehended is signified by the use of names. Therefore as to the names applied to God, there are two remarks to be made, as regards the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life, and the like, and as regards the mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they properly belong to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily (*per prius*) to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God ; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1. There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect mode whereby the creatures receive the Divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself, as a stone of itself signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their signification, as the words *being, good, living,* and the like, and such names can be properly applied to God.

Reply Obj. 2. Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, can be denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.

Reply Obj. 3. The names which are applied to God properly imply corporeal conditions, not in their signification, but as regards their mode of signification, but those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in their very signification itself.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER NAMES APPLIED TO GOD ARE SYNONYMOUS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. Synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God ; for the Goodness of God is His Essence, and likewise also It is His Wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

Obj. 2. Further, if these names are put forward as signifying one and the same thing in reality, but something else as regards their ideas, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality, and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality, and many in idea ; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas ; and thus they are synonymous.

On the contrary, All synonymous names united with each other entail a superfluous idea, as when we say, *vesture, clothing.* Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say that God is good, or the like, when nevertheless it is written, *Most mighty, Great and Powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name* (Jer. xxxii. 18).

I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous.

This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express, the habitude of cause to creatures ; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects affirmed of Him. But according to what was said above, these names signify the Divine Substance, although in an imperfect manner ; it is again

clear from what has been said (Art. 1 and 2) that they have diverse meanings. The idea signified by the name is the conception of the intellect regarding the thing signified by the name. Our intellect, which knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received, divided and multiplied. As, therefore, to the different perfections of creatures there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore, although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that thing under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous.

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, for synonymous names signify one thing under one aspect; names which signify different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; for the name only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

Reply Obj. 3. The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a multiplied manner, as things represent Him.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHAT IS SAID OF GOD AND OF CREATURES IS
UNIVOCALLY PREDICATED OF THEM?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the things said about God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is re-

duced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one, for if the name *dog* be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally, *i.e.*, of all barking dogs ; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. There are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man ; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun, which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent : thus what is said about God and creatures, is predicated univocally.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis (i. 26), *Let us make man to our own image and likeness*, it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.

Obj. 3. Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings, therefore God is homogeneous with creatures ; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.

On the contrary, Whatever is predicated of various things so that the same name is predicated but in various senses, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures ; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God ; and a different genus changes the idea, since the genus is part of the definition itself ; the same applies to other names. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is to be taken in an equivocal sense.

Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can univocal predication be predicated of God and creatures ; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.

I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between

God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the agent cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short of the agent, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by the exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said above, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God simply and united. Thus, when any name expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections, as, for instance. by this name *wise* applied to a man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply it to God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His Essence, or Power, or Existence. Thus also this name *wise* applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the things signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this name *wise* is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other names. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. If that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or proved about God at all; but everything would be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: *The invisible things of God are clearly seen from the things made* (Rom. i. 20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an *analogous* sense, that is, according to the sense of proportion.

This occurs in two ways as regards the use of names

either according to the proportion of many things to one, as for example when we speak of urine and medicine in relation and in proportion to health of body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause, or because one thing has proportion to another, as health is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. In this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and neither in a purely equivocal nor purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures. Thus, whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the order that exists of a creature to God as its principle and cause; wherein pre-exist excellently all perfections of things. This mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet also it is not totally diverse as in equivocals, but it must be said that a name used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions as regards some one thing; as health applied to blood signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of health.

Reply Obj. 1. Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the cause of the whole universal species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the active cause of the whole universal species, otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species, but rather it is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent. The universal cause comes before the particular cause. This universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless, is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q. IV.).

Reply Obj. 3. God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus.

What is adduced in the contrary sense proves indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; but still they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER NAMES ARE PREDICATED OF CREATURES BEFORE GOD (*per prius*)?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that names are applied to creatures before God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since *names*, as the Philosopher says, *are signs of ideas*. But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are applied to creatures before God.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says, *we name God from creatures*. But names transferred from creatures to God, are said of creatures before God, as lion, stone, and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied to creatures before God.

Obj. 3. Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says. But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it afterwards (*per posterius*); for we say that an animal is healthy, before medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said of creatures before God.

On the contrary, It is said, *I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named* (Eph. iii. 14, 15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied to God before creatures.

I answer that, In names applied to many in an analogical sense, all are taken in a sense having relation to one ; which one must be placed in the definition that belongs to them all. And as the idea expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says, that name must be applied first to what comes in the definition as regards other things, and afterwards to others in the order of their approach more or less to that first ; as, for instance, healthy applied to animals comes into the definition of healthy applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal ; and also into the definition of health as being the sign of bodily health. Thus, all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures before being applied to God, because when spoken of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as *smiling* applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like to the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of *lion* applied to God means only that God is like a lion in the strength of His works. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. To other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, God is good, it would then only mean, God is the cause of the creature's goodness ; thus the name *good* applied to God would include the meaning of the creature's goodness. Hence good would apply to creatures before God. But as was shown above, these names are not applied to God as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, God is good, or wise, do not only signify that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Himself in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name really signifies, these are applied to God before creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures ; but as regards giving the names, they are first given by us to the creatures we first know. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply Obj. 2. The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God as cause only, and not essentially; as in the example of health and medicine.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER NAMES WHICH IMPLY RELATION TO CREATURES
ARE SPOKEN OF GOD FROM TIME ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not spoken of God from time. For all such names signify the Divine Substance, in the ordinary sense of the words. Hence also Ambrose says that this name *Lord* is a name of power, which is the Divine Substance; and *Creator* signifies the action of God, which is His Essence. The Divine Substance is not temporal; but Eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God from time, but from eternity.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever can be something from time, can be called made; for what is white from time, is made white. But God is not made at all. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God from time.

Obj. 3. Further, if any names are applied to God from time as implying relation to creatures, the same rule appears in all things that imply the same relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word, *I have loved Thee with an everlasting love* (Jer. xxxi. 3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as *Lord* and *Creator*, are applied to God from eternity.

Obj. 4. Further, names of this kind signify relation. That relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot betoken something in the creature

only, for in that case God would be called Lord from the opposite relation in creatures ; while nothing can receive its denomination only from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing from time can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God from time.

Obj. 5. Further, a thing is called relative from relation, for instance lord from lordship ; as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

Obj. 6. Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other ; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says. But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous. Therefore a relation can be said of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature ; and thus these names, *Lord* and *Creator*, are spoken of God from eternity, and not from time.

On the contrary, Augustine says, that this relative appellation *Lord* is applied to God from time.

I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God from time, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. This is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real (*ens naturæ*) or logical (*ens rationis*). Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only be an idea in the apprehension of reason ; as when we say that a thing is identified with itself. Reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two ; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of the thing to itself. The same applies to relations between being and not being formed by reason, apprehending not being as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of

reason ; as genus and species, and the like. There are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both ; which applies to all relations of quantity ; as great and small, double and half, and the like ; for quantity exists in both extremes : the same applies to relations of action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like. Again, a relation in one extreme may be a reality ; while in the other extreme it is an idea only, and this happens when two extremes are not of one and the same order, as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things ; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intelligible existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things ; whereas the things in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence, the Philosopher says that they are called relations, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise, for instance, the term on the *right* is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side ; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. As God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely ; it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself ; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but it is so only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature to be predicated of God from time, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature ; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

Reply Obj. 1. Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as master and servant, father and son, and the like, which are called relatives of *existence (secundum esse)*. Others are imposed to signify the things that ensue upon certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: these are called relatives of *speech (secundum dici)*. Thus, there is the same twofold difference in Divine Names. Some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as *Lord*, and these do not signify the Divine Substance directly, but indirectly; presupposing the Divine Substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the Divine Substance. Others signify the Divine Essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes; as *Saviour, Creator*, and such-like; these signify the action of God, which is His Essence. Both names are said of God from time so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the Essence, either directly or indirectly.

Reply Obj. 2. As relations applied to God from time are only an idea as regards God; so, *to be made*, or *to have been made* are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, *Lord, Thou art our refuge* (Ps. lxxxix. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. The operations of the intellect and will are in the subject operator, therefore names signifying relations following the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following the actions proceeding to external effects according to our mode of thinking are applied to God from time, as *Saviour, Creator*, and the like.

Reply Obj. 4. Relations signified by these names which are applied to God from time, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, still so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him, as the

Philosopher says that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.

Reply Obj. 5. Since God is related to the creature in a degree corresponding to the creature being related to Him : the relation of subjection being a real one in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality ; for He is called Lord as the creature is subject to Him.

Reply Obj. 6. To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not so necessary to consider the order of things to which they belong as the meaning of the relations themselves. If one in its idea includes another, and *vice versa*, then they are simultaneous by nature : as double and half, father and son, and the like. If one in its idea includes another, and not *vice versa*, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object ; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in the act, then it is simultaneous with science in act ; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and *vice versa* ; these two relative terms, *Lord* and *servant*, are simultaneous by nature. Hence God was not *Lord* until He possessed a creature subject to Himself.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME GOD IS A NAME OF THE NATURE ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this name, *God*, is not a Name belonging to the Nature. For Damascene says that *God* is called so from *θεεῖν* (which means to run), and cherish all things ; or from *αἰθεῖν*, that is, to burn ; for our *God* is a fire consuming all malice ; or from *θεᾶσθαι*, which means to consider all things. But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name *God* signifies His operation and not His Nature.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the Divine Nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name *God*, does not signify the Divine Nature.

On the contrary, Ambrose says that *God* is a name of the Nature.

I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. As we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes from its operation, or its property: we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot (*lædit pedem*); but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness, and the like, are not named from other things. As regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.

Because God is not known to us in His Nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we can name Him from these; hence this name *God* is a Name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. This Name is imposed from His universal providence over all things. All who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all, hence Dionysius says, *The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness*. Taken from such operation, this name *God* is imposed to signify the Divine Nature.

Reply Obj. 1. What Damascene says refers to Providence; which is the source of the signification of the name *God*.

Reply Obj. 2. We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. As we can know what a stone is in itself from its property, this name *stone* signifies the nature of a stone in itself; for it signifies the definition of a stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition. From the Divine effects we cannot know the Divine Nature in Itself, so as to know what It is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation (Q. XII.). Thus the name *God* signifies the Divine Nature,

for this Name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things, and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME *GOD* IS COMMUNICABLE?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this Name *God* is communicable. Whosoever shares in the thing signified by a Name, shares in the Name itself. But this Name *God* signifies the Divine Nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, *He has given us many and precious promises, that thereby we may be partakers of the Divine Nature* (2 Pet. i. 4). Therefore this Name *God* can be communicated to others.

Obj. 2. Further, only proper Names are not communicable. But this Name *God* is not a proper Name; but it is an appellative Name; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, *I said, you are gods* (Ps. lxxxii. 6). Therefore this Name *God*, is communicable.

Obj. 3. Further, this Name *God* comes from the operation, as explained. But other Names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as *good, wise, and the like*. Therefore this Name *God* is communicable.

On the contrary, It is said, *They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones* (Wisdom xiv. 21), in reference to the Divine Name. Therefore this Name *God* is incommunicable.

I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways, properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many, by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. This name *lion* is properly communicated to all things of the same nature as *lion*; by similitude it is communicable to those with some part of the nature of a lion, as for instance courage, or strength, called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which

it is individualized, is common to many in reality, or at least in idea ; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea ; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea ; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects ; and for the reason that the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the species. So, the idea of the species being retained, it can be understood as existing in many. The singular, from the fact of so being, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea. The plurality of this individual thing cannot be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude ; as for instance a person can be called Achilles metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are not individualized by any particular subject, but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea ; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are ; we understand them as compound things having forms in matter, therefore, as was said in the first article, we impose upon them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some subject. Hence, so far as concerns the idea of names, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given by us to signify simple subsisting natures.

Since, then, this name *God* is given to signify the Divine Nature, and as the Divine Nature cannot be multiplied (Q. XI.), it follows that this name *God* is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion ; just in the same way as this name *sun* would be communicable if many suns existed, as some say is the case. Therefore, it is said

You served those who were not gods (Gal. iv. 8), and the Gloss adds, *Not gods in nature, but in human opinion*. Nevertheless this name God is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, *I said, you are gods* (Ps. lxxxii.).

But any name that existed to signify God not in His Nature but in His Subject (*suppositum*), accordingly as He is individually considered, would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Name of the Four Letters among the Hebrews; and this is like giving the name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

Reply Obj. 1. The Divine Nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.

Reply Obj. 2. This name *God* is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the Divine Nature in the possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. Names do not follow upon the real mode of existence in things, but upon the mode of existence as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name *sun*.

Reply Obj. 3. These names *good, wise, and the like*, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify the Divine Nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. This name *God* is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the Divine Nature.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME *GOD* IS APPLIED TO GOD UNIVOCALLY,
BY NATURE AND BY PARTICIPATION, AND ACCORDING
TO OPINION?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that this name *God* is applied to God univocally by nature and by participation, and accord-

ing to opinion. Where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation ; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says : An idol is not God, contradicts a pagan who says : An idol is God. Therefore God in both senses is spoken of univocally.

Obj. 2. Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth ; so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. The name *beatitudo* is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to that true happiness. Therefore also this name *God* is applied to God univocally and truly ; and to God also in opinion.

Obj. 3. Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. When a Catholic says : There is one God, he understands by the Name of God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all ; while the heathen understands the same when he says, an idol is God. Therefore this Name is applied univocally to both.

On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing. The word *animal* applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this Name *God* applied to the true God and to God in opinion, is applied equivocally.

Moreover, No one can signify what he does not know. The heathen does not know the Divine Nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says there is one God. Therefore this Name *God* is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.

I answer that, This Name *God* in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally ; but analogically. Which is apparent from this reason :—Univocal names mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal names absolutely different ; in analogical names a name taken in one signification must be placed in its definition as taken in other senses ; as, for instance, *being* applied to *substance* is placed in the definition of being as applied to *accident* ; and *healthy* applied to

animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. Urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health. The same rule applies to the present subject. This name *God*, when taken to mean the true God, is taken in the idea of God to mean God in opinion, or participation. When we name anyone God by participation, we understand by the name of God some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol God, by this name God we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.

Reply Obj. 1. The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification. This name *man*, of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is said in one way. It would be multiplied if by the name *man* we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name *man* what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name *God* to signify the true God. When the pagan says the idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth; as also Catholics sometimes use the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, *All the gods of the Gentiles are demons* (Ps. xcvi. 5).

The same remark applies to the second and third Objections. For those reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.

Reply Obj. 4. The term animal applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal. The Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also existence, which is taken analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments.

Reply Obj. 5. Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very Nature of God in Itself, as It is ; but each one knows It according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (Q. XII.). So a pagan can take this name *God* in the same way when he says the idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying, the idol is not God. If anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME, *HE WHO IS*, IS THE MOST PROPER NAME OF GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this Name *He who is* is not the most proper Name of God. For this Name *God* is an incommunicable Name. But this Name *He who is*, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this Name *He who is* is not the most proper Name of God.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says that *the naming of good excellently manifests all the processions of God*. It especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this Name *good* especially belongs to God, and not this name *He who is*.

Obj. 3. Further, every Divine Name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this Name *He who is*, imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this Name *He who is*, is not the most applicable to God.

On the contrary, It is said that when Moses asked, *If they say to me, What is His Name? what shall I tell them?* the Lord answered him, ‘*Tell them, “He who is,” hath sent me to you*’ (Exod. iii. 13, 14). Therefore this Name, *He who is*, most properly belongs to God.

I answer that, This Name, *He who is*, is most properly applied to God, for three reasons :—

First, because of its signification. It does not signify

form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the Existence of God is His Essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q. III.), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.

Second, on account of its universality. All other names are either less common, or, if convertible with it, still add something above it at least in idea. Hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Our intellect cannot know the Essence of God Itself in this life, as It is in itself, but whatever mode is taken to determine its idea of God falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determined the names are, and the more absolute and common they are, the more properly are they applied to God. Hence Damascene says that, *He who is, is the principal of all names applied to God ; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance.* By any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this Name *He who is*, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all ; and therefore it names the infinite ocean of substance itself.

Third, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence ; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence does not know past or future, as Augustine says.

Reply Obj. 1. This Name *He who is*, is the Name of God more properly than this Name *God*, as regards its source, namely, Existence ; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification. As regards the object intended by the name, this Name *God* is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the Divine Nature ; and still more proper is the Name of Four Letters, imposed to signify the Substance of God Itself, incommunicable and singular.

Reply Obj. 2. This name *good* is the principal name of God as expressing the cause, but not absolutely ; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not necessary that all the Divine Names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they

be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures ; among which is His Existence itself, from which comes this Name, *He who is*.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS CAN BE FORMED ABOUT GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says that, *negations about God are true ; but affirmations are vague.*

Obj. 2. Further, Boethius says, that *a simple form cannot be a subject.* God is the most absolutely simple form : therefore He cannot be a subject. Anything capable of an affirmative proposition is a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

Obj. 3. Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any compound element in it. Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands everything it knows as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God is impossible.

On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. Some affirmative propositions are of faith ; as that God is Three and One ; and that He is Omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.

I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify the same thing in reality, and signify something else in idea. This appears to be the case both in propositions predicated accidentally, and in those predicated substantially. It is manifest that *man* and *white* have the same subject, and differ in idea ; for the idea of man is one thing, and whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, Man is an animal ; the being man is truly an animal, for there exists in the same subject (*supposito*) both the

sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man ; hence this predicate and subject are in the same subject (*suppositum*), but differ in idea. In propositions where the same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way is found, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the *suppositum* what it places in the subject ; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the *suppositum* ; so that we can say *the things predicated are the form, and the subjective things are the matter*. To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself. God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, still our intellect knows Him by different conceptions ; so, however, that it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea ; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are inconclusive or, according to another translation, incongruous ; inasmuch as no Name can be applied to God in the mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 2. Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves ; but it apprehends them as compound things containing something as subject and something in that subject. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.

Reply Obj. 3. This proposition, *The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false*, can be taken in two senses ; accordingly as this adverb *otherwise* determines the word *understanding* to the thing understood, or to the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is : Whatever intellect understands that the thing is otherwise than it is,

is false. This does not hold in the present case ; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. The mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing as it exists. It is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner ; not that it understands them to be immaterial things ; but it understands them in an immaterial manner. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite aspect ; but still not as if it understood them to be composite things. Thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.

QUESTION XIV.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF [IN] GOD.

(In Sixteen Articles.)

HAVING considered what belongs to the Divine Substance, we go on now to treat of God's Operation. Because one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the Power of God, the principle of the Divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the Divine Knowledge, we consider the Divine Life. As knowledge concerns truth, we then consider truth and falsity. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the reasons of things existing in the knowledge of God, are called Ideas; to the consideration of the knowledge will also be joined the treatment of the Ideas.

Concerning the knowledge in God, there are sixteen points for inquiry: (1) Whether there is knowledge in God? (2) Whether God understands Himself? (3) Whether He comprehends Himself? (4) Whether His understanding is His Substance? (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself? (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them? (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things? (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil? (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things? (12) Whether He knows the Infinite? (13) Whether

He knows future contingent things? (14) Whether He knows enunciative things? (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable? (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS KNOWLEDGE IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the medium between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.

Obj. 2. Further, since knowledge is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else, which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore knowledge is not in God.

Obj. 3. Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. In God there is no universal nor particular (Q. XIII., A. 9). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, *O the depth of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God* (Rom. xi. 33).

I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we consider that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings because the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being naturally has also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says that *the soul is in a sense everything*. The contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above, forms accordingly as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason and rule of its cognoscibility; and the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge,

Hence, as the Philosopher says, plants do not know, because they are wholly material. Sense knows in proportion as it receives images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognoscitive, because it is more separated from matter, and unmixed. Since God is in the highest degree of immateriality (Q. VII.), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1. As the perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (Q. IV.), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it ought to be separated in its signification from everything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality in God, nor a habit ; but Substance and Pure Act.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (Q. XIII.). Man has different kinds of knowledge, according to different objects of his knowledge. He has intelligence as regards the knowledge of principles ; he has science according to the knowledge of conclusions ; he has wisdom, as he knows the highest cause ; he has counsel or prudence, as he knows what is to be done. God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge. The simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names ; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into the Divine predication, everything that savours of imperfection ; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, *Wisdom and strength belong to Him ; and He possesses counsel and intelligence* (Job xii. 13).

Reply Obj. 3. Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows ; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Since the mode of the Divine Essence is higher than that of creatures, Divine Science does not exist in God after the mode of created science, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the philosopher, *Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence.* God does not go out from His own Essence, nor is He moved at all ; thus He cannot return to His own Essence ; therefore He does not know His own Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, to understand is a kind of passion and motion, as the Philosopher says ; and science also is a kind of assimilation to the object known ; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect of itself, *nor*, as Hilary says, *is likeness its own* : therefore God does not understand Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in mind, as Augustine says. Our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things. Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.

On the contrary, It is said, *The things of God no one knoweth, but the Spirit of God* (1 Cor. ii. 11).

I answer that, God understands Himself of Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which are transitive as regards the external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator ; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator ; and accordingly as it thus resides, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says, that *the sensible in act is sense in act, and the actual intelligible is intellect in act.* We feel and know anything to be actual from the fact that our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. Thus sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object,

because both are potentialities. Since God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is Pure Act, the Intellect and its object in Him are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect regarded as a potentiality; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the Divine Intellect, as it differs in our intellect regarded as actually intelligent; but the Intelligible Idea itself is the Divine Intellect Itself, and thus He understands Himself by Himself.

Reply Obj. 1. Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself so far as it has existence. Those cognoscitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as appears as regards each of the senses; whereas those cognoscitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said that, *whoever knows his essence returns to it*. It supremely belongs to God to be self subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own Essence, and knows Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. To be moved and to suffer are taken equivocally, accordingly as to understand means a kind of being moved, or kind of passion, as the Philosopher says. To understand is not the imperfect act passing from one to another; but it is a perfect act existing in the agent itself. Likewise also as the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, or is assimilated to it, this belongs to the intellect considered as a potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible idea, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. The Divine Intellect, which is no way a potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is It assimilated thereto; but It is Its own perfection, and Its own Act of understanding.

Reply Obj. 3. Natural existence does not belong to primary

matter, which is a pure potentiality ; except as when it is reduced to act by the form. Our possible intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things ; it is a potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our possible intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of anything ; in that way it understands itself by the intelligible species, as it understands other things. It is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty itself. God is Pure Act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects ; therefore He understands Himself by Himself.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD COMPREHENDS HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says, that *whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself*. But God is in all ways infinite ; therefore He does not comprehend Himself.

Obj. 2. If it be said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself ; in contradiction it can be urged, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite ; which is against what was laid down above (Q. VII.) : therefore God does not comprehend Himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself*. God understands Himself ; therefore He comprehends Himself.

I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. Anything is comprehended when the end of its being known is attained, and it is fully known ; this is accomplished when it is as perfectly known as it can be known ; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not,

however, when it is known by only probable reason. God knows Himself as perfectly as He can be known. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality. A thing is not known as a potentiality, but as an actuality. The power of God's own knowledge is as great as His actual existence; because from the fact that He is Actuality separated from all matter and potentiality, He is knowable in a corresponding degree. It is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.

Reply Obj. 1. The strict meaning of comprehension signifies that one thing holds and includes another; in which sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. This is not the meaning of comprehension as applied to God, when we speak of His comprehending Himself, as if His Intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; whereas these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. As God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained in anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says, *The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.*

Reply Obj. 2. When God is said to be finite to Himself, this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His Intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. God is not to be called finite, as if He understood Himself to be finite.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACT OF GOD'S INTELLECT IS
HIS SUBSTANCE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the act of God's Intellect is not His Substance. To understand is an operation. An

operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's Intellect is not His Substance.

Obj. 2. When we understand that we understand, that which we understand is not something great or principally understood, but something secondary and accessory. If therefore God is His own act of understanding, to understand God will be as when we understand that we understand, and so to understand God will not be something great.

Obj. 3. Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When God understands Himself, if He Himself were not distinct from this act, He would understand that He understands, and that he understands that He understands Himself ; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's Intellect is not His Substance.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *The existence of God is Wisdom.* To be wise is to understand. Therefore God's being is understanding. But God's existence is His Substance (Q. III.). Therefore God's Intellect is His Substance.

I answer that, It must be said that God's Intellect is His Substance. If it were not His Substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says, would be the act and perfection of the Divine Substance ; to which the Divine Substance would be related, as potentiality is to act ; which is altogether impossible. The act of understanding is the perfection and act of the intelligent agent. We must consider how this is. As was laid down above, to understand is not a progressive act to anything extrinsic ; but remains in the operator as his own act and perfection ; as existence is the perfection of the one existing. As existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible idea. In God there is no form apart from His Existence (Q. III.). Hence as His Essence Itself is also His Intelligible Species, it necessarily follows that His Act of understanding Itself must be His Essence and His Existence.

Thus it follows that in God, the Intellect, and the object understood, and the Intelligible Species, and His Understanding Act are entirely one and the same. Hence, when

God is called intelligent, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His Substance.

Reply Obj. 1. To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator ; but it remains in him.

Reply Obj. 2. When the object of the intellect is a non-subsistent act of understanding, this object is not something great ; as when we understand our own thought ; and therefore the likeness to the act Itself of Divine Understanding which is self-subsisting, does not hold.

Thus appears the *Reply to Obj. 3.* The act of Divine Intelligence, self-subsisting, is of Himself, and is not another's ; so it need not proceed to infinity.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. All other things but God are outside of God. Augustine says that *God does not behold anything out of Himself.* Therefore He does not know other things.

Obj. 2. Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If God understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He ; which is impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, the act of understanding receives its specific character from the intelligible object, as does every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act itself is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. God is His own Intelligent Act. If God understands anything apart from Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself ; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things apart from Himself.

On the contrary, It is said, *All things are bare and open to His Eyes* (Heb. iv. 13).

I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. It is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself ; otherwise He would not be perfect, since His

Existence is His Intelligence. If anything is perfectly known, its power is also perfectly known. The power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power is extended. Since the Divine Power extends itself to other things by the very fact that It is the first effective cause of all things (Q. II.), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. This appears still more plainly if we add that the Existence Itself of the first efficient cause, that is God, is His own Intelligence. Whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the First Cause, must be in His Intelligence, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode. Everything which is in another, exists in it according to the mode of that other's existence.

The mode whereby God knows other things, is seen when we consider that anything is known in two ways : in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself by the proper idea adequate to itself as a cognoscible object ; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man ; and in another, a thing can be seen through the image of that which contains it ; as when a part is seen in the whole by the idea of the whole ; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image of the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself by His Essence ; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself ; inasmuch as His Essence contains the similitude of other things besides Himself.

Reply Obj. 1. The opinion of Augustine that God sees nothing outside Himself is to be taken, not as if God simply saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that He sees all outside Himself in Himself, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. The object understood is the perfection of the intelligent agent not by its substance, but by its idea, by which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection. For the idea of a stone is in the soul ; and not the stone itself. Things apart from God are understood by God, inasmuch as the Essence of God contains the ideas of them as above explained ; hence it does not follow that the Divine Intellect has any other perfection than Itself.

Reply Obj. 3. Intelligence is not specificated by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. Intelligence itself is specificated by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intelligible operation. Every operation is specificated by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating is caused by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specificated by that intelligible form which makes the intellect really actual (*in actu*). This is the form of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own Essence; comprehending all ideas of things. Hence it does not follow that the Divine Intellect, or rather God Himself, is specificated by anything else than the Divine Essence Itself.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS OTHER THINGS THAN HIMSELF
BY PROPER KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know other things than Himself with proper knowledge. For, as was shown in the fifth article, God so knows other things than Himself, according as they are in Himself. Other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them in the universal, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself in the universal, and not by proper knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, the created essence is as distant from the Divine Essence, as the Divine Essence is distant from the created essence. The Divine Essence cannot be known by the created essence (Q. XII.). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the Divine Essence. Thus as God knows only by His Essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know its quiddity, which is to have proper and particular knowledge of it.

Obj. 3. Further, proper knowledge of a thing can only come from its own proper idea. But as God knows all things by His Essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its own proper idea (*ratio*); for one thing cannot be the proper idea (*ratio*) of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a common knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper idea is to have a common and general knowledge of them.

On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. God knows things in that manner, as it is said that *He reaches even to the division of the spirit and the soul, of the joints also and the marrow, and is the discerner of the thoughts and intentions of the heart; and there is no creature invisible in His sight* (Heb. iv. 12, 13).

I answer that, Some err on this point, saying that God knows other things only in general; that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew itself as the principle of heat, would know the nature of heat, and all things else as hot; so God, as knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows also the nature of being, and all other things as beings.

This opinion, however, cannot be supported. To know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge of it. Hence our intellect, when it passes from potentiality to act, proceeds first to a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as coming from the imperfect to the perfect. If the knowledge of God regarding other things were only universal and not special, it would follow that His Intelligence would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His Being be perfect; against what was said above (Q. IV.). We must therefore hold that God knows other things than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only as beings, but as distinguished from each other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed

from the centre ; or if the light knew itself, it would know all colours.

These examples, although they present some sort of similarity, as regards universal causality, fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are not caused by the one universal principle as the principle of distinction, but only in the point of communication. The diversity of colours is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it ; likewise, the diversity of the lines is caused by the different location. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge ; but only in a general way. In God, however, it is quite otherwise. It was shown above (Q. IV.) that whatever perfections exist in a creature, all pre-exist and are contained in God in an excelling manner. Not only does the mutual bond of communication between creatures, which is their existence itself, belong to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other also so belongs ; as to live and to understand, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection. Thus all things pre-exist in God ; not only as regards what is common to all ; but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the Essence of God is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre of a circle to the radiating lines ; but as the perfect act to the imperfect ; as if I were to compare man to animal ; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. It is manifest that by a perfect act the imperfect, can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge ; as, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge ; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.

As therefore the Essence of God contains all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more ; God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. The nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the Divine Perfection. God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own Perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of existence perfectly, unless He knew all modes of existence. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their mutual distinction from each other.

Reply Obj. 1. So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb *so (sic)*, imports the mode of cognition as regards the thing known ; and in that sense it is false. The knower does not always know the object known according to the being it has in the knower itself ; for the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye itself ; but rather by the image of the stone which the eye has in itself, it knows the stone according to its own mode of existence outside the eye. If any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the existence it has in the knower, nevertheless it knows the same thing according to its mode of existence outside the knower ; as the intellect knows a stone according to its intelligible existence in the intellect ; inasmuch as it knows that it understands ; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb *so (sic)* be understood to import the mode of existence on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower. For the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.

We must say therefore that God does not only know that things are in Himself ; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.

Reply Obj. 2. The created essence is compared to the Essence of God, as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the Divine Essence; but rather the converse is true.

Reply Obj. 3. The same thing cannot be taken as an equal and proper idea for different things. The Divine Essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as an idea proper to each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS DISCURSIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge; but actually intelligent. As the Philosopher says, *The habit of knowledge contains many things at once; but the act of knowledge has only one thing.* Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, it seems that He does not understand all at once; but that He passes from one to another discursively.

Obj. 2. Further, discursive knowledge means to know the effect by its cause. But God knows things other than Himself by Himself; as effect by cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.

Obj. 3. Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we ourselves know it. We know the effects in their created causes; thus we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once.*

I answer that, The Divine Knowledge is not discursive; which will appear if we consider that in our knowledge there is a twofold discursive mode, of which one is according to

mere succession, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else ; and the other mode of discursive reasoning is according to causality, as when by principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first mode of discursive reasoning cannot belong to God. Many things which we understand in succession, if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing ; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror ; whereas God sees all things in one, that is, in Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise also the second mode of discursive intelligence cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode presupposes the first mode ; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once ; second, because such discursive reasoning means to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown ; and thus the second is not known in the first, but it is known from the first. The term of discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by the resolving of the effects into their causes ; and then the discursive process ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as in their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

Reply Obj. 1. Although one thing only is understood in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one, as shown above.

Reply Obj. 2. God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown ; but He knows the effects in the cause ; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.

Reply Obj. 3. God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can ; but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us ; and hence His knowledge is not discursive.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on the text, *Whom He called, He justified, etc.*, as follows: *A thing will not happen because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists.*

Obj. 2. Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.

Obj. 3. Further, *The thing known is before knowledge, and is its measure*, as the Philosopher says. But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *All creatures, spiritual and corporeal, are not known by God because they are; but they are because He knows them.*

I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. The knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. The knowledge of the artificer is the cause of those things inasmuch as the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of the work; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must remember that the natural form, being a form that remains in the subject to which it gives existence, includes and implies the principle of action only accordingly as it has an inclination to the effect; likewise, the intelligible form does not include the principle of action as it resides in the intelligent subject unless we add to it the inclination to the effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things, inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites; it would not produce

a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says. It is manifest that God causes things by His Intellect, since His Existence is His Intelligence; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His Will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the knowledge of approbation.

Reply Obj. 1. Origen spoke in reference to that idea of knowledge, to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.

When he says that God foreknows some things because they are in the future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence; and not according to the cause of existence. If things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but nevertheless the futurity of things is not the cause why God knows them.

Reply Obj. 2. The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. That things should be eternal is not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, still it does not follow that creatures are eternal.

Reply Obj. 3. Natural things are the medium between the knowledge of God and our knowledge. We receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge; hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, on the other hand, the knowledge of God comes before natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is the medium between the knowledge of the builder who makes it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house, from the house already built.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD HAS KNOWLEDGE OF NON-EXISTENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God has not knowledge of non-existence. The knowledge of God is of true things. *Truth*

and *being* are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of non-existence.

Obj. 2. Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But what exist not, cannot have any likeness to God, Who is Existence itself. Therefore what are not, cannot be known by God.

Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known to Him. But it is not the cause of non-existences, because non-existences have no cause. Therefore God has not knowledge of non-existence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, *Who calls what are not as though they were* (Rom. iv. 17).

I answer that, God knows all things that in any way are. It is possible that things that do not absolutely exist should in a certain sense exist. Absolutely, things exist which are actual; and things which are not actually existing, are potentially, in the power of God Himself or of the creature, that is, either in active power, or passive; either in power of idea, or of imagination, or in some other sense. Whatever can be made or thought of or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all is known to God; although they do not actually exist. In that sense it can be said that He has knowledge even of non-existences.

A certain difference may be noticed in the consideration of non-existences. Though some of them may not be actually existing now, still they were, or they will be; God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision. Since the intelligence of God, which is His existence, is measured by Eternity, without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God is extended over all time, and over all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. Other things are in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; as regards these He is said to have not the knowledge of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so said because what we see exists distinct from the seer.

Reply Obj. 1. What things exist potentially are true as

potentialities, for it is true that they are potentialities ; and as such they are known by God.

Reply Obj. 2. As God is His Existence itself, everything exists in the degree in which it participates in the likeness of God ; as everything is hot in the degree it participates in heat. So, potentialities are known by God ; although they do not actually exist.

Reply Obj. 3. The knowledge of God, joined to His Will, is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that whatever God knows should exist ; or have been, or will be ; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills or permits to exist. Further, the knowledge of God does not mean that they exist ; but that they are possible.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS EVIL ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know evil. For the Philosopher says that the intellect which is not a potentiality does not know privation. But *evil is the privation of good*, as Augustine says. Therefore, as the intellect of God is not a potentiality, but is always actual, it seems that God does not know evil.

Obj. 2. Further, all knowledge is the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil ; nor is it caused by evil, therefore God does not know evil.

Obj. 3. Further, everything known is known by its likeness ; or by its opposite. Whatever God knows, He knows by His Essence. The Divine Essence is neither the likeness of evil ; nor is evil contrary to it ; for to the Divine Essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says. Therefore God does not know evil.

Obj. 4. Further, what is known by another and not by itself, is imperfectly known. Evil is not known by God by itself, otherwise evil would be in God ; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known by

another, namely, by good, it would be known by Him imperfectly ; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil.

On the contrary, It is said, *Hell and loss are before God* (Prov. xv. 11).

I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good perfectly, unless He also knew the evils. A thing is knowable in the degree in which it exists ; hence, since the existence of evil is the privation of good, He knows evil also ; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says, *God by Himself receives the vision of darkness ; not otherwise seeing darkness except by the light.*

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in a state of potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in itself ; and this agrees with what he had said previously, that a point and every indivisibility are known by privation of division. This happens inasmuch as simple and indivisible forms are not actually real in our mind ; but are only potentialities ; for were they actual in the mind, they would not be known by privation ; thus simple things are known from separate substances. God does not know evil by privation in Himself ; but by the opposite good.

Reply Obj. 2. The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil ; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

Reply Obj. 3. Although evil is not opposed to the Divine Essence, which is not corruptible by evil ; still it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His Essence ; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.

Reply Obj. 4. To know anything by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if it is of itself knowable ; but evil is not thus knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good ; therefore evil can neither be described nor known except by good.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS SINGULAR (INDIVIDUAL)
THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know singular things. For the Divine Intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. The human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know the singular; but as the Philosopher says, *reason has to do with universals; while sense is concerned with particular things.* Therefore God does not know singular things.

Obj. 2. Further, in us those faculties are the only ones that know the singular, which receive the images not abstracted from material conditions. In God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.

Obj. 3. Further, every kind of knowledge comes about by some likeness. The likeness of singular things as such, does not seem to be in God, forasmuch as the principle of singularity is matter; and as matter is a potentiality only, it is altogether unlike God, who is Pure Act. Therefore God cannot know the singular.

On the contrary, It is said, *All the ways of men are open to His Eyes* (Prov. xvi. 2).

I answer that, God knows singular things. All created perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way (Q. IV.). To know the singular is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thence against Empedocles he argues that God would be the most foolish of beings if He were ignorant of discord. The perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple Intellect.

Some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by the universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing which does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal motions of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualised except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or something of that kind, would not know him formally considered as this particular man. According to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in their aspect of singularity.

Others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. This will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply something to another unless he first knows it; hence the said application cannot be the rule of knowing the particular and singular; rather it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, His knowledge is extended as far as His Causality extends. As the active power of God extends itself not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. XLIV.), the knowledge of God must extend itself to singular things, which are individualized by matter. Since God knows other things than Himself by His Essence, as being the Model of all things, as their active principle, His Essence must be the sufficing principle of knowledge as regards all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the being of the whole thing, and not only of the form.

Reply Obj. 1. Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individual principles. Hence the intelligible species of our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual

principles ; on that account our intellect formally as such does not know the singular. The Intelligible Species of the Divine Intellect, which is the Essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of Itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or of the individual ; hence by It God knows not only the universal, but also singular things.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the Species of the Divine Intellect in its existence has no material conditions like the images of the imagination and sense, still its power extends itself to both immaterial and material things.

Reply Obj. 3. Although matter as potentiality, recedes from a likeness to God, still, even in the existence it has, it retains a certain likeness to the Divine Existence.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN KNOW INFINITE THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot know the infinite. The infinite, as such, is unknown ; for the infinite is that which *to those who measure it leaves always something more to be measured*, as the Philosopher says. Augustine says that, *Whatever is known, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower*. The infinite cannot be in a finite boundary. Therefore it cannot be comprehended by God's knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it must be said that the idea of the infinite requires it to be impertransible, and the finite must be pertransible. But the infinite is impertransible by the finite ; and also by the infinite. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, or by the infinite ; so the infinite cannot be finite in God's knowledge, which is infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. The infinite cannot be measured. Therefore the infinite cannot be known by God.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *Although we cannot*

number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds.

I answer that, Since God knows not only things actual (*in actu*), but also things possible to Himself or to created things, and as these must be infinite, it is evident that He knows the infinite. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or were, or will be, is not of the infinite, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals will be infinitely multiplied; still, if we consider more attentively, we shall see that God knows the infinite even by the knowledge of vision. God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.

The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the known knowledge of each one is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness only of one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. The intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing [known] as regards the species, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of a man in a certain way knows an infinite number of men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; because the intelligible species of our intellect is not the likeness of man as to the individual principle, but as to the principles of the species. The Divine Essence, whereby the Divine Intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be; not only as regards common principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one; hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends itself to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.

Reply Obj. 1. The idea of the infinite can belong to quantity, as the Philosopher says. The idea of quantity includes the order of parts. To know the infinite according to its own mode is to know part after part; in that way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be

taken, there will always remain something else outside. God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things together all at once, and not successively. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.

Reply Obj. 2. Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be passed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence, it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by one who is infinite. Thus what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended by Him; but not as if it were pertransible in itself.

Reply Obj. 3. The Knowledge of God is not the quantitative measure of things; for the infinite is not subject to quantitative measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. Everything has truth of nature in the degree to which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made agrees with the art which makes it. Granted, however, an infinite number of actual things to exist, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients said; still it is manifest that all these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS FUTURE CONTINGENT THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know future contingent things. A necessary effect proceeds from a necessary cause. The knowledge of God is the cause of what He knows. Since it is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore God does not know contingent things.

Obj. 2. Further, every conditional proposition of which the

antecedent is absolutely necessary, must have an absolutely necessary consequence. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion : and from necessary principles, only a necessary conclusion can follow, as the Philosopher says. But this is a true conditional proposition, *If God knew that this contingent thing will be, it will be*, for the knowledge of God is only of true things. This conditional antecedent is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary ; thus God does not know contingent things.

Obj. 3. Further, everything known by God must be ; because even what we ourselves know, must be ; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. No future contingent thing must necessarily exist. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.

On the contrary, It is said, *He who made the hearts of every one of them ; who knoweth all their works* (Ps. xxxii. 15), that is, of men. The works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.

I answer that, As was shown above, not only actual but also things possible to God and the creature, God knows all ; and that some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways ; first, in itself, as actual in which sense it is not considered as a future thing, but as a present thing ; not as contingent, but as determined to one ; and in that way it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge as for instance to the sense of sight ; as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause ; and in that sense it is considered as a future thing, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one ; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things, and in that sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in

its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually (*actu*) in itself. Although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in themselves, as we do; but He knows them all at once; because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His Existence; for eternity existing all at once comprises all time (Q. X.). Hence, all temporal things are present to God from eternity, not only in the manner that He has the ideas of all things before Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the Divine sight in their presentiality; still they are really future contingent things in relation to their own proximate causes.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the supreme cause is necessary, still the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary; so likewise what are known to God are contingent as regards proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the First Cause, is necessary.

Reply Obj. 2. Some say that this antecedent, *God knew this contingent to be future*, is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although even the future sometimes does not follow. Others say that this antecedent is contingent, as a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, Socrates is a white man. This also is to no purpose; for when we say, *God knew this contingent to be future*, the contingent is there only as the matter of the verb, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition,

or to its being true or false. For it may be as true that I said that a man is a donkey, as that I said that Socrates ran, or that God is : and so also with regard to a necessary or a contingent proposition. Hence it must be said that the antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional proposition would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect ; as, for example, if I said, If the sun shines, the grass will grow. Therefore it must be otherwise decided, that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to the act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul. For the existence of a thing in itself is one thing, and the existence of a thing in the soul is another, as, for example, when I say, *What the soul understands is immaterial* ; this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect ; not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, *If God knew anything, it will be*, the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the Divine knowledge, that is, as it is in its presentiality. Thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent. *For everything that is, while it is, must necessarily be*, as the Philosopher says.

Reply Obj. 3. Things reduced to act in time, are known by us successively in time ; but by God are known in Eternity, which is above time. To us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such ; but they are certain to God alone, whose Intelligence is in eternity above time ; as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him ; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the same way. What is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself, for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us ; whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the Divine knowledge, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, *Everything known by God must necessarily be*, is usually distinguished ;

for it may apply to the thing itself, or to the saying. If applied to the thing itself, it is divided, and false ; for the sense is, *Everything which God knows is necessary*. If understood of the saying it is composite and true ; for the sense is, *This proposition, which is known by God to be, is necessary*. Some urge an objection and say that this distinction has place in forms that are separable from the subject ; as if I said, *White can be black*, which is false as a saying, and true as to the thing. For a thing which is white can become black : whereas this saying, *White is*

ERRATUM

Page 207. line 5. *Instead of ' which is known by God to be,' read, ' that which is known by God, is.'*

intelligible.

FOURTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS ENUNCIBLE THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourteenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know enuncible things. For to know enuncible things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the Divine Intellect there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciabile things.

Obj. 2. Further, every kind of knowledge is made by some similitude. In God there is no likeness of enuncible things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enuncible things.

On the contrary, It is said, *The Lord knows the thoughts of men* (Ps. xciii. 11). Enuncible things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows those things.

I answer that, Since our intellect can form enunciative things, and God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, it follows that God necessarily knows all the enunciative things which can be formed.

As He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciative things not by the enunciative mode, as if in His own Intellect there were composition or division of enunciative things; but He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as we by the very fact that we understand what man is, understand also all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a ^{way} was as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not thereby understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On that account what we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by the formation of something enunciative. The Species of the Divine Intellect, which is God's Essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His Essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection would avail if God knew enunciative things by way of enunciation.

Reply Obj. 2. Enunciative composition signifies some existence of the thing itself; and thus God by His Existence, which is His Essence, is the Similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciative propositions.

FIFTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS VARIABLE?

We proceed thus to the Fifteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the Knowledge of God is variable. Knowledge is related to what is known. Whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from

time, and varies according to the variation of creatures, as *Lord*, *Creator*, and the like. Therefore the Knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever God can make, He can know. God can make much more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His Knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.

Obj. 3. Further, God knew that Christ would be born. He does not know now Christ will be born ; because Christ will not be born any more. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew ; thus the Knowledge of God is variable.

On the contrary, It is said, that *In God there is no change nor shadow of vicissitude* (Jas. i. 17).

I answer that, As the knowledge of God is His Substance, and His Substance is altogether immutable (Q. IX.), so His Knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.

Reply Obj. 1. The words *Lord*, *Creator*, and the like import relations to creatures in themselves. The Knowledge of God imports relation to creatures as they are in God ; because everything is actually understood as it is in the intelligent subject. Things created exist in God in an invariable manner, while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that *Lord*, *Creator*, and the like, import the relations which follow on the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves ; therefore these relations are spoken of variously in God, according to the variation of creatures. The words *knowledge* and *love*, and the like, import relations which follow on the acts which are understood to be in God Himself ; therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner.

Reply Obj. 2. God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, accordingly as He is said to know things actual in time. That He knows some things to be

possible which do not exist, or things that exist to be possibly non-existent, does not imply that His Knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His Knowledge would be variable. This could not be ; for whatever is, or can be in time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows ; because such a proposition implies that He was first of all ignorant, and then afterwards knew.

Reply Obj. 3. The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say that Christ is born, and that He will be born, and was born ; because the same thing is signified by these three propositions, viz., the nativity of Christ ; therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows, because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false ; both because the diversity in the parts of the saying causes a diversity of enunciable propositions ; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true ; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down when he says that this saying, Socrates sits, is true when he is sitting, and also false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, *Whatever God knew He knows*, if referred to enunciable propositions. It does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. As it is without variation in the Divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and at sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the Divine Knowledge that God knows that an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The Knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Our knowledge varies either as regards what is true and what is false, for example, if when a thing

is changed in itself we retained the same opinion about it ; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting ; neither of which can be in God.

SIXTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD HAS A SPECULATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixteenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. The Knowledge of God is the cause of things. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the Knowledge of God is not speculative.

Obj. 2. Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things ; which does not belong to the Divine Knowledge. Therefore the Knowledge of God is not speculative.

On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. Speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.

I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only ; some is practical only ; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof we say knowledge can be called speculative in three ways : first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower, as the knowledge of man is of natural or Divine things ; second, in the mode of knowledge—as, for instance, the builder may consider the house by defining, and dividing, and considering what is becoming or unbecoming to a house in general : for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable ; for operable means the application of the form to the matter, and not the resolution of the whole into its universal formal principles ; third, as regards the end ; *for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative*, as the Philosopher says. The practical

intellect is ordered to the end of the operation ; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if any builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of his operation, but only to know how to do it, this would be only a speculative consideration as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative as regards the thing known, is merely speculative.

But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical : and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.

Therefore it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only ; for He Himself is not operable.

Of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode ; for whatever we speculatively know in things by defining and dividing, God knows it all much more perfectly.

Of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, accordingly as knowledge is called practical from the end. In that way He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in time. As regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, still they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things ; inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or orders them ; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.

Reply Obj. 1. The Knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of others ; of some things actual, that is of things made in time ; and of some things virtually possible, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made.

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally as it is human.

In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known formally as such. Therefore, since the Knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must

know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only as speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative Knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all other things than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively: and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself He possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.

QUESTION XV.

ON IDEAS.

(*In Three Articles.*)

AFTER considering the Knowledge of God, it remains to consider Ideas. And about this three things are asked: (1) Whether ideas exist? (2) Whether they are many, or one only? (3) Whether they exist of all things known by God?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IDEAS EXIST?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that ideas do not exist. For Dionysius says that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore ideas do not exist.

Obj. 2. Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (Q. XIV.). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.

Obj. 3. Further, The idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the Divine Essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood.*

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the Divine Mind. For the Greek word 'Ιδέα is in Latin *Forma*. Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing

apart from the things themselves. The form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends ; either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, even as the forms of things knowable are said to exist in him who knows them. Now, in either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason :

In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. The agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form exists in himself, as may happen in two ways. First, in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to the natural being, as in those that act by their nature ; even as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Second, in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists as to an intelligible existence, as in those that act by the intellect, and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this likeness may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Q. XLVI.), there must exist in the Divine mind that form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.

Reply Obj. 1. God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle also rejects the opinion of Plato, who supposed ideas as existing of themselves, and not in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. Although God knows Himself and all else by His own Essence, yet His Essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things ; though not with respect to Himself.

Reply Obj. 3. God is the similitude of all things according to His Essence ; therefore ideas in God are identical with His Essence.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IDEAS ARE MANY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His Essence. But God's Essence is one only; so therefore is the idea.

Obj. 2. Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there is neither plurality of arts, nor diversity of wisdom. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.

Obj. 3. Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied with respect to the diversity of creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.

Obj. 4. Further, these respects exist either really in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only with respect to creatures. But if they exist really in God, it follows that there exists a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons. And this is against the teaching of Damascene, who says, *In the Divine nature is absolute unity, except that in the Persons one is unbegotten, one begotten, and one proceeding.* Ideas therefore are not many.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *Ideas are principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the Divine Intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can arise or decay, and all that actually does so.*

I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army is the proper intention

of the general. The highest good existing in created things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches. The order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first of created things, leaving the second to be created by the first, and so in regular progression, until the multitude of beings was produced that we now behold. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was immediately (*per se*) created by Him and intended by Him, He must have the idea of that order. There cannot be the idea of any complete work unless there exist the particular ideas of those parts of which the whole is made up; just as a builder cannot conceive a mental image of a house unless he has the idea of each part. So, then, it must needs be that in the Divine Mind there exist the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says, *Each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it*, from which it follows that in the Divine Mind ideas are many. It can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of the thing operated, is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which image is a form putting the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the material house. The understanding many things is not repugnant to God's simplicity, though it would be repugnant to His simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the Mind of God, as things understood, as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own Essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. It can be known not only as it exists in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to any degree of likeness. Every creature has its own proper species, according to which it

has in some degree a likeness to the Divine Essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His Essence as capable of imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature. And in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of many things, and these are many ideas.

Reply Obj. 1. The Divine Essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that Essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that created thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood by the self-same essence.

Reply Obj. 2. By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands ; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one act of the intellect understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are the objects of His Intellect, which is the same as saying that He understands many ideas. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands its material form. If he understands the form of a house, as considered by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands its type or idea. Not only does God understand many things by His Essence, but also understands that He does so. And this means that He understands the types of things ; or that many ideas are in His Intellect as understood by Him.

Reply Obj. 3. Such respects, whereby ideas are multiplied, are not caused by the things themselves, but by the Divine Intellect comparing its own Essence with these things.

Reply Obj. 4. Respects multiplying ideas do not exist in created things ; but in God. Nor are they real respects, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but respects understood by God.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IDEAS EXIST OF ALL THINGS THAT GOD KNOWS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God ; or it would follow that evil exists in Him. But evil is a part of God's knowledge. Therefore ideas do not exist of all things that God knows.

Obj. 2. Further, God knows things that neither are, nor have been, nor will be, as has been said above. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says, *Acts of the Divine Will are the determining and effective types of things*. Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by him.

Obj. 3. Further, God knows primary matter, to which no idea can belong ; since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.

Obj. 4. Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but genera, both the particular and accidental. But no ideas exist of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says. Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.

On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the Divine Mind, as is clear from Augustine. But God has the proper types of all things that He knows ; and therefore has the ideas of them.

I answer that, As ideas are, according to Plato, principles of the cognition and generation of things, they may be considered in a twofold aspect, as they exist in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called a type, and belongs to practical knowledge. So far as it is a principle of cognition only, it is properly called a concept (*ratio*), and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As a type, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any part of time ; whereas as a principle of cognition it has respect to all

things known by God, though never actually made, as well as to all things that He knows according to the proper concept of them, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.

Reply Obj. 1. Evil is known by God not through its own idea, but through the idea of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea existing in God, neither as type nor as concept.

Reply Obj. 2. God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor have been, nor will be. Hence, with respect to these no idea exists in God as a type, but only in so far as it denotes a concept.

Reply Obj. 3. Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he did not postulate an idea for matter but as a co-principle with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of it as compounded with form. Matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.

Reply Obj. 4. Genus can have no idea apart from species, in so far as idea denotes a type; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with the subject of them. Accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. An architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as paintings, are produced through some other form. Individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of the species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the co-principle with the idea; and because nature regards mainly species, and only produces individuals that the species may be preserved. However, Divine Providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals, as will be shown later (Q. XXII.).

QUESTION XVI.

CONCERNING TRUTH.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

SINCE knowledge regards truth, after the consideration of the Knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning Truth. About this eight points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect? (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect affirming and denying? (3) On the comparison of truth to being. (4) On the comparison of the truth to the good. (5) Whether God is truth? (6) Whether all things are true with one and the same truth, or with more than one? (7) On the eternity of truth. (8) On the immutability of truth.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH RESIDES ONLY IN THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect; but rather in things. For Augustine condemns this definition of truth, *That is true which is seen*, since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they cannot be seen. He also condemns the following, *That is true which is as it appears to the knowledge of him who is willing and able to know*, for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truths thus: *That is true which is*. It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of

truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that everything that is seen is true. Consequently mutual contradictories can be true, since contradictories seem to be true of the same thing as seen by different persons.

Obj. 3. Further, *that which is the cause of something in others, possesses that thing more fully itself*, as is evident from the Philosopher. But thought or word is true or false, according as the thing thought of is or is not true, as the Philosopher teaches. Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says, *Truth and untruth reside not in things, but in the intellect.*

I answer that, As good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so truth denotes that to which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is in respect to the thing known as it is in the mind of him who knows it; whilst appetite regards the inclination towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely truth, is in the intellect itself. As good exists in a thing so far as that thing is directed to the appetite, and hence the idea of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the desire itself, so that a desire is called good if its object is good; so, since truth is in the intellect in proportion to its conformity with the object understood, the idea of truth must needs flow from the intellect to the object of the intellect, so that the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it is conformed in relation to the intellect. A thing understood may be in relation to intellect either by its own nature, or by accident. By its own nature, it is in relation to an intellect on which it depends as regards its own existence; but by accident to one respecting which it is merely a possible object of knowledge; even as we may say that a house is related by its own nature to the intellect of the architect, but only

accidentally to one on which it does not depend for its existence.

We do not judge of a thing by what exists in it accidentally, but by what exists in it by its own nature. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is directed to an intellect from which it depends, and thus it is that the works of men's hands are said to be true as being directed to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of a true intelligence. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that exist in the Divine Mind. A stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the conception pre-existing in the Divine Intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says, *Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is*; and Hilary says that *Truth makes being clear and evident*. Now this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. To the truth of things as directed to the intellect belongs Augustine's definition, *Truth is the most perfect likeness of the first principle, in all respects similar to it*. Here, too, belongs Anselm's definition, *Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone*. For that is right which is in accordance with the first principle. Avicenna also defines truth thus, *The truth of anything is its own proper nature immutably attached to it*. The definition that *Truth is the equation of thought and thing* is applicable to it under either aspect.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes, in treating of this truth, relation to our intellect; for a merely accidental relation is not included in any definition.

Reply Obj. 2. The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth

implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to the human understanding. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes. Such do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the Divine Mind.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that the idea of truth exists by priority (*per prius*) therein, any more than the idea of health need exist by priority in the medicine, rather than in the animal. The virtue of the medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or word is true because the thing thought of or spoken of exists; and not because it is true.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH RESIDES ONLY IN THE INTELLECT AFFIRMING AND DENYING?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect affirming and denying. For the Philosopher says that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect in the matter of what anything is. Affirmation and negation are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing what anything is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect affirming or denying.

Obj. 2. Further, Isaac says in the book "On Definitions" that *Truth is the equation of thought and thing*. But this equation of thought and thing can exist in the intellect both as to things complex and non-complex, and even in sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect affirming and denying.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says that with regard to simple things and essences, truth is *found neither in the intellect nor in the things themselves*.

I answer that. As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing, and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of the thing seen, yet it does not know the conformity which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. The intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet does not apprehend it by knowing merely what it is. When, however, it judges that a thing really corresponds to the form, which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and affirms the truth. This it does by affirming and denying. In every proposition it either applies to, or removes from, the thing denoted by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that sense is true in its sensation, and the intellect in its knowledge of the nature of a thing; but not so as thereby (alone) to know or affirm the truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may exist in the senses, or in the intellect knowing the essence of a thing, as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the mind of the knower. The word truth implies the latter, for the perfection of the intellect is the truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect affirming and denying; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing the essence of the thing.

And thus the Objections given are solved.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE TRUE AND BEING ARE CONVERTIBLE TERMS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the in-

telleet, as has been said ; but being properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.

Obj. 2. Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being ; for it is true that what is, is ; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.

Obj. 3. Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being ; for being is not understood except in so far as it is true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says, *There is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.*

I answer that, As good is related to the appetite, so truth is related to knowledge. Everything, in so far as it partakes of being, in so far is knowable. Wherefore the Philosopher says that *the soul is in some manner all things*, through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is truth. But as good adds to being a relation to the appetite, so truth adds relation to the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. Truth resides in things and in the intellect, as said before. But the truth that is in things is convertible with being as to the substance ; but the truth that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested ; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already. It may, however, be said, that being also is in things and in the intellect, as truth is ; although truth is primarily in the intellect, but being is primarily in things. This is the case because truth and being differ by a mental distinction.

Reply Obj. 2. Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known ; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence truth is based on being, for even not-being is a kind of logical being (*ens rationis*) as apprehended by reason.

Reply Obj. 3. When it is said that being cannot be apprehended without the idea of truth, this can be under-

stood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of truth follows apprehension of being ; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of truth be apprehended also ; and this is false. But truth cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also ; since being falls under the idea of truth. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible with being. Being cannot be understood, without being intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being understood is true, yet truth is not understood by understanding being.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOOD IS LOGICALLY PRIOR TO THE TRUE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that good is logically prior to truth. For the more universal things are logically prior, as is evident. But good is more universal than truth, since truth is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to truth.

Obj. 2. Further, good is in things, but truth in the intellect affirming and denying, as said before. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to truth.

Obj. 3. Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from the Philosopher. But virtue is included under good ; since, as Augustine says, it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore good is prior to truth.

On the contrary, What exists in most things is prior logically. But truth exists in some things wherein good does not exist, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore truth is prior to good.

I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, in the subject, yet they differ logically. And in this manner truth, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons : (1) Because truth is

more closely attached to being, which is prior to good. For truth regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. (2) It appears from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since truth regards knowledge, but good the appetite, truth must be prior logically to good.

Reply Obj. 1. The will and the intellect mutually include one another. The intellect understands the will; and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of the appetible, good stands as the universal, and truth as the particular; whereas in the order of the intelligible the converse is the case. From the fact, then, that truth is a kind of good, it follows that good is prior in the order of the appetible; but not that it is prior absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. The intellect apprehends, first being itself; secondly, that it understands being; thirdly, that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first; that of truth second; and the idea of good third; though good is in things.

Reply Obj. 3. The virtue called truth is not truth in general, but a certain kind according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. Truth as applied to life is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfils in his life that to which he is ordained by the Divine Intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things. The truth of justice is found in man as he fulfils his duty to his neighbour, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS TRUTH?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect affirming and denying. But in

God there is not affirmation and negation. Therefore in Him there is not truth.

Obj. 2. Further, truth, according to Augustine, is a likeness to the principle. But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as the first cause of all things ; as the Being of God is the cause of all being ; and His Goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be owing to God ; which is evidently false.

On the contrary, It is said, *I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life* (John xiv. 6).

I answer that, As said above, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is ; and in things according as they have being conformable to the intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. His Being is not only conformed to His Intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect itself ; and this is the measure and cause of every other being and every other intellect, and He Himself is His own Existence and Intellect. Whence it follows that not only is truth in Him, but that He Himself is Truth itself, and the sovereign and first Truth.

Reply Obj. 1. Although in the Divine Intellect there is neither affirmation nor negation, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex ; and thus there is truth in His Intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the Divine Intellect. This cannot be said, properly speaking, of Divine truth ; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, who has a Principle. If we speak of truth in its essence, the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as, 'The Father is of Himself, because He is not of another.' Similarly, the Divine truth can be

called a likeness to the Principle, inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.

Reply Obj. 3. Not-being, and privation, have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of them by the intellect. All apprehension by the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in such a statement as, 'a person commits fornication is true,' is entirely from God. To argue from this that the sin itself is from God is a fallacy of accident.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE TRUTH, ACCORDING TO WHICH ALL THINGS ARE TRUE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine, *Nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God.* But truth is greater than the mind of man ; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth. But in fact it judges all things according to the measure of truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.

Obj. 2. Further, Anselm says that, *As is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to the true.* But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.

On the contrary, it is said, *Truths are diminished among the sons of men* (Ps. xi. 2).

I answer that, In one sense truth is one, whereby all things are true ; and in another sense more than one. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature ; as animal is found in each species of animal. When anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature ; and from this one the rest are dominated. So healthiness is predicated of

an animal, of urine, and of medicine, although health exists only in the animal ; but from the health of the animal, medicine, as effecting that health, is called healthy, and urine, as indicating that health. Although health exists neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one effects, and the other indicates health. We have said that truth resides primarily in the intellect ; and secondarily in things, according as they are directed to the Divine Intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects ; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence it is said on the text, *Truths are decayed from the children of men* (Ps. xi. 2), by the gloss of Augustine, *As from one face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one Divine truth*. If we speak of truth as it exists in things, then all things are true by one primary truth ; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. Thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the Divine Intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.

Reply Obj. 1. The soul does not judge of all things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows that the primary truth is greater than the soul. However, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree ; in so far as it is the perfection of the soul ; even as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God alone.

Reply Obj. 2. Anselm's *dictum*, is true in so far as things are said to be true by conformity to the Divine Intellect.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CREATED TRUTH IS ETERNAL ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says, *Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five.* But the truth of these is a created truth ; therefore created truth is eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, everything that exists always, is eternal. But universals exist always and everywhere ; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth ; which is the most universal of things.

Obj. 3. Further, what is true in the present, was always true to be future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.

Obj. 4. Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of assertions is without beginning and end ; for if their truth had a beginning, since it existed not before, it was true that their truth did not exist, and true, of course, by reason of truth ; so that truth existed before it began to exist. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it exists after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth does not exist. Therefore truth is eternal.

On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before (Q. X.).

I answer that, The truth of assertions is no other than the truth of the intellect. An assertion resides in the intellect, and in speech. According as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself. According as it is in speech, it is called enunciative truth, according as it signifies some truth of the understanding, not on account of any truth existing in the thing enunciated, as though in the subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within itself

but from the health which it indicates in an animal. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Because only the Divine Intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the Divine Intellect is God Himself, as shown already (A. 5).

Reply Obj. 1. The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the Mind of God.

Reply Obj. 2. The existence of anything, always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places; as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, as man is one by the unity of one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as they are not determined to place or time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal; except in the intellect, if one exists that is eternal.

Reply Obj. 3. The thing which now is was about to be, before it actually was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing would not have been about to be. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is was to be, except in so far as its future being was in the eternal cause; while God only is such a cause.

Reply Obj. 4. Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of propositions enunciated by us eternal, but had a beginning in time. Before such truth existed, it was not true to say that it did not exist, except by reason of the Divine Intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. Now, it is true to say that that truth did not then exist. This is

true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect ; and not by reason of any truth existing in the things. For that is truth concerning not-being ; and not-being has no truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is so far true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH IS IMMUTABLE ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says that *Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is.*

Obj. 2. Further, what remains after every change is immutable ; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change ; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore, truth is immutable.

Obj. 3. Further, if the truth of a proposition can be changed, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm, *is a certain rectitude*, in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the Divine Mind concerning it. But such a proposition as *Socrates sits*, takes from the Divine Mind its import that Socrates does sit, and has the same import though Socrates sits not. Therefore the truth of the proposition is in no way changed.

Obj. 4. Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, *Socrates sits, will sit, has sat.* Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable ; and for the same reason that of any other.

On the contrary, it is said, *Truths are diminished among the sons of men* (Ps. xi. 2).

I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before. Things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. This conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other similitude through change in either of the things compared. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed; and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion. In either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, any intellect exists wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and of which nothing can escape the knowledge, in this is immutable truth. Such is the Divine Intellect, as is clear from what has been said before (Q. XII.). Hence the truth of the Divine Intellect is immutable. The truth of our intellect is mutable, not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to untruth, for thus forms may be called mutable. The truth of the Divine Intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of Divine truth.

Reply Obj. 2. Truth and being are convertible terms. Hence as being is not generated nor corrupted in itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains; but by that truth not remaining which was before.

Reply Obj. 3. A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the Divine intellect concerning them; but is said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of thought and thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this

proposition, *Socrates sits*, is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is indicative, and with the truth of indication, in so far as it indicates a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains; but the second is changed.

Reply Obj. 4. The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause that the proposition, *Socrates sits*, is true, is not precisely the same regarded as a present, past, or future action. Hence the truth, which results, varies, and is variously indicated by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.

QUESTION XVII.

CONCERNING FALSITY.

(*In Four Articles.*)

THE next question is about falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether falsity exists in things? (2) Whether it exists in the sense? (3) Whether it exists in the intellect? (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FALSITY EXISTS IN THINGS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says, *If truth is that which is, it will be concluded that falsity does not exist anywhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary.*

Obj. 2. Further, false is derived from *fallere*, to deceive. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says, *they show nothing but their own species.* Therefore falsity is not found in things.

Obj. 3. Further, truth is said to exist in things by conformity to the Divine Intellect (Q. XVI.). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity, and thus nothing is false.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *Every single body is a true body and a false unity.* For it imitates unity without being unity. But everything imitates the Divine unity, yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.

I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposite forms regard the same subject, it must be that falsity must first be sought, where primarily truth is found ; that is to say, in the intellect. In things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except as directed to the intellect. Since every thing is absolutely denominated according to what belongs to it by its own nature, but is partially denominated by what belongs to it accidentally ; a thing indeed may be called false absolutely when compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared, absolutely (*per se*) ; but may be called false partially as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Natural things depend on the Divine Intellect, as artificial things on the human. Artificial things are said to be false absolutely and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art ; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art. In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the Divine Intellect ; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from what that Intellect ordains, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained ; wherein, in fact, consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, *Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying ?* (Ps. iv. 3). As opposed to this, virtuous deeds are called the *truth of life*, as being obedient to the order of the Divine Intellect. Thus it is said, *He that doth truth, cometh to the light* (John iii. 21). Natural things, as directed to our intellect, with which they are compared accidentally, can be called false ; not absolutely, but partially ; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it ; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing. So, too,

Augustine says, *The true tragedian is false Hector*. On the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to any quality that belongs to it. In another way can a thing be called false, not absolutely, but partially—that is, by way of cause—and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. Whereas it is innate in us to judge of things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and naturally deals with external accidents, therefore are those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, said to be false with respect to those things; as gall may falsely appear honey; and tin, gold. Regarding this, Augustine says, *We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like to true*. The Philosopher says, *Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not*. In this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions, or words, and not merely because he can invent them; for in that case many wise and learned persons might be called false.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it really is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, *The tragedian is true, but his Hector false*. As, therefore, in things that are found something that they are not, so in those things is found in a degree the idea of falseness.

Reply Obj. 2. Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. They give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.

Reply Obj. 3. Things are not said to be false as compared with the Divine Intellect, in which case they would be false absolutely, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only partially.

To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to induce a false opinion, not in isolated cases, but in the majority of instances.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER FALSITY EXISTS IN SENSE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that falsity does not exist in sense. For Augustine says, *If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them.* Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses ; and therefore that falsity does not exist in them.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says, *Falsity is not a property of sense, but of the imagination.*

Obj. 3. Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to sense ; therefore in sense falsity does not exist.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their similitudes.*

I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in sense, except as truth resides in sense. Truth does not reside therein in such a way as that sense knows truth, but in so far as it truly apprehends sensible things, as said above (Q. XVI.). This takes place from sense apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in sense through its apprehending or judging things to be other than they really are. The knowledge of things by sense is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the sense ; and the likeness of a thing can exist in sense in three ways. In the first way, primarily and by its own nature, as in sight, the likeness of colours, and other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, by its own nature, though not primarily ; as in sight, the likeness of shape, size, and other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor by its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, the likeness of a man, not in so far as he is man, but as the object, whose colour sight perceives, happens to be a man. Sense, therefore, has no false knowledge with regard to its own proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then

because the unsound organ does not receive the sensible form rightly ; just as other passive subjects may through indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that the unhealthy tongue of a sick person takes sweet for bitter. As to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense may form a false judgment, because it is not directly referred to them, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.

Reply Obj. 1. The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Because sense is sometimes affected erroneously by its object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object ; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.

Reply Obj. 2. Falsity is said not to belong properly to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, *Sense, in its own proper object, is never false.* Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, whenever anyone takes the mere likeness of a thing for the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension ; and for this reason the Philosopher says that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER FALSITY RESIDES IN THE INTELLECT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that falsity does not reside in the intellect. For Augustine says, *Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived.* But falsity

is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says, *Where there is composition of intellects, there is truth and falsehood.* But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.

I answer that, Just as the existence of a thing is by its own proper form, so the knowledge of the knowing faculty is by similitude to the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the existence that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short by accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge with regard to the thing of which the likeness gives it form; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental to it. For it has been said before, that sight is not deceived in its own proper sensible object, but only about such things as are common to more than one sense and are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. As the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness to the essence of the thing apprehended. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing; nor the sense about its proper object. In affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing, for instance, to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is only consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. The intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth, that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the knowledge of the intellect is false, but because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known. But because falsity of the

intellect is concerned essentially with the composition of the intellect alone, falsity occurs accidentally in the operation of the intellect knowing the essence of a thing, by composition being mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another ; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, by including in one definition terms which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as 'a reasonable four-footed animal' would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it ; for such a statement as 'some reasonable animals are four-footed' is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences ; but it is either true ; or there is no exercise of the intellect at all.

Reply Obj. 1. Because the essence of things (*quidditas rei*) is the proper object of the intellect, we can properly be said to understand a thing, when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby ; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, *that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived* ; and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect is always right as regards first principles ; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about essence. For principles known by their own nature are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUE AND FALSE ARE CONTRARIES ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not ; for *truth*, as Augustine says, *is that which is*. But being and not-being are not opposed as contraries ; therefore true and false are not contrary things.

Obj. 2. Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, *A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian.* Therefore true and false are not contraries.

Obj. 3. Further, in God there is no contrariety, for *nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance*, as Augustine says. But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, in the words, *They have laid hold on lying* (Jer. viii. 5). *that is to say, an idol*, as Jerome says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.

I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither determines any subject, nor supplies any attribute, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for we can say (that a person is) not seeing or not sitting. Privation attributes nothing, but determines its subject, for it is *negation in a subject*, as the Philosopher says; for blindness, for instance, is not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries both attribute something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of colour. Falsity attributes something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says, *inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is, for as truth implies an adequate taking in of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary.* Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.

Reply Obj. 1. What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. **To** apprehend being, and not-being, are contraries; for, as the Philosopher proves, the contrary of *good is good is, good is not good.*

Reply Obj. 2. Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its own subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals,

and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.

Reply Obj. 3. Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, by nature affect one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. In our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the Divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the Divine Unity.

QUESTION XVIII.

THE LIFE OF GOD.

(In Four Articles.)

SINCE to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the Divine Knowledge and Intellect, we must consider the Divine Life. About this, four points of inquiry arise : (1) To whom does it belong to live ? (2) What is life ? (3) Whether Life is properly attributed to God ? (4) Whether all things in God are Life ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO LIVE BELONGS TO ALL NATURAL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says that *Motion is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature.* But all natural things participate in motion. Therefore all natural things partake in life.

Obj. 2. Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they have in themselves a principle of motion of growth and decay. But motion in place is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, motion of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows. Since, then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of motion in place, it seems that all natural bodies have life.

Obj. 3. Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of 'living waters.' Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.

On the contrary, Dionysius says, that *The last echo of life*

is heard in the plants, whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants ; and therefore they have not life.

I answer that, We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Life manifestly belongs to animals, for it is said by the Philosopher that in animals life is manifest. We must, then, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live : and this it is in which life is manifested first, and remains last. We say that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself ; and as long as such motion appears in it, so long is it considered to be alive. When it no longer has any motion of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of motion, whether it be motion properly so called, as the act of an imperfect thing is called motion, *i.e.*, of a thing in potentiality : or motion in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called motion. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to motion or operation of any kind. Those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of primary motion, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of motion in its general sense. In either way is motion called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The motion of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the motion of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every natural motion in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its motion came from an intrinsic moving force, as some in fact have held, in that case motion would really be the life of all natural bodies.

Reply Obj. 2. To bodies, whether heavy or light, motion does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital motion, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such motion, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. Waters are called living that have a continuous current. Standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and pools. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the motion they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this motion of theirs is not from themselves; but from the cause that generates them. The same is the case with the motion of other heavy and light bodies.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIFE IS AN OPERATION ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher, who distinguishes life by four qualities, namely nourishment, feeling, motion in place, and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.

Obj. 2. Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.

Obj. 3. Further, to know God is an operation. But this

is life, as is clear from the words of John, *Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God* (John xvii. 3). Therefore life is an operation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says, *Life is the existence of things that live.*

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said, our intellect, of which the proper object is the essence of a thing, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (Q. XIII.), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object ; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word body is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions : and is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves ; and in this sense therefore body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature ; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word running (*cursus*) denotes 'to run' (*currere*) in the abstract.

Hence, to say that a thing is alive is to predicate of it something substantial, and not merely accidental. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says, *To live is principally to feel or to understand.*

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher here takes *to live* to mean the operation of life. Perhaps it would be better to say that feeling and intelligence, and the like, are sometimes

taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says that to live is to feel or to understand—in other words, to have a nature capable of feeling or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. In earthly beings there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to feel, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without motion. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as quadrupeds have, and birds, and other perfect animals. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2. By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are the powers of their nature, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead a life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.

The third objection is answered by what is said above.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIFE IS PROPERLY ATTRIBUTED TO GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated. But movement does not belong to God ; neither therefore does life.

Obj. 2. Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher that *the soul is the cause and principle of the living body*. But God has no principle; and therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3. Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things; therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.

On the contrary, It is said in the Psalms, *My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God* (Ps. lxxxiii. 3.).

I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved a threefold order is found. In the first place the end moves the agent. The principal agent is that which acts through its form, but sometimes uses some instrument that acts not by virtue of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. There are things that move themselves, not in respect to any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only to the executing of the act of movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature.

Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay. Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move only

with the motion of expansion and contraction ; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, not merely so as to recognize touch and connection, but objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive motion. Although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or motion ; for this has been implanted in them by nature ; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect ; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly co-ordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings ; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers ; and these by their command move the organs of motion. Thus we see that the art of navigation rules the art of ship-designing ; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.

Although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt ; and the last end, which it must always will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. That being whose nature is its intellect itself, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God ; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes, after showing God to be intelligent, that God has Life most perfect and eternal, since His Intellect is most perfect and always in act.

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher says, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass on to external matter, as

those of heating or cutting ; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as understanding, feeling, and willing. The difference between them is this, that the first action is not the perfection of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved ; but the second action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement in an act of the thing moved, the second action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called his movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what exists potentially ; and this kind of act is one of the perfect, that is to say, of what exists in act. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is motion, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself ; not in the sense in which motion is an act of the imperfect.

Reply Obj. 2. As God is His own very Existence and Intellect, so is He His own Life ; so He lives without principle of life.

Reply Obj. 3. Life in these earthly beings resides in a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found in them apart from a vegetative soul. This does not hold good with incorruptible natures.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS IN GOD ARE LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not all things in God are life. For it is said, *In Him we live, and move, and have our being* (Acts xvii. 28). But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things in Him are life.

Obj. 2. Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things in God are life.

Obj. 3. Further, as Augustine says, *A living substance is better than any substance that does not live.* If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than in themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.

Obj. 4. Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but that never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.

On the contrary, It is said, *What was made, in Him was life* (John i. 3, 4). But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things in God are life.

I answer that, The life of God is His Intellect, as before laid down. In God, the Intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the living of God itself, or, in other words, His Life. Since all things that have been made by God exist in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the Divine Life itself.

Reply Obj. 1. Creatures are said to be in God in a two-fold sense. In one way, so far as they are held together and preserved by the Divine Power; even as we say that things that are in our power are within us. Creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, *In Him we live, and move, and have our being;* since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the Divine Essence. Hence things as they are in God are the Divine Essence. Since the Divine Essence is Life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but Life.

Reply Obj. 2. The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intellectual being ; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the Divine Mind, as having a Divine existence in that Mind.

Reply Obj. 3. If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the Divine Mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the ideal (*separatus*) man was the true man ; and man as he exists in matter, man only by participation. Since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have, absolutely speaking, a more true being in the Divine Mind than in themselves, because in that Mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a being created. But such being (*hoc esse*), a man, or a horse, for example, has more truly in its own nature than in the Divine Mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the Divine Mind, it is not. A house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter ; yet a material house is more truly called a house than what exists in the mind ; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.

Reply Obj. 4. Although bad things are within the knowledge of God, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their idea (*rationem*) in Him. They are known by God through the ideas (*rationes*) of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God ; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.

QUESTION XIX.

THE WILL OF GOD.

(*In Twelve Articles.*)

AFTER considering the things belonging to the Divine Knowledge, we consider what belongs to the Divine Will. The first consideration is about the Divine Will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to the Will; the third about what belongs to the Intellect in order to the Will. About the Will itself there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is Will in God? (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself? (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily? (4) Whether the Will of God is the cause of things? (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the Divine Will? (6) Whether the Divine Will is always fulfilled? (7) Whether the Will of God is mutable? (8) Whether the Will of God imposes necessity on the things willed? (9) Whether there is in God the Will of evil? (10) Whether God has Free Will? (11) Whether the Will of expression is distinguished in God? (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the Divine Will?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS WILL IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there is not Will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not Will in God.

Obj. 2. Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite,

as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not Will in God.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher, the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as has been proved by the Philosopher. Therefore there is not Will in God.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, *That you may prove what is the Will of God* (Rom. xii. 2).

I answer that, There exists Will in God; as there is Intellect. For will follows upon intellect. As natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intellectual form. Everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it possesses it not it tends towards it; and when it possesses it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude to good as apprehended through its intellectual form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being will exists, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be Will in God, since there is Intellect in Him. And as His Intellect is His own Existence, so is His Will.

Reply Obj. 1. Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His Essence, for by His Essence He is good, as shown above (Q. VI.). For the end implies the idea of good.

Reply Obj. 2. Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and delighting in what it does possess. In this respect Will is said to be in God, as having always good for its object, and being, as already said, not distinct from His Essence.

Reply Obj. 3. A will of which the principal object is a

good outside itself, must be moved by another. The object of the Divine Will is His goodness, which is His Essence. Hence, since the Will of God is His Essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This was what Plato meant when he said that the first moving power moves itself.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD WILLS THINGS APART FROM HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the Divine Will is the Divine Existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as the Philosopher says. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His Will must be moved by another ; which is impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His Will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.

Obj. 4. Further, acts of the will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His Will is manifold, and consequently His Existence, which is His Will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, *This is the Will of God, your sanctification* (1 Thess. iv. 3).

I answer that, God not only wills Himself, but other things apart from Himself. Which is clear from the comparison which we made above (art. 1). Natural things not only have a natural inclination towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein ; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so

far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the Divine Will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the Divine Will to communicate by likeness its own good to others, as much as is possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the Divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.

Reply Obj. 1. The Divine Will is God's own Existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has been already said (Q. XIII.). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His Will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own Essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 3. From the fact that His own goodness suffices the Divine Will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing

except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the Divine Intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the Divine Essence, yet in that Essence knows other things.

Reply Obj. 4. As the Divine Intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the Divine Will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHATEVER GOD WILLS HE WILLS NECESSARILY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from Eternity, for otherwise His Will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Obj. 2. Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever belongs to the Nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (Q. II.). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills ; since in God there can be nothing over and above His Nature. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Obj. 4. Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. So the Divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

Obj. 5. Further, on the part of that which is indifferent

to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator (Averroës) says. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.

Obj. 6. Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the Divine Knowledge is His Essence, so is the Divine Will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, *Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will* (Eph. i. 11). But, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, or by supposition. Absolute necessity is conveyed by relation of terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject. It is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even.

In this way the proposition 'Socrates sits' is not necessary—that is, not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily be sitting, as long as he actually is sitting. As to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. The Divine Will has a necessary relation to the Divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to colour, since it tends to it by its own nature. God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. In willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it,

unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them ; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things not indispensable for attaining the end, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to many other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His Will is not mutable.

Reply Obj. 1. From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily ; except by supposition.

Reply Obj. 2. Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness ; for it can exist without other things.

Reply Obj. 3. It does not pertain to the Nature of God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily ; yet to do so is not incompatible with His nature, or contrary to it, but is a purely voluntary act.

Reply Obj. 4. Sometimes a necessary cause has not a necessary relation to an effect ; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a not necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the Divine Will, but from defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that it is not necessary to the perfection of the Divine goodness ; and such defect accompanies all created good.

Reply Obj. 5. A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The Divine

Will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.

Reply Obj. 6. As the Divine Existence is necessary of itself, so is the Divine Will and the Divine Knowledge ; but the Divine Knowledge has necessary relation to the thing known ; not the Divine Will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower ; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God ; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves ; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He knows, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says : *As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the Divine good by its very essence pours the rays of its goodness upon everything that exists.* But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by Will ; and so His Will is not the cause of things.

Obj. 2. Further, in any order that is first, which is, as in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the primary agent. Therefore he acts by His Essence ; and that is His Nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the Divine Will is not the cause of things.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is the cause of anything, through being such a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot ; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. But Augustine says, *Because God is good,*

we exist. Therefore God is the cause of things by His Nature ; and not by His Will.

Obj. 4. Further, a single effect has a single cause. But the cause of created things is the Knowledge of God, as said before (Q. XIV.). Therefore the Will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.

On the contrary, It is said, *How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not ?* (Wisdom xi. 26).

I answer that, We must hold that the Will of God is the cause of things ; and that He acts by the Will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His Nature.

This can be shown in three ways : First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as has been proved by the Philosopher, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect ; as, the mark and aim is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God comes first in the order of agents, He must act by His Intellect and His Will.

This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect ; for nature operates in one and the same way, unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent ; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature ; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and infinite in being. That this is impossible has been already shown (Q. VII.). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His own Will and Intellect.

Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. Effects proceed from the agent that causes them,

in so far as they pre-exist in the agent ; for every agent produces the like unto itself. Effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Since the Divine Being is His own Intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the Will of God is the cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely ; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain beings, but to all ; and as election implies the making distinction.

Reply Obj. 2. Because the Essence of God is His Intellect and Will, from the fact of His acting by His Essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of Intellect and Will.

Reply Obj. 3. Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, *Because God is good, we exist*, are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before.

Reply Obj. 4. Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is a cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. In God all these things are one.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE
WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that some cause can be assigned to the Divine will. For Augustine says, *Who would venture*

to say that God made all things irrationally? But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the Will of God has some cause.

Obj. 2. Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, but whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except the will of him who wills. But the Will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown. If, then, there is no cause of His Will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the Divine Will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the Divine Will.

Obj. 3. Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If the Will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His Will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected. But nothing is greater than the Will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.*

I answer that, In no wise has the Will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is a cause of the will in the person that wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.

Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. As God by one act understands all things in His Essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.

Reply Obj. 1. The Will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.

Reply Obj. 2. Since God wills effects to proceed from fixed causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the Divine Will. It would be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the Will of God. In this sense Augustine says: *Philosophers in their variety have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is above all others, the Will of God.*

Reply Obj. 3. Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the Will of God, but on something else besides. The first effect depends on the Divine Will alone, as, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man for His own pleasure or the completion of the universe. Which cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple Will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS ALWAYS FULFILLED ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says : *God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth* (1 Tim. ii. 4). But this does not happen. Therefore the Will of God is not always fulfilled.

Obj. 2. Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists ; for much more good might exist. Therefore the Will of God is not always fulfilled.

Obj. 3. Further, since the Will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by defect of a secondary cause ; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the Divine Will may be hindered by defect of the secondary causes. The Will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.

On the contrary, It is said : *God hath done all things, whatsoever He would* (Ps. cxiii. 3).

I answer that, The Will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this : that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. Though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. The same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause ; under which all particular causes are included. If any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. An

effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. It may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects ; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the primary heaven. Since, then, the Will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the Divine Will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the Divine Will in one order, returns into it in another order ; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the Divine Will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that Will, when by its justice he is punished.

Reply Obj. 1. The words of the Apostle, *God will have all men to be saved*, etc., can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says, *God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will.* Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class ; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to the Damascene, they are understood of the antecedent Will of God ; not of the consequent Will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the Divine Will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent ; but to the things willed. To understand which we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its strict sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstance is taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into its contrary. Thus that men should live is good ; and that men should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. If in a particular case it happens that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him becomes a good ; to let

him live an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

Reply Obj. 2. An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in him who knows it; while an act of the appetitive faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that has the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though not all being nor all truth exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.

Reply Obj. 3. A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the Will of God, as said before.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS MUTABLE?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the Will of God is mutable. For the Lord says: *It repenteth Me that I have made man*

(Gen. vi. 7). But whoever repents of what he has done, has a mutable will. Therefore God has a mutable Will.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said to Jeremias in the person of the Lord : *I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it ; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them* (Jer. xviii. 7, 8). Therefore God has a mutable Will.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a mutable Will.

Obj. 4. Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is mutable ; as that which can exist and not exist is mutable substantially ; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is mutable locally. Therefore God is mutable as regards His will.

On the contrary, It is said : *God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed* (Num. xxiii. 19).

I answer that, The Will of God is entirely immutable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing ; to will that a thing should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards ; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same. The will would be changed, if anyone should begin to will what before he had not willed ; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either on the part of knowledge ; or in the disposition of the substance of him who wills. Since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, which does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire ; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time

that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before. We take counsel for this reason, to know what is good for us. It has already been shown that both the Substance of God and His Knowledge are entirely immutable (QQ. IX. and XIV.). Therefore His Will must be entirely immutable.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and after the fashion of our own nature. When we repent of having made a thing, we destroy what we have made; although we may even destroy a thing without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, as His deed seems to represent Him doing; when by the Deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had made.

Reply Obj. 2. The Will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the Divine Power and Knowledge and Will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only at inferior causes might have said that Lazarus would not rise again; but looking at the Divine First Cause might have said that he would rise again. And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing should happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it should not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the Divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: *Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live* (Isa. xxxviii. 1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the Divine Knowledge and in the Divine Will, which is immutable. Hence Gregory says: *The sentence of God changes, but not*

His counsel—that is to say, the counsel of His Will. When therefore He says, ‘I also will repent,’ His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not fulfil what they have threatened.

Reply Obj. 3. It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.

Reply Obj. 4. Although God’s willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the immutability of the Divine Will, as has been said above (art. 3).

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IMPOSES NECESSITY ON THE THINGS WILLED ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says : *No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it ; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be.*

Obj. 2. Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says : *Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it.* But the Will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says : *Who resisteth His Will ?* (Rom. ix. 19). Therefore the Will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely ; as it is necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Things created by God are related to the Divine Will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true, that if God wills anything, it comes to pass. A conditional statement, if true, is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary absolutely.

On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be.

If therefore His Will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity ; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.

I answer that, The Divine Will imposes necessity on some things willed, but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary ; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.

This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. No defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's Will from producing its effect. Second, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the Divine intention and Will ; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the Divine Will. When a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the substance of the effect, but also as to its manner of being and of being made. From defect of active power in the seminal element it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since the Divine Will is perfectly efficacious, it not only follows that things are made that God wills to be made, but made also in the way that He wills. God wills some things to be made necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail ; but to others defectible and contingent causes ; from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God has prepared contingent causes for them, it being His Will that they should happen contingently.

Reply Obj. 1. By the words of Augustine we must under-

stand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. The conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.

Reply Obj. 2. From the very fact that nothing resists the Divine Will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His Will.

Reply Obj. 3. Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the Divine Will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD WILLS EVILS ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says : *Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but evil also.* Therefore God wills evil things.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says : *Evil conduces to the perfection of the universe as a whole.* And Augustine says : *Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good the more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil.* But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.

Obj. 3. Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist ; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's Will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *No wise man will be the author of evil in another man. But God is more excellent than all wise men. Much less therefore does God will evil in anyone. Yet He is the Author of all that is done in accordance with His Will.* It is not, therefore, by His Will that any man is evil. But those who do bad deeds are clearly made more evil thereby. Therefore God does not will evil.

I answer that, Since good is the object of the appetite, as said before (Q. V.), whereas evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought as an accidental object, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. A natural agent has not for his object privation or corruption, but a form annexed to which is the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. When a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. The evil, that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never would evil be sought after, not even as an accident, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness ; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the Divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment ; and willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.

Reply Obj. 1. Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be, or be done. This they said because things evil in them-

selves are ordered to some good end ; and this order they thought was expressed in the statement that it is good that evil should be or be done. This, however, is not correct ; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. It is beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin ; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from out of their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.

Reply Obj. 2. Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above. Therefore Dionysius in saying that *Evil conduces to the perfection of the universe*, draws a conclusion that points to the incongruity of evil.

Reply Obj. 3. The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories ; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed ; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to exist, nor wills it not to exist, but wills to permit evil ; and this is a good.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD HAS FREE WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God has not free will. For Jerome says, in the homily on the Prodigal Son : *God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable : all others, as having free will, can incline to either side.*

Obj. 2. Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will by which good and evil are chosen. God does not will evil, as has been said. Therefore there is not free will in God.

On the contrary, Ambrose says : *The Holy Spirit divideth*

unto each one as He wills, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity.

I answer that, We have free will with respect to what we do not will of necessity or by natural instinct. Our will to be happy does not appertain to free will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free will. Since God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above, He has free Will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.

Reply Obj. 1. Jerome seems to deny free Will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the evil of sin consists in its turning away from the Divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown, it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, where there is no question of sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF EXPRESSION ('VOLUNTAS SIGNI') IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the Will of God is the cause of things, so is His Wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the Divine Wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the Divine Will.

Obj. 2. Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the Divine Will are not in agreement with that Will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the Divine Will.

On the contrary, The Will of God is one, since it is the very Essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many,

as in the words of the Psalm : *Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills* (Ps. cx. 2). Therefore, sometimes the sign is taken for the will.

I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense ; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (Q. XIII.). When certain human passions are predicated of the Divinity metaphorically, they are so because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God ; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a Divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the Will of God, as in the words : *Thy Will be done on earth, as it is in heaven*. There is this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion ; whereas will is attributed properly to Him. Therefore in God there are distinguished Will in its proper sense, and Will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure ; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.

Reply Obj. 1. Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. We do not put into act what we know ; unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression (*signum*) is not attributed to knowledge ; but to will.

Reply Obj. 2. Expressions of will are called Divine Wills, not as being signs that God wills anything ; but because what in us are the usual expressions of our will, are called the Divine Wills in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God ; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FIVE EXPRESSIONS OF WILL ARE RIGHTLY
ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that five expressions of will—namely, *prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission*—are not rightly assigned to the Divine Will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.

Obj. 2. Further, God works nothing except as willing that thing, as the Scripture says (Wisdom xi. 26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.

Obj. 3. Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division ; not being of one order.

Obj. 4. Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since *good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways*, as is clear from the Philosopher, and from Dionysius. It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil—namely, prohibition—and two—namely, counsel and precept—in the case of good.

I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, either by doing something directly, or indirectly and as an accidental cause. He shows it directly when he works in his own person ; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering

the doing of a thing ; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary ; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the Divine Will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the Will of God is clear from the words of Scripture : *Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven.* That permission and operation are called the Will of God is clear from Augustine, who says : *Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it.*

Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary, and counsel to good that is of supererogation.

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways ; as we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is no reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel ; or of prohibition or permission.

Reply Obj. 2. As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His Will, properly speaking, He wills not ; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. Operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure ; but precept and counsel are not ; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the future ; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will ; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.

Reply Obj. 3. Rational creatures are masters of their own

acts ; and for this reason certain special expressions of the Divine Will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the Divine operation ; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.

Reply Obj. 4. All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the Divine Will. With regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. Good stands in various relations to the Divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept, and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining greater good ; but the avoiding lesser evils.

QUESTION XX.

THE LOVE OF [IN] GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the Will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude, and the like. Hence we shall first consider the Love of God, and secondly His Justice and Mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether love exists in God? (2) Whether He loves all things? (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another? (4) Whether He loves more the better things?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER LOVE EXISTS IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Love is a passion. Therefore love does not exist in God.

Obj. 2. Further, love, anger, sadness, and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sadness and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.

Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius says: *Love is the force that unites and binds together.* This cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.

On the contrary, John says: *God is love* (1 John iv. 16).

I answer that, Love must necessarily be in God. Love

is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. Since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: but, good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; as, for instance, joy is prior to sadness, love to hate. What exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. There are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delectation regard good present and possessed; but desire and hope good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetitive motions presuppose love, as their root and origin. Nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved; nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love. If the first source is wanting, all that would flow from it is also wanting. It has been shown that Will exists in God (Q. XIX.), and hence we must attribute love to Him.

Reply, Obj. 1. The cognoscitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive; as in ourselves the universal principle moves through the medium of the particular application, as has been said; so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the

heart, which, as the Philosopher says, is the first principle of motion in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions ; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delectation are passions, in so far as they denote acts of the sensitive appetite ; but in so far as they denote acts of the intellectual appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says : *God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple*, and on the same principle He loves without passion.

Reply Obj. 2. In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element—namely, the bodily change—and a certain formal element, with which the appetite is concerned. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says, the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart ; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of good not possessed, and in sadness, which is about evil suffered. This applies also to anger, which supposes sadness. Certain other passions, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore no acts can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said ; neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him ; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already shown (QQ. III. and XIX.). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before.

Reply Obj. 3. An act of love tends towards two things ; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it. To love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good ; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, though in Him it is not composite ; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself alone, who is good by His

own Essence, as above shown (Q. VI.). By the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a force binding together, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. In this sense even the Divine Love is an aggregative force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet as existing in God it is without composition.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius: *Love places the lover outside of himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love.* But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, love is twofold—the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows. Therefore God does not love all things.

Obj. 4. Further, it is said in the Psalms: *Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity* (Ps. v. 7). Nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.

On the contrary, It is said: *Thou lovest all things that are,*

and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made (Wisdom xi. 25).

I answer that, God loves all existing things. All existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, for the existence of a thing is itself a good ; and similarly, whatever perfection it possesses. It has been shown above (Q. XIX.) that God's Will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness ; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not. To this end we direct our actions. The love of God, however, infuses and creates goodness.

Reply Obj. 1. A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved ; and works for that good by his providence, even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says : *On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside of Himself by His providence for all existing things.*

Reply Obj. 2. Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures ; and for that reason has loved them, even as we know things existing in themselves by their similitudes within us.

Reply Obj. 3. Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes

of fortune and happiness. In the same way towards those alone can benevolence properly speaking be exercised. Irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His own goodness, and of the services they render to us. We can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.

Reply Obj. 4. Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence, and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS EQUALLY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: *He hath equally care of all* (Wisdom vi. 8). But God's Providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.

Obj. 2. Further, the love of God is His Essence. But God's Essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His Love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.

Obj. 3. Further, as God's Love extends to created things, so do His Knowledge and Will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor to will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *God loves all things that*

He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son ; and much more than all, His only-begotten Son Himself.

I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more or less intensely. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the Will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. Since God's Love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.

Reply Obj. 1. God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the Will, which is the Divine Essence. The good that God wills for His creatures, is not the Divine Essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.

Reply Obj. 3. To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less ; as has been said with respect to God's love.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD ALWAYS LOVES MORE THE BETTER THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and Man. But God

loved the human race more than He loved Christ ; for it is said : *He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all* (Rom. viii. 32). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 2. Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man : *Thou hast made him a little less than the angels* (Ps. viii. 6). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said : *Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold* (Heb. ii. 16). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 3. Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying : '*Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these ?*' Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, '*Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me ?*' *By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest.* Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 4. Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says, *a second plank after shipwreck*. But God loves the penitent more than the innocent ; for He rejoices over him the more. For it is said : *I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance* (Luke xv. 7). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 5. Further, the just foreknown (to be reprobate) is better than the sinner predestined to eternal life. God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

On the contrary, Everything loves what is like to itself, as appears from the words of Ecclesiasticus : *Every beast loveth its like* (Ecclus. xiii. 19). The better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.

I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things. For it has been shown that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing greater good. God's Will is the cause of goodness in things ; and for this reason some things are better than others, because God wills for them greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.

Reply Obj. 1. God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe. He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him 'a Name that is above all names,' in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race ; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror. For, as Isaias says : *The government was placed upon His shoulder* (Isa. ix. 6).

Reply Obj. 2. God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the Person of Christ more than He loves all the angels ; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of union with the Godhead. Speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory. It is said in the Apocalypse that the measure of a man and of an angel is the same (Apoc. xxi. 17). Nevertheless, even in this respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. Yet as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more ; but because the needs of man were greater ; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.

Reply Obj. 3. This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative, signified by John because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this

present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.

Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church. But that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervour; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and the more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since the Lord is the weigher of spirits (Prov. xvi. 2), and not another.

Reply Obj. 4. The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and the better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory says about those words that, *In battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed.*

Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in them-

selves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds (*marcæ*) are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.

Reply Obj. 5. Since God's Will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by the Divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the Divine Will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is the better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.

QUESTION XXI.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD.

(In Four Articles.)

AFTER considering the Divine Love, we must treat of God's Justice and Mercy. About this there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether there is Justice in God ? (2) Whether His Justice can be called Truth ? (3) Whether there is Mercy in God ? (4) Whether in every work of God there are Justice and Mercy ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS JUSTICE IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is not Justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God ; neither therefore does Justice.

Obj. 2. Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says : *God worketh all things according to the counsel of His Will* (Ephes. i. 11). Therefore Justice cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3. Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore Justice does not belong to God.

Obj. 4. Further, whatever is in God, is His Essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says : *Good regards the essence ; justice the act.* Therefore Justice does not belong to God.

On the contrary, It is said : *The Lord is just, and hath loved justice* (Ps. x. 8)

I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and the intercourse of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: *Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?* (Rom. xi. 35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As the proper order displayed in ruling a family or a people evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the Justice of God. Hence Dionysius says: *We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves the nature of each one in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it.*

Reply Obj. 1. Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence; fortitude with fear and daring; meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as above said (Q. XX.), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says, the subject of these virtues. Certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; which reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters; but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says, it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. Since good as perceived by the intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His Will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His Will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to

law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself.

Reply Obj. 3. To each one is due what is his own. Each one owns what is ordered to himself. Thus the servant belongs to the master, not the master to the servant, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is ordered. In things a twofold order has to be considered : the one, whereby one created thing is ordered to another, as the parts to the whole, accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end ; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the Divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, either as due to God, or to creatures ; and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His Will and Wisdom require ; and what manifests His goodness. In this respect God's Justice regards what befits Him ; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to created things that they should possess what is ordered to themselves ; as it is due to man to possess hands, and to command the service of other animals. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt is derived from the former ; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the disposition of the Divine Wisdom. Although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not ordered to other things ; but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness ; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says : *When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts ; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just ; since it befits Thy goodness.*

Reply Obj. 4. Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the Essence of God ; since even the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. Good does not

always regard act ; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said in the same place, that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE JUSTICE OF GOD IS TRUTH ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Justice of God is not Truth. For justice resides in the will ; since, as Anselm says, it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says. Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.

Obj. 2. Moreover, according to the Philosopher, truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.

On the contrary, It is said : *Mercy and truth have met each other* (Ps. lxxxiv. 11). Here truth stands for justice.

I answer that, Truth consists in the adequation of intellect and thing, as said above (Q. XVI.). That intellect, which is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure. The converse is the case with the intellect, which receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the intellect, truth consists in the adequation of the intellect to the thing, as happens in ourselves. According as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. When the intellect is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the adequation of the thing to the intellect ; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.

As works of art are related to the art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.

Reply Obj. 1. Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect ; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.

Reply Obj. 2. The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified ; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule ; as has been said regarding the truth of justice.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MERCY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sadness, as Damascene says. There is no sadness in God ; and therefore there is no Mercy in Him.

Obj. 2. Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His Justice. For it is said : *If we believe not, He continueth faithful : He cannot deny Himself* (2 Tim. ii. 13). But He would deny Himself, as the commentary says, if He should deny His words. Therefore Mercy does not belong to God.

On the contrary, It is said : *He is a merciful and gracious Lord* (Ps. cx. 4).

I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful (*misericors*), as being, so to speak, miserable at heart (*miserum cor*) ; being affected with sadness at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he works at dispelling the misery of this other, as if it were his ; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God ; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery ; whatever be the defect that we call by that name.

Defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness. The primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Q. VI.). It must be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the Divine goodness, but to justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (Q. VI.). In so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said. In so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality. In so far as perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.

Reply Obj. 2. God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His Justice, but by doing something more than justice; as though a man should pay to another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred. Clearly, such a man does nothing against justice, but only acts liberally and mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving, where he says: *Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you* (Eph. iv. 32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the plenitude thereof. And thus it is said: *Mercy exalteth itself above judgment* (Jas. ii. 13).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN EVERY WORK OF GOD THERE ARE JUSTICE
AND MERCY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that not in every work of God are justice and mercy. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the impious; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said:

Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy (Jas. ii. 13). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. xv.). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Obj. 3. Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world, which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Obj. 4. Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something on which to work. Creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.

On the contrary, It is said: *All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth* (Ps. xxiv. 10).

I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the Divine justice is either one due to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be passed over in any work of God. God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Similarly also, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion, wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. The work of Divine Justice always presupposes the work of Mercy; and is founded thereupon. Nothing is due to creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. To avoid an infinite series of causes, we must come down to something that depends only

on the goodness of the Divine Will—which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the Divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears Mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of the abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts. Less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the Divine goodness confers; since between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.

Reply Obj. 1. Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.

In the justification of the impious justice is seen, when God remits sins for the sake of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalene: *Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much* (Luke vii. 47).

Reply Obj. 2. God's Justice and Mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.

Reply Obj. 3. Justice and Mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are purged in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to which Gregory says: *The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God.*

Reply Obj. 4. Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe ; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation ; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the Divine Wisdom and Goodness. And the idea of Mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.

QUESTION XXII.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

HAVING considered all that relates solely to the Will, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the Intellect and the Will, namely Providence, in respect to all created things ; Predestination and Reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of Prudence, to which Providence would seem to belong. Concerning God's Providence there are four things to be inquired into : (1) Whether Providence is suitably assigned to God ? (2) Whether everything comes under Divine Providence ? (3) Whether Divine Providence is immediately concerned with all things ? (4) Whether Divine Providence imposes any necessity upon things thus provided ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROVIDENCE CAN SUITABLY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Providence cannot suitably be attributed to God. For Providence, according to Tully, is a part of Prudence. But Prudence, since, according to the Philosopher, it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, who never has any doubt whence He should take counsel. Therefore Providence cannot belong to God.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But Providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with the existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene. Therefore there can be no Providence in God.

Obj. 3. Further, there is nothing composite in God. But Providence seems to be something composite, because it contains under it both the intellect and the will. Therefore Providence cannot be attributed to God.

On the contrary, It is said in Wisdom: *Thou, Father, governeth all things by Providence* (Wisdom xiv. 3).

I answer that, It is necessary to attribute Providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (Q. VI.). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end, and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the Divine Goodness (Q. XXI.). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His Intellect, and thus it behoves that the idea of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before; it is necessary that the reason of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the Divine Mind. The reason of things ordered towards an end, however, is, properly speaking, *Providence*. For it is the chief part of *Prudence*, to which the other two parts are subjected—namely, remembrance of the past, and intelligence of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. It belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher, to order other things towards an end, whether in regard to oneself—as, for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life—or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city, or kingdom; in this way he is said to be a 'faithful and wise servant, whom his lord placed over his family.' In this way Prudence or Providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last

end of all. This reason of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called *Providence*. Whence Boethius says that *Providence is the Divine reason itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things*. Disposition may be said to be both the reason of the order of things towards an end, and the reason of the order of parts in the whole.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher, *Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'eubulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged*. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God, according to Ps. cxlviii. 6: *He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away*. In this manner both Prudence and Providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: *Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His Will* (Eph. i. 11).

Reply Obj. 2. Two things pertain to the care of Providence—namely, the *reason of order*, which is called Providence and disposition; and the *execution of order*, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal; and the second is temporal.

Reply Obj. 3. Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he wills that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the Divine Will and Intellect equally, this would not affect the Divine Simplicity, since in God both the Will and Intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above (Q. XIX.)

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERYTHING IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVIDENCE
OF GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject to Divine Providence. Nothing provided for can happen by chance. If everything was provided for by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear ; which is against common opinion.

Obj. 2. Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent ; or else He does not have care for everything.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher : *Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice.* Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to Providence.

Obj. 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God, in accordance with the words : *God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel* (Ecclus. xv. 14). And particularly in reference to the wicked : *I let them go according to the desires of their own heart* (Ps. lxxx. 13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to the Divine Providence.

Obj. 5. Further, the Apostle says : *God doth not care for oxen* (1 Cor. ix. 9). And we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of Divine Providence.

On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom : *She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly* (Wisdom viii. 1).

I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence

of Providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans ; laying it down that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to Providence, but corruptible things not in their individual selves, but only according to their species ; for in this respect they are incorruptible. Their views are thus expressed in the Book of Job (xxii. 14) : *The clouds are His covert ; and He doth not consider our things ; and He walketh about the poles of heaven.* Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from amongst things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.

We must say, however, that all things are subject to Divine Providence ; not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is clear ; for since every agent acts for an end, the arrangement of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to the constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles ; not only of things subject to corruption, but also of things not so subject. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end ; as the Apostle says : *Those that are, are ordained of God* (Rom. xiii. 1). Since, therefore, as the Providence of God is nothing less than the reason of the order of things towards an end, as we have said ; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate existence, must likewise be subject to Divine Providence. It has also been shown (Q. XIV.) that God knows all things ; both universal and particular. Since His Knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His plan ; as all things wrought by art are subject to the rule of that art.

Reply Obj. 1. There is a difference between universal and particular causes. For an event can happen which escapes the order of a particular cause ; but no such thing could possibly take place in reference to a universal cause. Nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause ; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning by the action of water. Since, then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause ; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. As, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent them to meet at the one place, whilst they remain ignorant of this fact.

Reply Obj. 2. We must speak in different terms of one who has care of a particular thing, and of one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can ; but one who is universal allows some little defect to remain, lest in removing it the whole plan should suffer. Hence, corruption and defects in the things of Nature around us are said to be contrary to some particular nature ; but they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature ; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good. For ' the corruption of one is the generation of another,' and through this it is that a *species* is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His Providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered. If all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals ; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus

Augustine says : *Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil.* It would appear that it was on account of these two reasons, which we have just given, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things—*e.g.*, casual and evil things—as removed from the care of Divine Providence.

Reply Obj. 3. Man did not make Nature ; but he uses in the performance of art and virtue the things of Nature. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in Nature from necessity ; but Divine Providence extends thus far, since God is the Author of Nature. From a motive of this kind those seemed to be moved who withdrew the course of Nature from the care of Divine Providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients.

Reply Obj. 4. When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from Divine Providence ; but merely that there is not given him an operating force determined to only the one effect ; as in the case of things in nature, which are made to act as though directed towards an end by a higher agent : and do not act of themselves, as if they knew and directed their action towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said : *In the hand of his own counsel.* But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to Divine Providence. For human providence is included under the Providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His Providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked ; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For *to those who love God, all things conspire unto good* (Rom. viii. 28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of guilt, He is said to abandon them ;

not that He altogether withdraws His Providence from them ; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His Providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who subtracted from the care of Divine Providence all those things concerning which we take counsel.

Reply Obj. 5. Since a rational creature has, through the possession of free will, control over its actions, as was said above (Q. XIX.), it is subject to Divine Providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit ; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God ; not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of Divine Providence ; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD HAS IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OVER EVERYTHING ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not immediately provide for everything. Whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a King, that he should have ministers ; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less does God Himself provide immediately for everything.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to Providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good ; every active cause therefore is a cause of the effect of Providence. If therefore God were to provide immediately for everything, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that, *It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them ;* for example, vile things. The same thing, the Philosopher says. But

all the better things must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.

On the contrary, It is said, *What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world He hath made?* (Job xxxiv. 13). On which passage Gregory says: *He Himself rules the world which He Himself hath made.*

I answer that, Two things belong to Providence; namely, the plan of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate provision over everything, because He has in His Intellect the plans of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the plan of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of Divine Providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa, is exploded. He taught a threefold Providence: First, one which belongs to the Supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second Providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third Providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us.

Reply Obj. 1. It pertains to a King's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, as it considers more closely the particular things in which an act consists.

Reply Obj. 2. God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (Q. XIX.).

Reply Obj. 3. It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot know many things simultaneously; and because thinking over things which are evil has a tendency to pervert the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose Will cannot ever turn in the direction of evil.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROVIDENCE IMPOSES ANY NECESSITY ON THINGS PROVIDED?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Divine Providence imposes necessity upon things provided. For every effect which has a direct cause (*per se*), either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves. But the Providence of God, since it is Eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for the Divine Providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore Divine Providence imposes a necessity upon things provided.

Obj. 2. Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.

Obj. 3. Further, Boethius says: *Fate from the immovable source of Providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connexion of causes.* It seems therefore that Providence imposes necessity upon things provided.

On the contrary, Dionysius says that, *to corrupt Nature is not the work of Providence.* But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine Providence does not

therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.

I answer that, Divine Providence imposes necessity upon some things ; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to Providence it belongs to order things towards an end. After the Divine Goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe ; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to Divine Providence to produce every grade of being. So it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity ; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the disposition of their proximate causes.

Reply Obj. 1. The effect of Divine Providence is not that things should happen anyhow ; but that they should happen either by necessity or contingency. Therefore whatsoever Divine Providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity ; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of Divine Providence conceives to happen from contingency.

Reply Obj. 2. The order of Divine Providence is immutable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.

Reply Obj. 3. That indissolubility and immutability of which Boethius speaks, pertains to the certainty of Providence, which fails not in producing its effect, and that in the way foreseen ; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that necessary and contingent properly belong to being, considered as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being ; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.

QUESTION XXIII.

OF PREDESTINATION.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

AFTER the consideration of Divine Providence, we must treat of Predestination and the Book of Life. There are eight points of inquiry on Predestination: (1) Whether Predestination is suitably attributed to God? (2) What is Predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined? (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men? (4) On the comparison of Predestination to Election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen? (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of Predestination, or Reprobation, or Election? (6) Of the certainty of Predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved? (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain? (8) Whether Predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the Saints?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE PREDESTINED BY GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that men are not predestined by God, for the Damascene says: *It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is within us, but does not predetermine it all.* But human merit and demerit are things within us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination does not hold.

Obj. 2. Further, all creatures are disposed towards their

end by Divine Providence, as was said above (Q. XXII.). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God ; therefore neither are men.

Obj. 3. Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But Predestination is not suitable to angels since in them there never was any unhappiness ; for Predestination, as Augustine says, is the ' decision to take pity.' Therefore men are not predestined.

Obj. 4. Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men : *Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God : that we may know the things that are given us by God* (1 Cor. ii. 12). Therefore if man were predestined by God, since Predestination is a benefit from God, His Predestination would be made known to each predestined ; which is clearly false.

On the contrary, Whom He predestined, them He also called (Rom. viii. 30).

I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. All things are subject to His Providence, as was shown above (Q. XXII.). It belongs to Providence, however, to dispose things towards their end, as was also said. The end towards which created things are disposed by God is twofold ; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature ; and this end is Life Eternal, consisting in the beatific Vision, which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (Q. XII.). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its individual nature. To that, however, to which a thing cannot attain by the power of its own nature, it must be directed by another ; thus, an arrow is shot by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, as it were, directed by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God ; as in Him is the plan of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be Providence. The plan of something to be done, existing in the mind of the doer, is a

certain pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the plan of the above-mentioned direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called *Predestination*. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that Predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of Providence.

Reply Obj. 1. The Damascene calls Predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from what follows : *He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.* Whence Predestination is not excluded by him.

Reply Obj. 2. Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined ; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.

Reply Obj. 3. Predestination belongs to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not get its species from the term *whence* (*a quo*), but from the term *whereto* (*ad quem*). For it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow, or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of Predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy ; as was shown previously (Q. XXI.).

Reply Obj. 4. Even if by a special privilege to some, their Predestination were revealed, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone ; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair ; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PREDESTINATION PLACES ANYTHING IN THE
PREDESTINED ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself

(*ex se*) causes passion. If therefore Predestination is action in God, Predestination must be passion in the predestined.

Obj. 2. Further, Origen says on the text, *He who was predestined*, etc. (Rom. i. 4) : *Predestination is of something which does not actually exist ; destination of something that already exists.* But Augustine says : *What is Predestination but the destination of something that exists?* Therefore Predestination is only of something which exists ; and it thus places something in the predestined.

Obj. 3. Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But Predestination is the Preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says. Therefore, Predestination places something in the predestined.

Obj. 4. Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of Eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of Predestination. For Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present ; and of glory in the future. Therefore, Predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God ; for whatever is in Him is Eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *Predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits.* But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, Predestination is in the person who predestines, and not in the predestined.

I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined ; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that Predestination is a part of Providence. Providence, however, is not anything in the things provided for ; but is a plan in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (Q. XXII.). But the execution of Providence, which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that Predestination is a kind of plan of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the Divine Mind. The execution, however, of this order is

in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of Predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle: *Whom He predestined, them He also called; and those He called, them also He justified* (Rom. viii. 30).

Reply Obj. 1. Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves (*ex se*) passion—e.g., the actions of warming and cutting; but not so with actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (QQ. XIV. and XVIII.). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them.

Reply Obj. 2. Destination is accepted sometimes as a real mission of something to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of something actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person considers in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we have firmly established in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar *determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life* (2 Mac. vi. 20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed of a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way its destination (or determination) is accepted.

Reply Obj. 3. Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion; and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent, to action, and this is in the agent; which preparation is Predestination, as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestinating, conceiving the idea of the order of some men towards salvation.

Reply Obj. 4. Grace does not come into the definition of Predestination, as something belonging to its essence; but inasmuch as Predestination implies a relation

to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that Predestination is anything temporal.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD REPROBATES ANY MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man ; according to the wise man : *Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made* (Wisdom xi. 25). Therefore God reprobates no man.

Obj. 2. Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobate as Predestination has to the predestined. But Predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this is false. For it is said : *Perdition, O Israel, is thy own ; from Me only comes thy help* (Osee xiii. 9). God does not, then, reprobate any man.

Obj. 3. Further, to no one ought anything to be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said : *Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised* (Eccl. vii. 14). Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.

On the contrary, It is said : *I have loved Jacob, but I have hated Esau* (Mal. i. 2, 3).

I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it is said above that Predestination is a part of Providence. To Providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to Providence, as was said above (Q. XXII.). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the Providence of God, it likewise is part of that Providence to permit some to fall

away from that end; this is called Reprobation. Thus, as Predestination is a part of Providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so Reprobation is a part of Providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence Reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also an additional aspect, as does Providence, as was said above (Q. XXII.). Therefore, as Predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also Reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.

Reply Obj. 1. God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them.

Reply Obj. 2. Reprobation acts quite differently in its causality from Predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true—namely, *Perdition, O Israel, is thy own.*

Reply Obj. 3. Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility; but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Q. XIX.), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet by a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PREDESTINED ARE CHOSEN BY GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says : *As the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all impartially, so does God His goodness.* But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory ; and this belongs to Predestination.

Obj. 2. Further, election is of things that exist. But Predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore some are predestined without election.

Obj. 3. Further, election implies some discrimination. *God wills all men to be saved,* as the Apostle tells us (1 Tim. ii. 4). Therefore, Predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.

On the contrary, It is said : *He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world* (Ephes. i. 4).

I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason ; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that Predestination, as was said above, is a part of Providence. Providence, however, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the order of some things towards an end ; as was proved above (Q. XXII.). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the Predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation ; and to this belong both election and love : love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation : for to love is to wish well to anyone, as was said above (Q. XX.). Election is presupposed, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others ; since He reprobates some, as was proved above. Election and love, however, are differently constituted in God, and in ourselves ; because in

us the will in loving does not cause good ; but we are incited to love by the good which already exists ; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is just the reverse. For His Will, by which, in loving, He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes Predestination. Whence all the predestinate are chosen and loved.

Reply Obj. 1. If the communication of the Divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election ; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Q. VI.). But if the communication of this or that particular good be considered, He does not allot it without election ; since He gives certain good to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory is implied election.

Reply Obj. 2. When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise ; as was said above (Q. XX.). Thus, as Augustine says : *Those are chosen by God, who do not exist ; yet He does not err in His choice.*

Reply Obj. 3. God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is not to will absolutely (*simpliciter*), but relatively (*secundum quid*) ; but not by His consequent will, which is to will absolutely (*simpliciter*).

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF MERITS IS THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of Predestination. For the Apostle says : *Whom He foreknew, those also He predestined* (Rom. viii. 29). And

again in Ambrose's gloss upon, *I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy* (Rom. ix. 15), he says : *I will give mercy to him, whom I foresee will turn to Me with his whole heart.* Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of Predestination.

Obj. 2. Further, Divine Predestination includes the Divine Will, which by no means can be irrational ; since Predestination is *the determination to have mercy*, as Augustine says. But there can be no other reason for Predestination except the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause or reason of Predestination.

Obj. 3. Further, *There is no injustice in God* (Rom. ix. 14). Injustice, however, is when unequal rewards are given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin ; inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal futures for men by predestinating and reprobating ; unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.

On the contrary, The Apostle says : *Not from the works of justice which we have done, but according to His great mercy has He saved us* (Titus iii. 5). But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of Predestination.

I answer that, Since Predestination includes the will, as was said above, the reason of Predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the Will of God. It was shown above (Q. XIX.), that we cannot assign any cause of the Divine Will on the part of the act of willing ; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed ; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Nobody would be so absurd as to say that merit is the cause of Divine Predestination as regards the act of the Predestinator. But this is the question, Whether, as regards the effect, Predestination has any cause ; or what comes to the same thing, whether God preordained that He would give the effect of Predestination to anyone on account of merits ?

There were some who held that the effect of Predestination was preordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning ; and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united to the body. This opinion is contrary to the word of the Apostle : *For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said to her : the elder shall serve the younger* (Rom. ix. 11, 12).

Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of Predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us ; the consummation, however, from God. Thus it came about, they said, that the effect of Predestination was granted to one, and not to another ; because the one made a start by preparing, whereas the other did not. This also is contrary to the Apostle : *That we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves* (2 Cor. iii. 5). But no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Whence it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of Predestination. And so others said that merits following the effect of Predestination are the reason of Predestination ; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and preordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these persons seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace. and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of Predestination ; and this cannot be considered as the reason of Predestination, since it is contained in the notion of Predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of Predestination, this will be outside the effect of Predestination. There is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of Predestination ; as there is no distinction between what

flows from a secondary cause and a first cause. The Providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (Q. XXII.). Whence, that which flows from free will is also of Predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of Predestination may be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of Predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect of a previous effect, as regards the final cause; and the previous of those that follow, as regards the meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter; as if we were to say that God preordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He preordained to give grace to merit the glory. The effect of Predestination may be considered in another light, in general (*in communi*). Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of Predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, it is all included under the effect of Predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by Divine help, according to the Prophet Jeremias: *Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.* Yet Predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of Predestination is ordained as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.

Reply Obj. 1. The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 3. The reason for the Predestination of some, and Reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the Divine goodness might be represented in things. It is necessary that the Divine goodness, which

in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Q. XXII.). Let us now consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some; and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying: *What if God, willing to show His wrath (that is, the vengeance of His Justice), and to make His power known, endured (that is, permitted) with such patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory* (Rom. ix. 22, 23). He also says: *But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and earth; and some, indeed, unto honour, but some unto dishonour* (2 Tim. ii. 20). Why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason; except the Divine Will. Whence Augustine says: *Why He draws one, and another He does not draw, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to fall into error.* Also in the things of Nature, a reason can be assigned, since *primary matter* is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of Nature. Why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple Will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place,

and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of Predestination was granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: *Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?* (Matt. xx. 14, 15).

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS CERTAIN ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Predestination is not certain. Because on the words *Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown* (Apoc. iii. 11), Augustine says, *Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it.* So the crown which is the effect of Predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore Predestination cannot be certain.

Obj. 2. Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined—*e.g.*, Peter—may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of Predestination would be thwarted. This, then, is not impossible. Therefore Predestination is not certain.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine. Therefore Predestination is not certain.

On the contrary, the gloss of Augustine on, *Whom He foreknew, them also He predestined*, says: *Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which most certainly those will be freed who are freed.*

I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, namely, that its effect should take place from necessity. For it was

said above, that Predestination is a part of Providence. But not all things subject to Providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the condition of the proximate causes, which Divine Providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of Providence is infallible, as was shown above (Q. XXII.). So also the order of Predestination is certain; yet free will is not destroyed; whence the effect of Predestination takes place from contingency. All that has been said about the Divine Knowledge and Will (QQ. XIV. and XIX.) must also be taken into consideration; since they likewise do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible.

Reply Obj. 1. The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; one, by God's Predestination, and thus no one loses his crown; another way by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours. Thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to Job: *He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead* (Job xxxiv. 24). Thus in the place of the fallen angels men are established; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that he will rejoice, in eternal life at the good the fallen has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.

Reply Obj. 2. Although it is possible for one predestinated to die in mortal sin, if we merely consider this fact in itself; yet it is not possible, if the condition be placed that he is predestined. Whence it does not follow that Predestination can fall short of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3. Since Predestination includes the Divine Will: as the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the Divine Will, but is not necessary absolutely—(*i.e.*, apart from such supposition); so the same

thing must be said of Predestination. Whence one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a concrete sense, though, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of Predestination is not destroyed.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED IS CERTAIN ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. A number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But to the number of the predestined there can be an addition, as it seems ; for on the words *The Lord God adds to this number many thousands* (Deut. i. 11), the gloss adds, *fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him.* Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.

Obj. 2. Further, no reason can be assigned why God preordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved preordained by God cannot be certain.

Obj. 3. Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things ; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. This is contrary to the text, *For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life ; and few there are who find it!* (Matt. vii. 13, 14). Therefore the number of those preordained by God to be saved is not certain.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished.*

I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain.

Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however this or that individual. This, however, destroys the certainty of Predestination; of which we spoke above in the last article. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not only by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are known for certain by God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the Infinite (Q. VII.). Whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are absolutely required for the perfection of the whole. He does not select any definite number of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and the roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. He preordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and how many would be the essential parts befitting that universe—that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the

good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the number of all individuals; the number of oxen, flies, and such-like, is not pre-ordained by God directly; but Divine Providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Amongst all His creatures those are chiefly ordained for the good of the universe which possess reason, and as such they are incorruptible; more especially those who are to attain to eternal happiness; since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certainly fixed by God; not only by reason of His knowledge, but by reason of His previous principal determination. It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be preordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard *all things conspire to good* (Rom. viii. 28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, however, so many as there were angels left; others, in fine, so many as the number of angels who fell, added to that of all the angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, *To God alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness*, as the prayer for the living and dead expresses it.

Reply Obj. 1. The word of God in Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to justice in this life. Their number is always being increased and diminished; but not the number of the predestined.

Reply Obj. 2. The extent of the quantity of any one particular part must be judged from the proportion of that part to the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 3. The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and

is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are called madmen or fools; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since eternal happiness, consisting in the Vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as it is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, the fewer will be saved. In this, however, appears the mercy of God that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PREDESTINATION CAN BE FURTHERED BY THE PRAYERS OF THE SAINTS?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the Saints. Nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But Predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the Saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination is not therefore furthered by the prayers of the Saints.

Obj. 2. Further, as advice is not needed except on account of defective knowledge, so help is not needed except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: *Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord, or hath been His counsellor?* (Rom. xi. 34). Therefore Predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the Saints.

Obj. 3. Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But Predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.

On the contrary, It is said that *Isaac besought the Lord*

for his wife because she was barren ; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive (Gen. xxv. 21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and was predestined. Now his Predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore Predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the Saints.

I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of Divine Predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation ; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.

Others declared that the Divine Predestination was altered through prayer. This was supposed to be the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the Divine ordination, which they called Fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said : *But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance* (1 Kings xv. 29) ; *and the gifts and calling of God are without repentance* (Rom. xi. 29).

Thus we must say otherwise, that in Predestination two things are to be considered—namely, the Divine Pre-ordination ; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can Predestination be furthered by the prayers of the Saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, Predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the Saints, and by other good works ; because Providence, of which Predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes, but so provides for effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under Providence. So, as natural effects are provided for by God in such a way that natural causes are provided to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen ; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way,

that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of Predestination ; whether it be one's own prayers, or those of another ; or other good works, and such-like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, those predestined must strive to pray well and do good works ; because through these means Predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said : *Wherefore, brethren, labour the more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election* (2 Pet. i. 10).

Reply Obj. 1. This argument only shows that Predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the Saints, as regards the Preordination.

Reply Obj. 2. One is said to be helped by another in two ways ; in one way, inasmuch as he receives certain power from him : and thus the weak are helped ; but this cannot be said of God, and thus is interpreted, *Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord ?* In another way one is said to be helped by a person, through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us ; inasmuch as we execute His orders according to the Apostle : *We are the helpers of God* (1 Cor. iii. 9). But this does not arise from any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe ; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.

Reply Obj. 3. Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (Q. XIX.), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore Predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.

QUESTION XXIV.

THE BOOK OF LIFE.

(In Three Articles.)

WE now discuss the Book of Life ; concerning which there are three points of inquiry : (1) What is the Book of Life ? (2) Of what life is it the book ? (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the Book of Life ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BOOK OF LIFE IS THE SAME AS
PREDESTINATION ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Book of Life is not the same thing as Predestination. For it is said, *All these things are the Book of Life* (Ecclus. xxiv. 32)—*i.e.* (the gloss), the Old and New Testament. This, however, is not Predestination. Therefore the Book of Life is not Predestination.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says that, *The Book of Life is a certain Divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory.* But Divine energy does not belong to Predestination ; but rather to Divine Power. Therefore the Book of Life is not the same thing as Predestination.

Obj. 3. Further, Reprobation is opposed to Predestination. So, if the Book of Life were the same as Predestination ; there should also be a Book of Death ; as there is a Book of Life.

On the contrary, It is said in the gloss upon Ps. lxxviii. 29, *Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, That book is the*

Knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew.

*I answer that, 'Book of Life' is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For there is a custom amongst men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called *Conscript* Fathers. It is clear from the preceding (Q. XXIII.) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is called the Book of Life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to Proverbs (iii. 1, 3): *Forget not my law, and let thy heart keep my commandments, and further on, Write them on the tablets of thy heart.* For things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the 'Book of Life.' For as the writing in a book is the sign of things known, so the knowledge of God is a certain sign in him of those whom he intends to lead towards eternal life, according to the Apostle: *But the sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His* (2 Tim. ii. 19).*

Reply Obj. 1. The Book of Life may be understood in two senses: in one sense as the conscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of the Book of Life. In another sense, the conscription of those things which lead us to life, may be called the Book of Life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testaments are called a Book of Life; or of things already done, and thus that Divine energy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the Book of Life. As that also may be called the Book of War, in which are written down either those chosen for military service; or which treats of the art of warfare, or in which are recounted the deeds of soldiers.

HENCE THE SOLUTION OF THE SECOND OBJECTION IS CLEAR.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not the custom to inscribe those who may be rejected, but only those who are chosen. Whence there is no Book of Death corresponding to Reprobation ; as the Book of Life to Predestination.

Reply Obj. 4. Predestination and the Book of Life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of Predestination ; as also is made clear from the gloss adduced.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BOOK OF LIFE ONLY REGARDS THE LIFE OF GLORY OF THE PREDESTINED ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Book of Life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the Book of Life is the knowledge of Life. But God, through His own Life, knows all other life. Therefore the Book of Life is so called in regard to Divine Life ; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.

Obj. 2. Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the Book of Life ; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.

Obj. 3. Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory ; as is clear from what is said : *Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?* (John vi. 71). But the Book of Life is the inscription of the Divine Election, as was said in the preceding article. Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.

On the contrary, The Book of Life is the knowledge of Predestination, as was said in the preceding article. But Predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is ordered to glory ; for those are not predestined who have grace, and yet fall short of glory. The Book of Life therefore is only so called in regard to the life of glory.

I answer that, The Book of Life, as was shown in the preceding article, implies a conscription or a knowledge of

those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not naturally belong to him; and again that to which a man is chosen has the nature of an end. A soldier is not inscribed or chosen merely to put on armour, but to fight; this is the express duty to which the whole military service is ordered. The life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above (Q. XXIII.). Whence, strictly speaking, the Book of Life only regards the life of glory.

Reply Obj. 1. Divine Life, even the life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no Book of Life. We do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that follow on nature.

Reply Obj. 2, is seen from the answer given above. For there is no election, nor a book of life as regards the life of nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The life of grace has not the nature of an end; but the nature of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is ordered to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fall from glory, are not said to be chosen absolutely (*simpliciter*), but only relatively (*secundum quid*). Likewise they are not said to be written in the Book of Life absolutely, but only relatively; that is to say, that in the ordination and knowledge of God it happens that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYONE MAY BE BLOTTED OUT OF THE BOOK OF LIFE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that no one may be blotted out of the Book of Life. For Augustine says: *God's foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the Book of Life.* But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God; neither

from Predestination. Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the Book of Life.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is in a thing, is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the Book of Life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is therein written, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably and indelibly.

Obj. 3. Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be a second time written in the Book of Life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out.

On the contrary, It is said, *Let them be blotted out from the book of the living* (Ps. lxxviii. 29).

I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the Book of Life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the Book of Life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present justice they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that state of justice, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus the gloss explains the passage: *Let them be blotted out of the book of the living.* But because not to be blotted out of the Book of Life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, *He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life* (Apoc. iii. 5) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the Book of Life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the Book of Life is the registering of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is ordained from two sources; namely, from Predestination, and this ordination never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This ordination fails sometimes; because some are ordained by possessing grace to eternal life, yet fall from that grace through

mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through Divine Predestination are written down in the Book of Life absolutely (*simpliciter*), because they are written therein to have eternal life itself ; such are never blotted out from the Book of Life. Those who are ordained to eternal life, not through the Divine Predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the Book of Life not absolutely (*simpliciter*), but relatively (*secundum quid*), for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. But though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the Book of Life, this process of blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not ; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained, since he falls from grace.

Reply Obj. 1. The act of blotting out does not refer to the Book of Life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change ; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.

Reply Obj. 2. Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting-out of the Book of Life refers.

Reply Obj. 3. The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the Book of Life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew ; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace ; which also is included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.

QUESTION XXV.

THE POWER OF GOD.

(*In Six Articles.*)

AFTER the consideration of the Divine foreknowledge and Will, and other things pertaining thereto, there remains to be considered the Power of God. About this are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is Power in God? (2) Whether His Power is infinite? (3) Whether He is Almighty? (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been? (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does? (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS POWER IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Power is not in God. For as primary matter is to Power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent—namely, God—is devoid of power.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher: *Than every power, its act is better.* For form is better than matter; and action than active potentiality; for it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above (Q. III.). Therefore, there is no power in God.

Obj. 3. Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the Divine Power is God's Essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and of the Essence of God there is

no principle. Therefore, the notion of power cannot be attributed to God.

Obj. 4. Further, it was shown above (QQ. XIV. and XIX.) that God's Knowledge and Will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign to God Power; but only Knowledge and Will.

On the contrary, It is said: *Thou art powerful, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee* (Ps. lxxxviii. 9).

I answer that, Power is twofold—namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. It is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of anything. But everything suffers according as it is deficient and imperfect. It was shown above (QQ. III. and IV.) that God is the Pure Act, absolutely and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. The nature of active principle fits in well with an active potency. For active potency is the principle of acting upon something else; passive potentiality, however, is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher remarks. It remains, therefore, that in God above all there is active power in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1. Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it; for everything acts according as it is actual (*in actu*); but passive potentiality is contrary to act; for a thing is acted upon according as it is in potentiality. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power.

Reply Obj. 2. Whenever act is something else than potentiality, act must be nobler than potentiality. But God's action is not different from His power, for both are His Divine Essence; neither is His Existence different from His Essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God nobler than His Power.

Reply Obj. 3. In creatures, power is not only the principle of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of

power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect ; not, however, as it is a principle of action ; for this is the Divine Essence itself. Unless, perchance, after a manner of understanding ; inasmuch as the Divine Essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action, or under that of power ; as also it is understood under the notion of a subject (*suppositum*) possessing nature, and under that of nature itself.

Reply Obj. 4. Power is not predicated of God as something really differing from His Knowledge and Will, but differing only in our notion of them ; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, all of which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the Knowledge or Divine Will, according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the Knowledge and Will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE POWER OF GOD IS INFINITE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is, according to the Philosopher, imperfect. But the Power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.

Obj. 2. Further, all power is made known by its effect ; otherwise it would be of no use. If, then, the Power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect ; but this is impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher proves that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would move instantaneously. God, however, does not move in an instant, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, as Augustine remarks. Therefore, His Power is not infinite.

On the contrary, Hilary says that *God's power is immense. He is the living mighty One.* Everything that is immense, however, is infinite. Therefore the Power of God is infinite.

I answer that, As was said in the preceding article, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual (*actu*). His Existence, however, is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the Divine Essence (Q. VII.). Whence, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that according as an agent has the form by which it acts more perfectly, so is its power in acting greater. For instance, the warmer a thing is, the greater power has it to give warmth; and it would have infinite power to give warmth, were its own warmth infinite. Whence, since the Divine Essence itself, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (Q. VII.), it follows that His Power likewise is infinite.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinitude in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the Divine Essence is far otherwise; as was shown above (Q. VII.); so also His Power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.

Reply Obj. 2. The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. It is eminently clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (QQ. III. and IV.). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite Power of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the Power of God would not be

useless ; because a thing is useless which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the Power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end ; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher is here proving that if a body had infinite power, it would move without time. Yet he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because He can move in an infinity of time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that the power of an infinite body if such existed would move without time (*non tempus*), not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent ; whence it is proper that the whole of the power of the agent should be made known in motion. So, because by how much the power of a moving body is greater, by so much the more quickly does it move ; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without *time*. An incorporeal mover is not a univocal agent ; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time ; and especially when, it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS OMNIPOTENT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not omnipotent. For to be moved, and to suffer, belongs to everything. But this is impossible with God. For He is immovable, as was said above (Q. II.). Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Obj. 2. Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor contradict Himself, as it is said 2 Tim. ii. 13. Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Obj. 3. Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence *especially by sparing and having mercy*. The greatest act of the Divine Power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and

having mercy ; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

Obj. 4. Further, upon the text, *Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world ?* (1 Cor. i. 20), the gloss says : *God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish, by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible.* Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them ; but in reference to the Divine Power. If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible ; nothing, therefore, impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary ; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things, if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

On the contrary, It is said : *No word shall be impossible with God* (Luke i. 37).

I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent ; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists : for there may be a doubt as to the precise meaning of the word "all" when we say that God can do all things. If we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, *God can do all things*, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible ; and in this respect He is omnipotent. According to the Philosopher, a thing is said to be possible in two ways ; in regard to some power, as whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. God cannot be said to be omnipotent merely because He can do all things that are possible to created nature ; for the Divine Power extends much farther. If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His Power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His Power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do.

It remains, therefore, that God is called omnipotent

because He can do all things that are possible, absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, when regard is had only to the terms. It is absolutely possible, because the predicate is not repugnant to the subject, as that Socrates should sit; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether repugnant to the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey. It must be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to everything that is capable of being warmed. The Divine Existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of an entity, is numbered among the absolutely possible things; and it is in respect of these that God is called omnipotent. Nothing is opposed to the idea of entity except nonentity; that, therefore, is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, coming within the scope of the Divine Omnipotence, which implies existence and non-existence at the same time. For such cannot come under the Divine Omnipotence, not because of any defect in the Power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of Divine Omnipotence, because it cannot have the nature of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the Angel, saying: *No word shall be impossible with God.* For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be true; because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.

Reply Obj. 1. God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above. Whence the fact that He cannot be moved or suffer is not repugnant to His Omnipotence.

Reply Obj. 2. To sin is to fall short of a perfect action ; hence the power to sin is the power to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His Omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says that *God can deliberately do what is evil.* This must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible—as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He willed. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible : as if one were to say : *If man is a donkey, he has four feet.* Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil : which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.

Reply Obj. 3. God's Omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has the greatest power, when He freely forgives sins. It is not the privilege of one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good ; which is the farthest effect of the Divine Power. Or because, as was said above (Q. XXI.), the effect of the Divine Mercy is the foundation of all His Divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the Divine Omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.

Reply Obj. 4. The absolute possible is not so called in reference to secondary causes, nor to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. The possible in reference to some power

is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Whence those things the doing of which belongs to God alone—as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like, are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency, or necessity, as was shown above (Q. XIV.). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the Omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN MAKE THE PAST NOT TO EXIST ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God can make the past not to have existed. For what is impossible in itself (*per se*) is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally (*per accidens*). But God can do what is impossible *per se*, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible *per accidens*. But for the past not to have been is impossible *per accidens*. For Socrates not to run is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have existed.

Obj. 2. Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His Power is not lessened at all. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.

Obj. 3. Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost ; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.

On the contrary, Jerome says : *Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted.* Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.

I answer that, As was said above (Q. VII.), there does not fall under the scope of God's Omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. That the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting; so does it to say that he did sit, and did not sit. To say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of Divine Power. This is what Augustine means when he says : *Whosoever says, If God is Almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done;* does not see that this is the same thing as ; *If God is Almighty, let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be in fact false.* The Philosopher says : *Of this one thing alone is God deprived—namely, to make undone the things that have been done.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although it is impossible, *per accidens*, for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only *per se*, but absolutely implying a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because it is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of Divine Power.

Reply Obj. 2. As God, in accordance with this perfection of the Divine Power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His Power, because they fall short of being possible; so also, if we regard the immutability of the Divine Power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall

short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.

Reply Obj. 3. God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen ; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her ; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or of having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN DO WHAT HE DOES NOT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do what He does not. God cannot do what He has not foreknown and preordained that He would do. But He did not foreknow nor preordain that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.

Obj. 2. Further, God can only do what He ought to do, and what is right to be done. But God ought not to do what He does not ; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what he does.

Obj. 3. Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting than to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.

On the contrary, It is said : *Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of Angels ?* (Matt. xxvi. 53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.

I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from the necessity of His Nature, in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place,—as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive ; so from the Divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of

things, than that which now is. We showed above (Q. XIX.) that God does not act from the necessity of His Nature, but that His Will is the cause of all things; nor is that Will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present series of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the Divine Power is restricted to this present series of things through the order of the Divine Wisdom and Justice, without which God does nothing. But since the Power of God, which is His Essence, is nothing else but His Wisdom, it can conveniently be said that there is nothing in the Divine Power which is not in strict order with the Divine Wisdom; for the Divine Wisdom includes the whole potency of the Divine Power. Yet the order placed in creation by Divine Wisdom, in which the notion of His justice consists, as said above (Q. XXI.), is not so adequate to the Divine Wisdom that the Divine Wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. It is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is influenced by their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. The Divine Goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the Divine Wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other series of things could happen. Whence we must say absolutely that God can do other things than those He has done.

Reply Obj. 1. In ourselves, in whom power and essence are quite distinct from will and intellect, and intellect again from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, His power and Essence, His Will and Intellect, His Wisdom and Justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the Divine Power which cannot also be in His just Will or in His wise Intellect. Nevertheless, because His Will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon sup-

position, as was said above (Q. XIX.), neither are the Wisdom and Justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above ; so there is nothing to prevent there being something in the Divine Power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has placed in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, the intellect and wisdom as directing ; what is attributed to His Power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute Power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of an entity, as was said above. What is, however, attributed to the Divine Power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just Will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary Power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute Power than those He has foreknown and preordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not preordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and preordination, though His power, which is His Nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do ; yet the power to do them does not come from His Will, but from His Nature.

Reply Obj. 2. God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words *befitting* and *just* may be understood in two ways : one, in direct connection with the verb *is* ; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things ; and would concern His Power. Then what is said in the objection is false ; for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb *can* (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with *is*, the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in

this sense : *God cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just.*

Reply Obj. 3. Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the Divine Power and Wisdom is not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now exist, yet God can do quite other things and impose upon them another order.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN MAKE BETTER WHAT HE HAS MADE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God could not make better those things He has made. For whatever God does, He does in a most wise and powerful way. But a thing is so much the better made as it is made more wisely and powerfully. Therefore God cannot make anything better than He has made it.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine thus argues : *If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious.* For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But there is no envy in God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does.

Obj. 3. Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered ; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says : *All things that God has made are good, and, viewed universally, very good ; because in them all, consists the beauty of the whole universe.* Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.

Obj. 4. Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit in no restricted measure ; and so He cannot be better. Created happiness is said to be the highest created good, and thus could not be better. The Blessed Virgin Mary is above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made.

On the contrary, It is said : God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand (Eph. iii. 20).

I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold ; one, which is of the essence of it—as, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is in itself ; although He can make another thing better than it. As He cannot make the number four greater than it is ; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of the substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity in numbers. Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence ; as of a man to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make things better than they are. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.

Reply Obj. 1. When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if 'better' is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something better than what actually exists. Moreover, He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not ; as was explained in the body of this article. If, however, 'better' is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making ; thus God cannot make anything better than He has made it, because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. If, however, it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better ; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents ; not as regards the substance.

Reply Obj. 2. It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence there is not the same line of argument.

Reply Obj. 3. The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God ; in which the good of the

universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed ; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. God could make other things, or add something to the present creation ; and then there would be another and a better universe.

Reply Obj. 4. The Humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead ; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God ; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that She is the Mother of God ; have all a certain infinite dignity from the Infinite Good, who is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these ; just as there cannot be anything better than God

QUESTION XXVI.

THE DIVINE BEATITUDE.

(In Four Articles.)

AFTER considering all that pertains to the unity of the Divine Essence, we lastly treat of the Divine Beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Beatitude belongs to God? (2) In what manner is God called Blessed; does this regard His act of Intellect? (3) Whether He is essentially the Beatitude of each of the blessed? (4) Whether all other Beatitude is included in the Divine Beatitude?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER BEATITUDE BELONGS TO GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Beatitude does not belong to God. For Beatitude according to Boethius, *is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things.* But aggregation of goods has no place in God; as neither has composition. Therefore Beatitude does not belong to God.

Obj. 2. Further, Beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher. But reward belongs not to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does Beatitude.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: *Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords* (1 Tim. vi. 15).

I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual

nature ; the privilege of which it is to realize its sufficiency in the good which it possesses ; and to which good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. Both of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence Beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1. Aggregation of good is in God ; not after the manner of composition, but of simplicity ; for those things which in creatures are manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (QQ. IV. and XIII.), in simplicity and unity.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs as an accident to Beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to Beatitude, just as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has Being, though not begotten ; so He has Beatitude, although not acquired by merit.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS CALLED BLESSED AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not called Blessed as regards His Intellect. For Beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His Essence, because good has reference to existence which is according to essence, as Boethius remarks. Therefore Beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His Essence ; and not to His Intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. End, however, is the object of the will ; as is also good. Therefore Beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His Will, and not with reference to His Intellect.

On the contrary, Gregory says : *He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise.* To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect of our intellect, because 'vision' is 'the whole of the reward,' as Augustine says, the conclusion

is that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His Intellect.

I answer that, Beatitude, as was said in the preceding article, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. That which is most perfect in an intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. In God Existence and Intelligence are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His Intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blessed (*beati*) by reason of our assimilation to His Beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument proves that Beatitude belongs to God in regard to His Essence; not that Beatitude pertains to Him by reason of His Essence; but rather by reason of His Intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. Since Beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; but the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in the manner of understanding, Divine Beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus Beatitude is to be found in an act of the Intellect.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE BEATITUDE OF EACH OF THE BLESSED?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is the Beatitude of each of the Blessed. For God is the Highest Good, as was said above (Q. VI.). But it is quite impossible that there should be many highest goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (Q. XI.). Therefore, since it is of the essence of Beatitude that it should be the highest good, it seems that Beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, Beatitude is the last end of rational nature. But to be the last end of rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the Beatitude of every Blessed is God alone.

On the contrary, The Beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to the Apostle: *Star differeth from star in glory* (1 Cor. xv. 41). But nothing is greater than God. Therefore Beatitude is something different from God.

I answer that, The Beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself, which is to understand. If, then, Beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only Beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine: *Blessed is he who knows Thee, even if he knows nothing else.* But as regards the act of understanding, Beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.

Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude, as regards its object, is the highest good absolutely; but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their highest good, not in an absolute sense, but in the genus of goods in which a creature can participate.

Reply Obj. 2. End is twofold; namely, *cujus* and *quo*, as the Philosopher says, namely, the *thing itself* and *its use*. Thus the end to a miser is money and its acquisition. God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL OTHER BEATITUDE IS INCLUDED IN THE
BEATITUDE OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the Divine Beatitude does not embrace all other Beatitudes. For there are some false

Beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the Divine Beatitude does not embrace all other Beatitudes.

Obj. 2. Further, a certain Beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal ; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. None of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His Beatitude does not embrace all other Beatitudes.


On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the Divine Perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (Q. IV.). Therefore the Divine Beatitude embraces all other Beatitudes.

I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever Beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in an eminent degree in the Divine Beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else ; as to that which is active, he has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in pleasure, riches, power, dignity, and fame, He possesses, according to Boethius, Joy in Himself and all things else, for His delectation ; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches ; in place of power, He has Omnipotence ; for dignities, the government of all things ; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true Beatitude ; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of Beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the Divine Beatitude.

Reply Obj. 2. The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God ; but in a spiritual manner.

Let this suffice concerning what pertains to the Unity of the Divine Essence.



Summa theologica.

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